University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers

1-1-1994

Negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords: A case study in
conflict termination.
John Robert Nicholson
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
Nicholson, John Robert, "Negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords: A case study in conflict termination."
(1994). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 6917.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6917

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only,
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution,
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.

8*1

National Library
of Canada

Bibliotheque nationate
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa. Ontario
K1A0N4

395. rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A0N4
hit'

ft*

v»*

NOTICE

AVIS

The quality of this microform is
heavily dependent upon the
quality of the original thesis
submitted
for
microfilming.
Every effort has been made to
ensure the highest quality of
reproduction possible.

La qualite de cette microforme
depend grandement de la qualite
de
la
these
soumise
au
microfilm age. Nous avons tout
fait pour assurer une qualite
superieure de reproduction.

If pages are missing, contact the
university which granted the
degree.

S’i! manque des pages, veuillez
communiquer avec I’universite
qui a confere le grade.

Some pages may have indistinct
print especially if the original
pages were typed with a poor
typewriter ribbon or if the
university sent us an inferior
photocopy.

La qualite d’impression de
certaines pages peut laisser a
desirer, surtout si les pages
originates
ont
ete
dactylographies a I’aide d’un
ruban use ou si I’universite nous
a fait parvenir une photocopie de
qualite inferieure.

Reproduction in full or in part of
this microform is governed by
the Canadian Copyright Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and
subsequent amendments.

La reproduction, meme partielle,
de cette microforme est soumise
a la Loi canadienne sur le droit
d’auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et
ses amendements subsequents.

Canada
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

NEGOTIATING THE 1973 PARIS PERCE ACCORDS:
A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT TERMINATION

/
by
J . Robert Nicholson

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1994
(c) 1994 J . Robert Nicholson

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

B^ •

National Library
of Canada

Biblioth^que nalionale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa. Ontario

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)

K1A0N4

K1A0N4
YcK-f r * r

W cfte r * V f r * w

The author has granted an
irrevocable non-exclusive licence
allowing the National Library of
Canada to reproduce, loan,
distribute or sell copies of
his/her thesis by any means and
in any form or format, making
this thesis available to interested
persons.

L’auteur a accorde une licence
irrevocable et non exclusive
permettant a la Bibiiotheque
nationale
du
Canada
de
reproduire, preter, distribuer ou
vendre des copies de sa these
de quelque maniere et sous
quelque forme que ce soit pour
mettre des exemplaires de cette
these a la disposition des
personnes interessees.

The author retains ownership of
the copyright in his/her thesis.
Neither the thesis nor substantial
extracts from it may be printed or
otherwise reproduced without
his/her permission.

L’auteur conserve la propriete du
droit d’auteur qui protege sa
these. Ni la these ni des extraits
substantiels
de celle-ci
ne
doivent
etre
imprimes
ou
autrement reproduits sans son
autorisation.

ISBN

0 -3 1 5 -9 3 2 9 8 -8

Canada
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Nam e
Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most
nearly describes the content o f your dissertation. Enter the corresponding Four-digit code in the spaces provided.

W.V\t\c-wA ^ c\^ut

rTfcra^ r^\

SUBJECT TERM

IOIU \M U'M'I
SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUM ANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS
Architecture .............................. 0 72 9
A rtH iito ry ........................
.0 3 7 7
G n *m a
..
0 90 0
Donee
.....................................0378
Fine A m ........................................ 0 35 7
Jnformohon Science .................... 0723
kxjrnoltsm ....................
0 39 9
lib ra ry S cience ...................
M as* Communications..................G708
M uvc ..... ..................................... 0413
Speech Com m unication............... 0 45 9
Theater ...........................................0465

Psychology....................
0 52 5
Reading' ...................................... 0 53 5
0 52 7
Religious.............
Sciences..........................................0 71 4
0533
Secondary..........................
Social Science*
.......................0 53 4
Sociology o f ...............
0 34 0
................................. 0 52 9
0391S p e c ia l
Teochef T ra in in g ..........................0 5 3 0
Technology.....................
0710
Test* ana M easurement*..............0 2 8 8
V ocational...................................... 0 7 4 7

EDUCATION
General ..........................................0 51 5
A d m in istra tio n ...............................0514
A dult and C on tin u in g ................... 0516
Agricultural ... ..
0517
A r t ................................................... 0273
Bilinguol and M u lticultural...........0282
B u u n c is ..........................
0688
Community C olleg e
. 0275
Curriculum and Instruction
0 72 7
Early C hildhood ........................... 0518
Elem entary.....................................0 52 4
Finance...........................................0 27 7
Guidance and C ounseling
0 51 9
H e a lth ................................
0 68 0
Higher .........................
0 74 5
History o f ....
... ... ...0 5 2 0
Homo E co n om ic*
0 27 8
In d u strial...................................
0521
lanauogc and lite ra tu re .............. 0279
M a tn e m o lic*
......................... 0280
M u iic ........................................... 0522
Philo>ophy o f ..........
0998
Physical...........................................0 5 2 3

LANGUAGE LITERATURE AND
LINGUISTICS
language
G e n e ra l.........................
0 67 9
A n cie n t
...................
0 28 9
0 29 0
lin g u istics .................
M o d e rn ....................................0291
literature
G e n e ro l
............................0401
C lassicol...................................0 29 4
C om parative........................... 0 29 5
M c d ie v o l................................. 0 2 9 7
M o d e m .............................
0 29 8
A fric a n ..................................... 0 3 1 6
Am erican................................. 0591
A s ia n ....................................... 0 3 0 5
Canadian (English)................ 0 35 2
Canadian (F re n ch)................ 0 35 5
English .......................
0 59 3
G e rm a n ic ................... ........... 0 3 H
la tin American ...................... 0 31 2
M iddle Eastern........................0 31 5
R om ance................................. 0 31 3
Slavic and East European. .0 3 1 4

PHILOSOPHY, REUGION AND
THEOLOGY
Philosophy...............
0422
Religion
G e n e ra l........................
0318
Biblical Studies........................0321
C le rg y ...................................... 0 31 9
History o f
...........
0 32 0
.............. 0 32 2
Philosophy o f
Theology..........................
0 46 9

SOCIAL SCIENCES
Am erican Studies.......................... 0 32 3
A nthropology
A rc h a e o lo g y........................... 0 32 4
Cultural . 7 . .............................. 0 3 2 6
..................... 0 3 2 7
Physical
Business Administration
G e n e ra l ............................... 0 31 0
A c c o u n tin g .............................. 0 27 2
B a n kin g .................................... 0 77 0
M a na g e m en t........................ 0 45 4
' M a rk e tin g
..................0 33 8
C onodion S tu d ies......................... 0 38 5
Economics
G e n e ra l
........................ 0501
A g ric u ltu ra l..............................0 50 3
Commerce-Business............... 0 50 5
F in an ce
................ 0 50 8
H istory...................................... 0 5 0 9
l a b o r .......................................0 5 1 0
T heory.......................................0511
Folklore ........................................035 8
G e o g rap h y
.............
0 36 6
G e ro n to lo g y
........................ 0351
History
G e n e ra l.................................... 0578

A n cie n t
............
0579
Medieval ............................... 0581
M o d e m ...................................0582
B lo c k ........................................ 0328
A fric a n ................................. 0331
Asia, Australia and O ceania 0332
C anadian ... .......................... 0 33 4
European
......................0 3 3 5
Latin Am erican ...........
0 33 6
M iddle Eastern
........... 0 33 3
United States ..............
0 33 7
History o f 5cience . .......................0 585
la w ................................................. 0398
Politico! Science
G e n e ra l...................................0 61 5
International la w and
• Relations
.............
0 61 6
Public A d m in istra tio n
.0 6 1 7
Recreation......................... ...... .. 0 81 4
Social W o rk ................................ 0 4 5 2
Sociology
G e n e ra l ...........................
0 62 6
Crim inology a nd Penology ... 0 62 7
D em ography
.................0 93 8
Ethnic a nd Kociol Studies ... .0631
Individual and Family
Studies
......................062 8
Industrial and v oor
Relations
!.>.................... 0 6 2 9
Public e nd Social W e lfa re . 0 63 0
Social Structure and
Development.,
......
0 70 0
Theory and M ethods.............. 0 3 4 4
T ransportation............................... 0 70 9
Urban and Regional Planning , 0 99 9
W om en's S tu d ies..........................0 4 5 3

THE SCIENCES A N D ENGINEERING
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Agriculture
G e n e ro l...........................
0473
A g ro n o m y ...............................0 26 5
Anim al Culture and
N u tritio n ...............................0 47 5
Anim al Pathology................... 0 47 6
Food Science and
Technology .......................0 35 9
Forestry o na W ild life ............. 0 47 8
Plant C u ltu re ........................... 0 4 7 9
Plant P a th o lo g y......................0 4 8 0
Plant P hysiology..................... 0 8 17
Ronge M anagem ent
........ 0 77 7
W o o d Technology..................074 6
^ C m n e r o l....................................030 6
A n c lo m y ................................. 028 7
Biostalistics..............................030S
B otany...................................... 0 30 9
C o ll........................................... 037 9
E c o lo g y....................................0 32 9
Entom ology............................ 0 35 3
G e n e tics.................................. 036 9
lim n o lo g y ................................ 0 79 3
M ic ro b io lo g y .......................... 041 0
M o le c u la r................................ 0 3 0 7
N euroscience.......................... 0 3 1 7
O ceanography........................0 41 6
Physiology
........................0433
R ad ia tion
.......................... 0821
Veterinary Science..................0778
Z o o lo g y .................................... 0 47 2
Biophysics
G e n e ra l.................................. 0 78 6
M e d ic a l.................................... 0 76 0

EARTH SCIENCES
Biogeochemistry.............................042 5
Geochemistry ................................ 0 996

Geodesy
..........
0370
G e o lo g y.......................
0372
G e o p hysics...............
0 37 3
H yd ro lo g y...................................... 0 38 8
M ine ra lo g y ..................................... 0 4 1 1
Paleobotany
..........................0 34 5
Paleoecology................................. 0 4 2 6
Paleontology
..............
0 41 8
P o lco too log y.........................
0985
P a lyn o log y..................................... 0 4 2 7
Physical G e o g ra p h y ..................... 0 36 8
Physical O ceanography ............. 0 41 5

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCES
Environmental Sciences............... 0 76 8
Health Sciences
G e n e ral....................................0 5 6 6
A u d io lg g y................................ 0 3 0 0
C hem otherapy...................... 0 9 9 2
D entistry
................... 0 5 6 7
Educotton................................ 0 3 5 0
Hospital M onogcm cnt............0 7 6 9
Human D evelopm ent.............0 7 5 8
Im m unology.............................0 98 2
Medicine a nd S u rg e ry
0 56 4
Mental H e a lth .........................0 34 7
N u rs in g .................................... 0 56 9
N u tritio n ...................................0 57 0
Obstetrics and Gynecology ..0 3 8 0
Occupational Health ana
Th e rap y................................ 0 3 5 4
O p h th a lm o log y
......... 0381
P a th o lo g y................................ 0571
Phorm ocology.........................0 4 1 9
Pharm ocy................................ 0 5 7 2
rnysira
Public H e a lth ...:...................... 0 5 7 3
R odiotogy................................ 0 57 4
Recreation............................... 0 57 5

Speech Pathology...................0 46 0
T o x iro lo g y ............................... 0 38 3
Home Econom ics.......................... 0 38 6

PHYSICAL SCIENCES
Pare Sciences
Chemistry
General ...................................0 48 5
A gricultural.
........................0 74 9
A n a ly tic a l................................ 0 48 6
B iochem istry............................0 48 7
In o rg a n ic ....................
0 48 8
N u c le a r.................................... 0 73 8
O rg a n ic .................................... 0 49 0
Pharmoceutical........................0491
Physical.................................... 0 4 9 4
P olym er.................................... 0 4 9 5
R adiation................................. 0 75 4
M athem atics
...............
0 40 5
Physics
G e n e ra l ............................... 0 60 5
Acoustics..................................0 98 6
Astronomy and
Astrophysics......................... 0 6 0 6
Atmospheric Science.............. 0 60 8
A to m ic ..................................... 074 8
Electronics and E lectricity
0 60 7
Elementary Porticles ana
High E nergy......................... 079 8
F lu ia a n d Plasm a.................... 075 9
M o le c u la r................................ 0 6 0 9
0610
N u c le a r........................
O p tic s .......................................0 7 5 2
P o d ic tio n ..................................0 75 6
Solid S ta le ............................... 0611
Statistics.......................................... 0 46 3

Applied Sciences
Applied M echa n ics.......................0 34 6
Computer Science......................... 0 98 4

Engineering
G e n e ra l
..................... 0 53 7
A erosp a ce ............................0 53 8
A g ric u ltu ra l.............................. 0 5 3 9
A u to m o tiv e .............................. 0 54 0
Biom edical .......................... 0541
C h e m ic a l..................................0 54 2
C iv il..................................
0543
Electronics a nd E lectrical
0544
Heat and Thermodynamics .. .0 3 4 8
H y d ra u lic ..................................0545
Industrial ..................................0 54 6
M a r in e ..................................... 0 54 7
M aterials S cience................... 0 79 4
M e cha n ical......................
0 54 8
M e ta llu rg y ............................... 0 74 3
M ining ..................................... 0551
N u c le a r.................................... 0 55 2
Packaging ............................... 0 5 4 9
P etroleum .................................0 76 5
Sanitary and M u n ic ip a l
0 55 4
System Science........................ 0 79 0
G eole ch n alo g y.............................. 0 42 8
Operations Research.................... 0 79 6
Plastics Te ch n olo gy.......................0 79 5
Textile Technology......................... 0 9 9 4

PSYCHOLOGY
G e n e ro l.......................................... 0621
B ehavioral.......................................0 3 8 4
C lin ic a l............................................0 62 2
D evelopm ental............................... 0 62 0
E xperim ental..................................0 62 3
In d u strial......................................... 0 6 2 4
Personality.......................................0 6 2 5
P hysiologicol..................................0 9 8 9
P sychobiology............................... 0 34 9
Psychometrics.................
0 63 2
S o c ia l..............................................0451

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPROVED BY:

j\

/f..
Bruce Burton, Chair

E.D. Briggs, Folo&fc^l Science

I.C. Pemberton, History

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

When Richard Nixon took the oath of office as the thirtyseventh President of the United States on January 20, 1969,
his Administration faced a foreign policy disaster in Vietnam.
President Nixon, as well as his National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger, recognized that American disengagement from
Vietnam was of the highest strategic priority.

As long as the

United States remained involved in the quagmire of Vietnam,
the country could not exercise its role as the leader of the
West on the world stage.

Vital foreign policy matters, such

as Soviet-American detente and Sino-American rapprochement,
would remain atrophied.

Thus, all ranking members of the

Nixon Administration realized that a successful conclusion of
the

Paris

Peace

Talks

had

to

be

Washington's

principal

concern.
The purpose of this study is to provide a critical
analysis of the Paris Peace Talks and the dynamics that led to
the settlement of the Paris Peace Accords.

Two hypotheses

will be put forward and addressed: Only a fundamental shift in
the negotiating position of Hanoi by October of 1972 allowed
the Paris Peace Talks to be eventually settled in January of
1973, and second, the Nixon administration was compelled to
accept

a

settlement because

of

strong

domestic

anti-war

sentiment, especially in the Congress and business community.
In order to address the two key hypotheses that are central to
•

•

*

in.
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this study, an analytical framework will be put forward.
In

the

demonstrated

literature
that

there

review,
is

no

it

will

existing

be

clearly

comprehensive

analytical framework to address a topic of such importance.
Instead, most of the literature was found to focus on the
foreign policy process which led the United States into the
quagmire of Vietnam, the actual progress of the war itself
once the huge American military build-up began in 1965, and
the nature and internal dynamics of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam(DRV).

So, an analytical framework will be created

using the theoretical works on conflict resolution.
Three dominant themes can be found in the theoretical
literature on conflict resolution.
stalemate/military
instability,

reversal,

and the

These themes, military

the

threat

three

study, the

factors,

domestic

international balance of power,

directly applicable to the Paris Peace Talks.
these

of

to

two hypotheses

be

called

will

be

are

By reference to

"catalysts"

addressed.

in
The

this
three

catalysts will also address four inter-related questions that
are directly related to the hypotheses: What were the factors
that led the respective parties to enter into the Paris Peace
Talks in November of 1968, and subsequently, to conclude the
Paris Peace Accords in. January of 1973?; Why did the Paris
Peace Talks drag on for so long? Why did the United States
accept a peace settlement which from the Perspective of South
Vietnamese President Thieu(1967-1975)

was not in Saigon's

iv.
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interests?,

and

settlement

that

finally,

Why

apparently

did

Hanoi

thwarted

its

accept
two

a

peace

long-term

objectives: reunification of Vietnam and Vietnamese hegemony
in South-East Asia?
These vital issues will be addressed by applying the
analytical framework to four "historical snapshots." These
four snapshots have been isolated because their influence on
the Paris Peace Talks was vital.

The four snapshots are as

follows: the Communist Tet Offensive, the decision made by
President Johnson to begin deescalation of the war by entering
into peace talks in March of 1968, the American and South
Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and Laos in April of 1970
and February of 1971, respectively, and the North Vietnamese
Nguyen

Hue

Offensive

of

March

of

1972.

The

framework

developed for this study will succeed in clarifying many of
the most controversial aspects of the Second Vietnam War in
general and the Paris Peace Talks in particular.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I:
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS OF 1973 AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

On January 27, 1973, American Secretary of State William
P. Rogers and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy
Trinh signed the Agreement for Ending the War and Restoring
the Peace in Vietnam.1
Accords

in

that

year

The conclusion of the Paris Peace
would

herald

the

involvement in the quagmire of Vietnam.

end

of

American

For the first time

since 1956, American advisors would not be in the field with
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) . Yet, in no sense,
had the United States "abandoned" South Vietnam.

Instead, the

Nixon Administration had successfully disengaged the United
States from the conflict, but just as importantly, had allowed
the Republic of Vietnam to remain in a relatively advantageous
military position against the People's Army of Vietnam(PAVN).
President Richard Nixon had kept his promise to the American
people, made in 1969, to achieve an "honourable peace."
When Richard Milhous Nixon(1913-1994) took the oath of
office as the thirty-seventh President of the United States on
January 20,

1969, his new administration faced a foreign

1 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston:Little,
Brown, and Company, 1978), p.1476.
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policy disaster in Vietnam.

The complexity of the foreign

policy debacle inherited by the Nixon Administration was as
serious as any problem encountered by anv administration in
this century.

Prior to the end of World War Two, a clear

tenet of American strategy had developed:
attrition on the Asian mainland.

avoid a war of

This strategic point of view

was most strongly expounded by General of the Army George C.
Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the United States Army in World
War Two, and as Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949.2
To General Marshall, American strategy in the Pacific,
both during and after World War Two, had to be based on the
concept of mobility, provided by overwhelming American air and
naval strength.3

A strategy of encirclement would not only

succeed in isolating strategic strong points, but would also
provide the initiative to the United States, both tactically
and strategically.

By contrast, Marshall believed that a war

on the Asian mainland could not possibly safeguard American
interests.

Instead,

the United States would find itself

waging a war of attrition with tenuous supply lines.
Marshall's assessment of American strategic requirements
in the Pacific\Asia would profoundly influence the post-1945
administrations of Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) and Dwight D.

2 Clay Blair, The Korean War: America's Forgotten War. (New
York: Anchor Press, 1984), p.78.
3 Ibid.
\
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Eisenhower (1953-1961).

Perhaps Marshall's role in shaping

American strategy reached its climax in 1948, when he served
as Secretary of State.
Administration

was

In the autumn of 1948, the Truman

being

vehemently

berated

for

not

intervening in the Chinese civil war on behalf of Chiang Kaishek's Nationalists.

If Truman had been seen to "be soft on

Communism," his political career would have certainly ended.
Such influential Republican Senators as Robert Taft were
openly calling for American military intervention in China, a
theme also adopted by such popular periodicals as Time.4
Truman could only ignore this pressure at his political peril.
Yet, George C. Marshall would counter the interventionist
diatribes of Senator Taft with a cold analysis of strategic
reality.

Unless the United States was willing to countenance

the use of nuclear weapons, the Communist victory could not be
averted.

Marshall would declare:

"We must not get sucked

ini"5 President Truman would wisely follow this advice, which
had the support of Secretary of Defence James V.Forrestal and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Marshall's strategic doctrine would influence American
policy-makers long after he left public office.
to

limit the war

in Korea

(1950-1953)

The decisions

and to refuse to

intervene at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 were a legacy of the policy

4 Ibid.
5 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. (New York:
Random House, 1972), p.141.
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of this sagacious man.

Every American President from Franklin

Roosevelt to Dwight Eisenhower was aware of the futility of a
war on the Asian mainland and these men did everything in
their power to avoid such a war*

In fact, one can argue that

the avoidance of a land war in Asia had become a central tenet
of American strategic policy by 1961.
Nonetheless, when Richard Nixon entered office in 1969,
the United States was engaged in a full-scale Asian land war!
The warnings from Secretary of State Marshall and retired army
officers, such as General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and
General Matthew B. Ridgway had been essentially ignored by the
Democratic Administrations of John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and
Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969).

For President Johnson, and to

a lesser extent President Kennedy,

concern over "another

Korea" was tempered by an erroneous perception of a communist
monolith,

directed

from

Beijing,

that threatened Western

interests in East Asia, in general, and South-East Asia in
particular.

To President Johnson and his senior civilian

advisors, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, and National
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, South Vietnam became a test
of American resolve to resist "Communist aggression."

The

erroneous appraisal of the international situation that was
held by the Johnson Administration was best expounded by the
President himself:

"If we don't

stop

the Reds

in South

Vietnam, tomorrow they will be in Hawaii, and next they will

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5.

be in San Francisco.1,6
Therefore, in retrospect, the Johnson Administration’s
fallacious analysis of the international situation would lead
to the worst foreign policy debacle for the United States this
century.

Yet, Richard Nixon must have appeared to be the

wrong man in the White House in 1969 to end the war in
Vietnam.

During the 1950s, Nixon, then Vice-President, had

been one of the most ardent of the Cold War warriors.

In the

1952 Presidential campaign, for example, Nixon referred to the
State Department as the Dean Acheson College for the Cowardly
Containment

of

Communism.7

Nixon

would

perhaps

best

demonstrate his hawkish views in 1960 when he stressed the
strategic importance of defending the Nationalist off-shore
islands of Matsu and Quemoy against the People's Republic of
China (PRC).8
Yet, these same qualities would actually help Richard
Nixon in his efforts to conclude the Paris Peace Talks.
was above all a consummate politician.

Nixon

He recognized that it

was the Vietnam War that had destroyed the Presidency of
Lyndon Johnson, elected in 1964 with a historic 61 percent of
the popular vote.

Nixon, who had endured many travails in his

political career, was determined not to repeat the tragedy of
6 John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage.
(Guildford, Connecticutt: Lushkin Publishing, 1993),
p.25.
7 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.95.
8 Ibid.
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Lyndon Johnson.

The United States had to negotiate a "peace

with honour" to the war in Vietnam.
In addition, despite all his other weaknesses, Nixon had
a realistic appraisal of the international situation.

Unlike

his immediate predecessors, he recognized that there was no
Communist monolith directed from Moscow or Beijing.
the Socialist bloc was seriously divided.

Instead,

If there ever had

been a "Moscov-Beijing Axis," it had certainly been shattered
by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU), Nikita Khrushchev, with the decision to recall
Soviet

economic advisors and to refuse to share nuclear

technology with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in I960.9
During the 1960s, the schism between Moscow and Beijing would
worsen, due to differences in ideology and national interests,
to the point of corps-sized clashes between the PLA and the
Red Army along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers.

Nixon recognized

that dissension in the Socialist bloc could help facilitate a
settlement to the war in Vietnam.
Thus, Richard Nixon, along with his National Security
Advisor,

Henry Kissinger,

would successfully conclude the

Paris Peace Talks by using a combination of military pressure
and the "China Card."

In January of 1973,

the American

Secretary of State signed an agreement that allowed the United
States to extricate itself from a war that did not serve its

9 Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emoerors: China in the Era
of Mao and Pena. (New York: Avon, 1992), p.209.
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national interests.

However, the Paris Peace Accords also

provided a chance for an independent South Vietnam, despite
the fact that the regime in Saigon was not at all pleased with
the settlement.

The problem was that American attention, and

thus military power, was diverted from South-East Asia by the
devastating impact of Watergate.

As noted by both Nixon and

Kissinger in various works, the Paris Peace Accords were far
from perfect, but American military might would act as the
lynchpin that would safeguard the peace.
The successful conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords
in January of 1973 represented a partial victory for Hanoi as
well.

Since

constantly

1946,

at

war

the
to

Vietnamese
achieve

their

Communists
ultimate

had
goal:

been
the

reunification of an independent Vietnam. This noble goal had
apparently been achieved when the French Army suffered a
disastrous rout at Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954. Yet, Vietnam
would not be reunited by the Geneva Accords of 1954. Ho Chi
Minh found himself under great pressure from Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to make
huge concessions. The most important of these was the division
of Vietnam at the 17th parallel with national elections to be
held in 1956. These nation-wide elections would never be held
because of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal
to

participate,

a

position

backed

by

the

Eisenhower

Administration.
By January of 1959, the Central Committee of the Lao
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Dong Party called for armed insurrection in the South. This
decision resulted in the Kennedy Administration’s commitment
of almost 16,000 advisors by November of 1963. By the summer
of 1965, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam(DRV) was in effect
at war not only with the Republic of Vietnam, but also the
United States. As long as the American people were willing to
support a major war effort in South-East Asia, it was unlikely
that Vietnam would be reunified.
Thus, it was in this context

that the Paris Peace

Accords represented a victory for Hanoi. One of the central
purposes of the Paris Peace Accords, as noted by both Richard
Nixon and Henry Kissinger, was to allow the United States to
disengage itself from direct combat in Vietnam. For Hanoi, the
Accords represented a drastic American retrenchment in SouthEast Asia. American ground troops were finally withdrawn and,
perhaps most importantly, the punishing airstrikes against
North Vietnam were finally brought to a halt.
good reason to doubt that American

Hanoinow had

airpower would ever be

decisive in the future conflict because of war-weariness in
the United States and the actions being taken by the Congress
to limit the President’s scope ofaction
military force, best exemplified by

in the

use

of

the War Powers Act

of

1973.
The purpose of this introductory discussion has been to
outline the complexity of the situation
Vietnam upon his inauguration.

facing Nixon

in

If the Vietnam War was a
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quagmire for the United States, then the Paris Peace Accords
must be considered one of the great American diplomatic
triumphs since the Korean War.
the

successful

conclusion

As noted by Henry Kissinger,
of

the

Paris

Peace

Talks

demonstrated that the United States was still capable of
decisive action on the world stage.10

No less critical, the

United States was now free to exert its influence in areas of
real strategic importance, such as the Middle East.
For the reasons outlined in the above discussion, the
Paris Peace Accords must be considered one of the great
achievements of American foreign policy.

The purpose of this

thesis will be to determine and analyze the major factors that
led to a successful resolution of the Paris Peace Talks.

That

outcome will be studied by addressing four questions that are
very much inter-related: What were the factors that led the
respective parties to enter into the Paris Peace Talks in
November of 1968, and eventually, to conclude the Paris Peace
Accords in January of 1973?; Why did the Paris Peace Talks
drag on for so long?; Why did the United States accept a peace
settlement that,

from the perspective of South Vietnamese

President Nguyen Van Thieu(1967-1975), was not in Saigon’s
interests?,

and

finally,

Why

did

Hanoi

accept

a

peace

settlement that apparently did not promote its two ultimate
objectives: the reunification of Vietnam and the establishment
of Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina?
10 Kissinger, White House Years, p.1436.
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In the course of addressing these four questions, two
central hypotheses will also be tested. The first will be that
a settlement of the Paris Peace Talks was only possible after
a

fundamental

shift

had

taken

strategy of the North Vietnamese
1972.

place

in the

negotiating

Politburo by October of

Only in the wake of the serious failure of the 1972

Nguyen Hue Offensive did North Vietnam accept peace terms in
1973 that had been essentially available in 1970. The second
key

hypothesis

to

be

tested

will

be

that

the

Nixon

Administration was likewise under pressure to conclude the
Paris Peace Talks because of the continued anti-war sentiment
in the country, especially in the Congress and the business
community.

A

review

of

the

relevant

theoretical

and

substantive literature reveals three dominant themes, each of
which individually helps to explain why the two principal
parties were finally able to reach a settlement in January of
1973.

However,

nowhere

were

these

themes,

to

be

called

"catalysts" in this study, developed within a comprehensive
framework.

The specific contribution of this thesis to the

literature on the Second Vietnam War will be to provide

a

comprehensive systematic framework within which to analyze the
process and factors that led to a settlement of the conflict.
The
military

first catalyst or theme to be analyzed will be
defeat\military

stalemate.

This

catalyst

is

introduced in Getting to the Table by Janice Gross stein,
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although she uses the term "trigger.1,11

Despite the fact

that Stein's book deals with the process of prenegotiation,
the concept is nonetheless relevant to the present study for
two reasons.

First, the thesis will explore the factors that

motivated Lyndon Johnson to announce that he would not run for
a second term,

to declare a bombing halt above the 20th

parallel in the DRV, and to announce that the United States
was prepared to enter in peace talks with Hanoi, all of which
were announced by Mr. Johnson in a national television address
on March 31, 1968.

Second, the thesis will argue that if

reverses on the battlefield can lead to prenegotiations, then
a major battlefield reversal may lead to an actual settlement.
In Getting to the Table. Stein recognizes the importance
of

military

stalemate\military

prenegotiations.

She

notes:

reversal

"Most

leading

directly,

as

to

Zartroan

argues, mutual perception of a hurting stalemate informed by
a recent or impending crisis leads policy-makers to consider
actively

the

option

of

negotiation.1,12

Clearly,

Lyndon

Johnson had been left devastated by the enemy's Tet Offensive
of 1968.

To the American public, the war appeared to be a

hopeless stalemate.
the

only

option

"victory" at Tet.

Johnson believed that negotiations were

because

of

the

PAVN

and

Viet

Cong (VC)

In other words, American public opinion was

11 Janice Gross Stein, Getting to the Table. ( Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p.242.
12 Ibid. p.245.
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obviously important.
Military reversal would act as a powerful catalyst in
influencing the dramatic policy shift of the North Vietnamese
Politburo in October of 1972 as well. C.R. Mitchell, in The
Structure of Conflict, has argued that the likelihood of
military defeat can lead to a peace settlement.

As noted by

Mitchell:
Rather
than
continue
costly,
and
possibly
ineffective, military operations either because a
perceived stalemate exists or because defeat seems
more likely than victory, a national government may
take the difficult decision to send out peace
feelers to the adversary through a neutral
government, or prepare to make a direct compromise
offer to the opposing party.13
This study will contend that Mitchell's analysis is not only
applicable

to

the

dramatic

policy

shift

Vietnamese Politburo in October of 1972,

of

the

North

but also to the

Johnson Administration's decision to enter into the Paris
Peace Talks in March of 1968.
Another concept that is closely related to military
stalemate\military reversal is tolerance of costs.

In The

Logic of International Relations. Walter Jones argues:

"A

party inferior in strength and yet superior in cost tolerance
may be more powerful than a strong opponent less willing to
suffer."14

This theory is very applicable to the Vietnam

13 C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p.165.
14 Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations.
(New York: Harper Collins Publisher,1991), p.252.
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War.

Because the United States was unwilling to accept heavy

casualties, as clearly demonstrated in the collapse of popular
support for the war after the Tet Offensive, Washington found
itself compelled to enter into the Paris Peace Talks.

Thus,

Ho Chi Minh's warning to the United States in 1965 was proven
correct: "In the end the Americans will kill ten patriots for
every American who dies,

but

it

is they who

will

tire

first.”15 The United States by 1973 was unwilling to endure
further costs.
Clearly, the high morale and discipline of the North
Vietnamese people were great assets.

However, the relative

importance of cost tolerance cannot be overestimated.

Despite

the obvious fact that by 1973 the Nixon Administration had
lost all popular support for a continuation of the war, the
Politburo accepted a peace settlement in January of 1973 that
had bean categorically rejected in May of 1972.

This thesis

will argue that Hanoi's crucial "volte face" in October, 1972,
was precipitated by its own cost tolerance having been reached
in the form of military reversal.
Cost

tolerance

is

closely

related

to

the

"trigger" identified by Stein: domestic instability.
writes:

"[P]renegotiation

is triggered

by

an

second
Stein

attempt

to

prevent a crisis or to manage a relationship in the wake of a
recent crisis."16

This catalyst is especially pertinent to

15 Ibid.
16 Stein, Getting to the Table, p.240.
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the Paris Peace Talks of 1968-1973.

Domestic pressures were

clearly very important in the decision of both parties to
enter into the negotiation phase and the eventual decision to
conclude a peace agreement.
Stein limits domestic instability as a "trigger" only to
the prenegotiation stage.

Yet,

domestic

instability,

if

greatly exacerbated, perhaps by military defeat, can also lead
to a settlement.

This factor can take many forms.

manifestations of domestic unrest as

food riots,

Such

student

strikes, and growing political opposition can all threaten the
survival

of the regime.

This thesis will also consider

divisions within a country's leadership as a manifestation of
domestic unrest.

If a belligerent is suffering critical

reverses on the battlefield and there are signs of domestic
unrest, usually a "dovish" faction will emerge, calling for an
end to hostilities.
Yet, at the same time that one faction may be calling for
an end to hostilities, another faction may be tempted to fight
on if military reverse is not clear.

Mitchell has noted that:

"[F]actions within each party arguing for a continuation of
the coercive strategies, for 'more of the same,' for a little
greater effort to bring final success will be stronger and
more persuasive."17 Thus, only with clear military reversal,
which had occurred for Hanoi by September of 1972, would the
views of the "dovish" faction dominate.
17 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, p.179.
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Clearly,

military

stalemate\military

reversal

and

domestic instability are two catalysts that are inextricably
linked.

Obviously from the theoretical literature on conflict

resolution and the various case studies presented,

it is

futile to consider one catalyst in isolation from the other.
Stein has written that the fear of a domestic crisis resulting
from military stalemate will often lead a belligerent to
prenegotiation.18
beyond

the

This study will extend Stein's argument

prenegotiations

stage

to

the

argument

can

be

actual

peace

settlement.
Therefore,

a

strong

made

combination of disastrous military reversal

that

the

and domestic

problems was the determining factor in Hanoi's decision to
conclude the Paris Peace Talks, as clearly expounded by the
"Nine Points" put forward by North Vietnamese Special Advisor
Le Due Tho to Henry Kissinger in Paris on October 8, 1972.
The North Vietnamese decision to offer a new negotiating
position in the autumn of 1972 that, with some modifications,
was

essentially

the

one

put

forward

by

the

Nixon

Administration in 1969, can again be explained by reference to
the two catalysts.

Mitchell has observed:

Those wishing to terminate the conflict will argue
that the costs and risks of prolonging the conflict
far outweigh those of compromising now, and that
the, admittedly uncertain benefits of a settlement
soon also outweigh more uncertain benefits to be
obtained at some unspecified future time, when an
even greater position of dominance may have been
18 Stein, Getting to the Table, p.240.
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gained over the opposing party.19
Surely, similar arguments were made in the Politburo of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam by such "moderates’' as the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh,

Pham Van Dong,

and

in the autumn of 1972.

Yet, the same arguments held true for Washington, as well.
The theoretical works that were surveyed were generally found
to define possible manifestations of domestic unrest in a very
narrow manner.

Only one work, C.R. Mitchell's The Structure

of International Conflict, was found to consider intra-party
factionalism a legitimate obstacle in any negotiations.

All

too often in the literature on the Second Vietnam War, the
respective parties, especially the North Vietnamese Politburo,
are treated as monolithic entities.

As this thesis will

demonstrate, a leading factor that led to the Paris Peace
Talks being so dragged out were serious divisions within the
Politburo in Hanoi.

After the death of the President of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, on September 3,
1969,

at least three factions emerged within the Central

Committee of the Lao Dong Party.
The recognition of intra-party factionalism is vital to
understanding the dynamic of negotiations.

Mitchell has again

presciently noted that:
A more realistic approach is one which acknowledges
that many parties in conflict have a more complex
19 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, p.167.
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structure than that of a single individual, and
takes into account such factors as intra-party
conflicts and rivalries, the distribution of
factional influence, bureaucratic factors making
for slow decision-making and differing perceptions
of the adversary held by intra-party factions.20
Thus, Hanoi could not move towards a conclusion of the Paris
Peace

Talks

until

a

consensus

had

been

reached

in the

Politburo to do so.
So far, the theoretical literature clearly indicates that
two catalysts
termination.

are often decisive

in leading to conflict

This thesis will present the argument that it

was primarily military reversal\military stalemate, along with
domestic concerns, that led to the acceptance of the Paris
Peace Accords for both belligerents.

In addition, this thesis

will further contend that a third catalyst enhanced the effect
of the above two catalysts.
This
balance

third

of

catalyst,

power,

would

the
prove

role

of

the

crucial

conclusion of the Paris Peace Talks.

to

international
the

eventual

Yet, strangely, there is

virtually nothing in the theoretical literature that would
anticipate the unique roles of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
The literature on conflict resolution considers the role
of third players in two broad ways: as mediators and as direct
participants in hostilities.

Clearly, neither the USSR nor

PRC acted as third players in these forms.

Yet, the role of

20 Ibid. p. 185.
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the two Communist giants would be paramount in the successful
conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973.
Indeed, no less an eminent person than Richard Nixon himself
considered the "triangular diplomacy" with the USSR and PRC as
the key to the successful conclusion of the Paris Peace
Talks.21
The theoretical work on the role of third players as
mediators in conflict resolution is extensive.

One leading

exponent is Dean G. Pruitt who has argued that third players
can often influence stalemated negotiations through mediation:
Third parties
frequently become involved
in
negotiation...They may also intrude themselves, as
when a powerful state intervenes in a controversy
between two client states that threatens the
broader aims of the alliance.
Third party
intervention ordinarily has the function
of
resolving a difficult conflict that is dangerous to
continue.22
Likewise, Janice Gross Stein, in her case studies in Getting
to the Table, recognized the importance of the roles of third
actors as mediators.
players,

Yet,

the

mediatory role of third

as described by Pruitt and Stein,

is clearly not

applicable to the Paris Peace Talks of 1968-1973.
Fred Ikle's Every War Must End also fails to provide any
useful theoretical background, as he only considered third
players

in

the

most

classical

role:

direct

military

21 Richard M. Nixon, No More Vietnams. ( New York: Avon,
1984), p.147.
22 Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behaviour. (New York: Academic
Press, 1981), p.201.
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intervention.

In establishing strategy and war aims, Ikle

notes that a belligerent must consider third parties:
One's own mobilization potential and that of the
enemy are not isolated from the rest of the world.
On the one hand, they may be augmented by friendly
powers and future allies; on the other hand, some
military forces may have to be reserved for further
contingencies.
External aid might enlarge the
resources available for the war effort, real or
imagined threats from other powers might draw
forces to another front, and new conflicts between
third parties in other theaters might radically
alter the ambitions and restraints of the original
belligerents.23
Ikle's analysis is not without merit.

This argument provides

useful background to President Johnson's dramatic speech of
March 31, 1968.
won.

Johnson believed that the war could not be

If the United States attempted to escalate the war, as

called for by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
Commander-in-Chief, General William C. Westmoreland, (USA), the
President

was

convinced

that

Soviet

and/or

Chinese

intervention would ensue.
Yet,

Ikle's

work

Every

War

Must

End

predated

the

successful conclusion of Nixon's "triangular diplomacy." Thus,
it can not specifically provide any in depth analysis of the
"strategic

triangle."

In

retrospect,

the

"triangular

diplomacy" of Richard Nixon was perhaps unique in the history
of international relations.

Super Power detente and Sino-

American rapprochement in the early 1970s were both diplomatic

23

Fred C.Ikle, Every War Must End.( New York: Columbia
University, 1971), p.23.
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milestones of the post-Korean War world.
true historical parallel

Thus, there is no

for comparison purposes,

so the

reader can gain a greater understanding of the importance of
this third catalyst.
Nixon's successful "triangular diplomacy" was, in many
respects, a crucial factor or catalyst in the Paris Peace
Talks.

Even Gareth Porter,

a staunch critic of Nixon's

Vietnam policy, has noted:
The DRV had not reckoned, however, with Nixon's
ability to manipulate detente with the Soviet Union
and China for his own internal political benefit,
thus nullifying, in effect, the damaging political
impact of the offensive and the re-escalation of
American military involvement in South Vietnam. By
showing that he could take unprecedented military
measures against North Vietnam without jeopardizing
detente, Nixon was able to regain public confidence
at home in his ability to end the war, and to
resist the DRV demand for a transitional coalition,
which would have signified a clear-cut defeat for
the American effort.
Thus,

there is a clear consensus in the literature,

from

right-wing writers such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
as well as left-of-centre writers, such as Gareth Porter, that
the "triangular diplomacy" of the Nixon Administration was
indeed a catalyst that was very crucial to the eventual
conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973.
This

introductory

chapter has

had two

broad

goals.

First, it has attempted to justify the importance of the Paris
Peace Accords.
24

Second,

it has

explained the

analytical

Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied. (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1975), p.102.
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framework to be used to argue the two central hypotheses: the
Paris Peace Accords resulted from a fundamental shift in the
negotiating position of Hanoi in October of 1972 and the Nixon
Administration was

under

great

American involvement in Vietnam.

domestic pressure

to

end

These hypotheses were formed

in relation to four central questions: What were the factors
that led the two respective parties to enter into the Paris
Peace Talks in 1968, and subsequently, to conclude the Paris
Peace Accords in 1973? Why did the Paris Peace Talks last for
almost fifty-one months? Why did the United States accept a
peace settlement,

which from the point of view of South

Vietnamese President Thieu, was not in Saigon's interests? and
finally,

Why

apparently

did

failed

Hanoi
to

accept

achieve

a
its

peace

settlement

paramount

that

objective,

reunification of Vietnam?
With a basic theoretical framework in place, the thesis
will now proceed to analyze specific "historical snapshots."
In developing these "snapshots," the three catalysts will be
used to justify the two hypotheses presented.
For

the

purposes

of

snapshots" have been chosen.

this

thesis,

four

"historical

The first two and the last one,

the Tet Offensive, President Johnson's decision to enter into
the Paris Peace Talks, and the Nguyen Hue Offensive (1972)
have already been briefly mentioned.

The third " historical

snapshot" relates to the South Vietnamese-American incursions
into Cambodia and Laos in April of 1970 and February of 1971,
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respectively.

The two separate campaigns are being studied

together because they resulted from the same strategy: disrupt
the supply lines of the PAVN to buy time for American troop
withdrawals and the process of Vietnamization.
The following sections and chapters of the thesis will
make use of a wide variety of sources.
right-of-centre sources,

Sources will include

such as the memoirs of President

Nixon and his National Security Advisor, as well as books by
senior American military men, such as General Bruce R. Palmer,
Jr.,(USA). To provide a more balanced perspective, left-ofcentre

sources

will

also be

utilized,

including

Gabriel

Kolko's Anatomy of a War and Gareth Porter's A Peace Denied.
Such a rich and diverse range of substantive literature will
provide the basic answers to the four questions raised in this
introduction.
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PART II: THE ROAD TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS
CHAPTER II: THE TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968

As General William C. Westmoreland, Commander-in-Chief,
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam

(MACV),

prepared to retire in the late evening of January 30, 1968,
his mind was troubled.25

He remained fixated on the threat

posed by the People's Army of Vietnam's(PAVN) build-up in the
two northern-most provinces of South Vietnam, Quang Tri and
Thua Thien.

Above all, Westmoreland was deeply concerned

about the beleaguered Marine garrison under siege at the
isolated outpost of Khe Sanh.

General Westmoreland's chief of

military intelligence, Brigadier-General Phillip B. Davidson,
Jr., (USA), had become convinced that the decisive North
Vietnamese effort would come during or after Tet.26
For almost two months, General Westmoreland had been
preparing for this "decisive battle" in the two northern-most
provinces of South Vietnam.

The PAVN threat to the densely

populated coastal lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien became
most obvious on December 20.

On this date, the commanding

officer of the 3rd Marine Division, Major-General Rathvon McC.

25 General William C. Westmoreland, (USA-Retired),
" Perspectives," Vietnam, edited by Colonel H.G.
Summers, (USA-Retired), January, 1993, p.62.
26 Brigadier-General Edwin H. Simmons, (USMC-Retired),
Marines, (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), p.74.
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Tompkins,

(USMC), alerted the commander of the III Marine

Amphibious

Force,

Lieutenant-General

Robert

E.

Cushman,

(USMC), that the 308 and 325C PAVN divisions were digging in
around

Khe

Sanh.

If

the

Marine

outpost

at

Khe

Sanh,

garrisoned in mid-December by only the 3rd battalion, 26th
Marines, was allowed to fall, then the entire Marine line
along

the

Demilitarized

Zone

(DMZ)

could

be

outflanked,

leaving the cities of Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Hue extremely
vulnerable.

Yet, if Khe Sanh was to be held, it would have to

be reinforced and reserves would have to be committed for the
eventual lifting of the siege.

General Westmoreland decided

that Khe Sanh would be held, a decision supported by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in far-off Washington, D.C.27
By January 30,

1968,

all of the forces committed by

Westmoreland to hold and then to relieve Khe Sanh were in
place.

The alacrity of the American response to the threat to

Khe Sanh was due to the fact, as argued by Robert Pisor in End
of the Line, that Westmoreland had begun a military build-up
in Quang Tri and Thua Thien as early as November of 1967.28
Westmoreland was preparing the stage for the move that he
believed would

end the war:

interdiction of the

panhandle by American ground forces.

Laotian

At the New Year, the

XXIVth Provisional Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-

27 Westmoreland, nPerspectives," p.63.
28 Robert L.Pisor, End of the line. (New York: Viking Press,
11981), p.34.
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General William B. Rosson, (USA), was combat-ready with two of
its three divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and
the 3rd Marine Division, deployed in Quang Tri.

Westmoreland

was convinced that 1968 would be the decisive "turning point"
in the war.29 Little did he know that his judgement would be
proven valid for the wrong reasons.
At the same time that General Westmoreland was preparing
to retire for the evening, another senior American military
man, Lieutenant-General Frederick C. Weyand, (USA), commanding
officer of II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV), was also deeply
disturbed

by

recent

trends

in

his

command.30

During

September and early October of 1967, the 1st and 25th Infantry
Divisions had engaged in bloody firefights with the 9th Viet
Cong (VC)

Division

at Tay Ninh,

Loc Ninh,

and Song Be.31

However, by mid-October, the VC regiments had withdrawn to
their sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia to rest and refit.

This

occurrence was hardly unusual: it was the general tactic of
the enemy.

Lieutenant-General Weyand became deeply concerned

about events that followed, however.
For the next three and a half months, there would be
virtually no enemy activity in the II FFV area.

There were

very few skirmishes between the VC and American or South
29 General William C. Westmoreland, (USA-Retired), A Soldier
Reports. (New York: Random House, 1976), p.341.
30 Jack Shulimson, Tet-1968. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988),
p.14.
31 Pisor, End of the Line, p.41.
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Vietnamese troops.
patrols.

In addition, the enemy had stopped regular

Perhaps most strangely, there was a heavy influx of

refugees coming from the western provinces of South Vietnam to
Saigon.

To Lieutenant-General Weyand it must have seemed like

deja vu:

as a young officer in France in 1944,

he had

witnessed similar conditions prior to the Battle of the Bulge!
Weyand's fears were exacerbated by American military
intelligence.

Intelligence estimates for 1967 placed total

North Vietnamese

infiltration at 200,000.32

Yet,

in the

first month of 1968, the rate of enemy infiltration actually
increased.33
increase

Aerial reconnaissance also indicated a major

in enemy activity

in the Cambodian sanctuaries.

Weyand came to the conclusion that the enemy was preparing for
a major offensive against Saigon itself.34
At a meeting of senior American military men in Saigon on
January

10,

views.

1968,

In

Westmoreland,
John

M.

operations,

Lieutenant-General Weyand presented his

attendance

at

this

conference

were

General

Brigadier-General Davidson, Brigadier-General

Chaisson,(USMC),

Westmoreland's

and Lieutenant-General

Bruce

R.

director
Palmer,

commanding general, United States Army Vietnam.35

of
Jr.,

Although

Weyand’s colleagues were somewhat sceptical of the possibility
32 Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA. p.58.
33 Ibid.
34 Shulimson, Tet. p.23.
35 Ibid.
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of a full-scale enemy attack against Saigon, they recognized
that

Saigon

was

very

vulnerable.

General

supported Weyand1s request to withdraw the

Westmoreland
1st and

25th

Infantry Divisions from the Cambodian border and to relocate
them near Saigon.36

In retrospect, this decision was one of

the most important taken by the American military in 1968.

If

the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions had not encountered strong
American forces guarding the strategic western approaches to
Saigon,

then surely Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra,

senior military officer of the

Central Office

the

for South

Vietnam (COSVN), would have infiltrated at least one of his
divisions into Saigon to support the local force VC units.
it was,

As

the only sustained heavy fighting in Saigon was

largely localized, in Cholon.
Although senior American military men had some serious
concerns, they had no doubt that the war could be won.
same cannot be said of their Commander-in-Chief, however.
the

fall

of

1967,

Lyndon

Johnson

disenchanted with the war in Vietnam.

had

become

The
By

utterly

Johnson saw no way to

end the war without risking Chinese intervention.

In April of

1967, General Westmoreland declared in a private session with
the President that "the war could go on indefinitely11 unless
he was allowed to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail with ground

36 Ibid.
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forces.37

Johnson's

rationale

for

refusing

this

logical

request was evinced in a comment made to an aide: "I am not
going to spit in China's face."38
The attitude of the Administration, in general, and the
President, in particular, is perhaps best symbolized by the
fate of Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara

(1961-1968).

McNamara, more than any other senior official in the Johnson
Administration, was the driving force behind the American
military commitment and then build-up in Vietnam.

By January

of 1965, the reports coming from the American Ambassador in
Saigon,

General Maxwell

Commander-in-Chief,
clear:

D. Taylor

General

(USA-Ret)

Westmoreland,

and the MACV

were

painfully

unless American combat troops were introduced into

South Vietnam immediately,
Communists.

the country would fall to the

McNamara, along with National Security Advisor

MacGeorge Bundy, formulated the American response which would
lead the United States into its worst foreign policy debacle
of this century.
The Secretary of Defence believed that the key to ending
the conflict in South Vietnam was forcing Hanoi to accept a
settlement.

The Pentagon was convinced that a gradually

escalating strategic air campaign against North Vietnam would

37 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History. (New York: Penguin,
1985), p.543.
38 Ibid.
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lead

the

Politburo

demands.39

Thus,

in

Hanoi

to

capitulate

in February of 1965,

to

American

President Johnson

authorized Operation Rolling Thunder. At the same time, the
situation on the ground in South Vietnam had to be stabilized.
To

achieve

this

objective,

McNamara

endorsed

General

Westmoreland's dramatic request for forty-four battalions (34
from the United States, 9 from the Republic of Korea, and one
from Australia) to be committed to the conflict.40

On June

28, 1965, President Johnson announced on national television
that he had accepted Westmoreland's proposal and that the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was to be deployed immediately.
By November and December of 1965,

as noted by David

Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest. Mr. McNamara had
become

deeply

alarmed

about

the

conduct

of

the

war.41

Operation Rolling Thunder, according to intelligence reports,
was not restricting infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Most ominously, the Politburo in Hanoi showed no evidence that
it was prepared to accept American demands for a negotiated
settlement to the war in South Vietnam.

Indeed, the strategic

bombing campaign against North Vietnam actually strengthened
the resolve of the North Vietnamese people to resist American
"imperialism."
Therefore,

Mr.

McNamara

now

found

himself

39 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.349.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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in

a

complicated dilemma.

The underlying premise of the American

military build-up, that a strategic air campaign would quickly
lead to a negotiated peace settlement, was proven invalid by
December of 1965.

McNamara could either advise his President

to gradually withdraw from Vietnam, a decision that would have
been political suicide for Lyndon Johnson in 1965-1966, or to
gradually escalate American troop strength in South-East Asia
(a rapid military build-up, which would have necessitated the
activation of the reserves was considered to be politically
risky), without

anv

clear

strategic

objective

in

sight.

McNamara, because of his misguided faith in statistics and
behavioural procedures, had unwittingly led the Administration
into a land war in Asia.
Mr.

McNamara

Rolling

would

Thunder

Up to his last days in the Pentagon,

never

had

fully understand

failed

negotiated settlement.

to

lead

Hanoi

why
to

Operation
accept

a

To the former President of the Ford

Motor Company, Hanoi's intransigent position must have seemed
utterly illogical.

McNamara's confusion about the state of

the war, according to many of his senior aides, reached its
zenith in June of 1966, when President Johnson ordered a
temporary bombing halt.

The Johnson Administration informed

Hanoi, through the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly
Dobrynin, that the United States was prepared to extend the
bombing halt and to implement a $1 billion development project
for the Mekong

Delta,

in return

for a North Vietnamese
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commitment to end its support for the war in the South.42
The Politburo in Hanoi categorically rejected the offer.
President Johnson, Secretary of Defence McNamara,
National

Security

Advisor

MacGeorge

Bundy

were

and

utterly

perplexed.

According to The Pentagon Papers, it was at this

time

serious

that

Administration.43

divisions

emerged

within

the

Johnson

The split within the Administration was

perhaps best symbolized by MacGeorge Bundy's resignation in
November of 1966.

Bundy had been one of the staunchest

advocates of an American military build-up in the debates of
the winter of 1964-1965.

By the autumn of 1966, Bundy was

convinced that the war was hopeless.44 Upon his resignation,
President Johnson replaced him with a "hawk,” Walt W. Rostow.
Robert McNamara was no longer an effective war manager
for President Johnson.

The Secretary of Defence realized that

the gigantic American military build-up in South Vietnam was
only

reinforcing

conflict.

Hanoi1s

determination

to

continue

the

Nevertheless, McNamara could not envision any way

that Washington might extricate itself from the quagmire in
Vietnam.

By 1966, the American war effort in Vietnam no

longer had a sound strategic direction.

42 George Esper, The Associated Press Eve-Witness History of
the Vietnam War. (New York: Associated Press, 1985),
P.106.
43 James W. Gibson, The Perfect War. (Boston: Atlantic Press,
1990), p.398.
44 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.498.
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The Secretary of Defence was a broken man.

He had

advised his President to commit his country to a land war in
Asia, in which, if Operation Rolling Thunder failed to force
Hanoi

to

accept

a

negotiated

settlement,

alternative strategy to end the conflict.

there

was

no

By December of

1965, McNamara realized that Operation Rolling Thunder had
failed in its central objective.

American troop strength in

South Vietnam would gradually increase, to a peak of 582,000
personnel

in March

of

1968,

but

there

was

no

ultimate

strategic objective that the build-up was meant to achieve.
In the autumn of 1967, McNamara submitted his resignation
to the President.

Johnson deferred his acceptance of the

resignation until March of 1968, for two reasons.

First of

all, the President had to find a suitable successor.

Second,

President Johnson was concerned about the negative impact that
such a high-level resignation might have in the media and in
the

Congress.

Finally,

on

March

1,

1968,

a prominent

Washington lawyer, Clark W. Clifford, succeeded Mr. McNamara
at the Pentagon.45
Perhaps

what

was

most

relevant

in

relation

to

decision-making process in the Johnson Administration

the
and

perhaps even symbolic about Mr. McNamara's resignation as
Secretary of Defence regarded his health.

In all of the

literature on the Vietnam War, there is an implicit consensus
over the McNamara resignation: it was prompted by emotional
45 Karnow, Vietnam, p.532.

I
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instability.
of

the

Indeed, Lyndon Johnson himself stated that one

reasons

he

accepted

his

Secretary

of

Defence's

resignation was a fear that the pressures of the job would
lead to a suicide attempt on Mr. McNamara's part.*6 Thus, by
the end of January, 1968, the war in South Vietnam had claimed
another victim.
Clearly, senior officials in both the Administration and
the military believed that 1968 would be a decisive year in
the war.

Yet, what is most remarkable about the American

leadership was the deep foreboding of the Commander-in-Chief.
Lyndon Johnson,

just like Richard Nixon,

was a political

animal: he recognized that the war was eroding his Presidency.
On the eve of the Tet Offensive, Johnson's popular approval
stood at 48 percent of the electorate, his lowest standing
since taking office .*7

The President recognized that the

situation was only going to worsen.

In December of 1967,

while addressing the Australian cabinet of Prime Minister John
McEwen,

Johnson

declared

Vietnam."*8 The remark
At

the

same

time

that

"dark

days

lie

ahead

in

was truly prophetic.
that Administration

officials

and

American military men were preparing for the decisive year of
the war, their opposite numbers in Hanoi were now ready to
execute

perhaps

the

boldest

strategy

of

the

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Shulimson, Tet. p.61.
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countrywide,

general

offensive.

The

Tet

Offensive

is

generally associated with the Minister of Defence of the DRV,
Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap.

In fact, Giap was not the

progenitor of the radical strategy.

The Tet Offensive was the

"brainchild” of Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Chairman of
COSVN from its establishment in June of 1964, until his death
in July of 1967.

By the spring of 1967, Thanh believed that

the American war effort was in serious trouble.

American

combat units were operating in areas, particularly along the
Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) and the Cambodian border, where North
Vietnamese forces enjoyed short lines of communication which
leftthe

tactical

commanders.

initiative

to

the

North

Vietnamese

Thanh argued to his colleagues in the Politburo

that a series of coordinated, countrywide offensives could
lead

to

a military

disaster for

the

United

States.49

However, before Senior General Thanh could forge the needed
consensus within the Politburo, he died of heart failure in
Hanoi in July of 1967.50
Senior
forefront.

General

Vo

Nguyen Giap

Giap agreed that a

now

emerged

large scale,

at

the

countryside

offensive could prove decisive to the North Vietnamese war
effort.

Yet, he fundamentally altered Senior General Thanh’s

concept in two crucial ways.

Apparently, Thanh had envisioned

49 Edward Doyle, Samuel Lipsman, and Terence Maitland,
The North. (Boston: Little, Brown, and.Company, 1984),
p.61.
50 Ibid.
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the Tet Offensive as a series of regimental-size attacks upon
American ground forces near the DMZ and in the western Central
Highlands.

Senior General Giap changed the focus of the Tet

Offensive

from remote border areas to the most populous

regions of South Vietnam, Saigon and the Mekong Delta.51

In

addition, the Communist forces were to concentrate the bulk of
their

offensive

units.52

against

the

ARVN,

not

American

ground

These changes were implemented by Senior General

Giap to exacerbate the perceived political instability and
military weakness of the Saigon regime.
Vo Nguyen Giap intended the Tet Offensive to have three
stages.

In the first stage, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

forces would engage American units and draw American strength
away

from

country.53

the

most

heavily

populated

regions

of

the

Once this stage had been completed, by December

of 1967, the offensive was to enter into its all important
second stage.

By launching a massive, countrywide offensive,

the Communist political and military leadership hoped that a
series of disastrous reverses would lead to the collapse of
the ARVN and a "General Uprising" in South Vietnam against the
Saigon regime.54

with the legitimacy and authority of the

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Robert Pisor, "Faking MACV Out of Position,"
Vietnam,edited by Co 1one 1 H .G .Summers, (USA-Retired) ,
January, 1993, p.40.
54 Ibid.
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Saigon regime shattered, the Communist forces would launch a
series of countrywide, coordinated attacks against American
forces,

beginning

Vietnamese

in May.ss

government

and

The

collapse

army would

of

force

the South

the

American

military leadership to withdraw American ground units to a
series of enclaves along the coast.

Giap expected that the

final series of large scale attacks,

against the American

coastal enclaves, would force the United States out of the
war.

Sometime

in

the

late

summer

of 1967,

the North

Vietnamese Politburo approved Senior General Giap’s concept of
the Tet Offensive.
The Tet Offensive was the boldest and most ambitious
strategy ever conceived and executed by the senior leadership
of the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN.

Beginning on January 30

and 31, over 84,000 Communist troops, almost exclusively drawn
from the ranks of the Viet Cong, struck military and civilian
targets the length and breadth of South Vietnam.

Thirty-six

of

the

the

forty-four

provincial

capitals, fiveof

six

autonomous cities, sixty-four of the two hundred forty-two
district capitals,

and over 50 hamlets were struck by the

Communists in at least battalion level size attacks.56
the exception of Saigon,

the

Viet Cong main

With

force units

avoided American units and concentrated the full thrust of
their offensive against the ARVN.

Almost without exception,

55 Ibid. p.43.
56 Shulimson, Tet, p.86.
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ARVN units succeeded in weathering the initial onslaught from
the Viet Cong, despite the facts that the attacking forces
enjoyed the element of surprise and that most ARVN units were
at barely fifty percent strength.

The ability of the ARVN

regular line units to withstand the initial assault from the
Viet Cong would drastically affect the overall Communist
strategy.
The Tet Offensive would be characterized by fundamental
differences in its execution in the two northern corps and the
two southern corps.

In I Corps and the Central Highlands, the

Communist forces, either by error or design, would begin their
offensive almost twenty-four hours ahead of the Viet Cong
units around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta.57

In addition,

in I and II Corps, the North Vietnamese high command committed
a large number of PAVN regiments.

By contrast,

the Tet

Offensive in the two southern corps only began on January 31
and did not involve PAVN regulars.

The fighting in I and II

Corps also involved a far larger American troop commitment
than in the southern corps.

Thus, it is not invalid to argue

that the Tet Offensive was actually two separate offensives,
from a tactical viewpoint.
In northern-most I Corps, the Tet Offensive began on
January 30 with a heavy rocket and mortar barrage against the
giant Marine air station at Da Nang.

The artillery barrage

was followed by a ground assault from the R-20 and V-25 Viet
57 Ibid.
-)
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Cong battalions.

In heavy fighting, the units of the 1st

Marine Division stationed south-west of Da Nang decimated the
Viet Cong battalions.58
spread.

The next day, the enemy offensive

The US 7th Marine Regiment routed the 31st Viet Cong

Regiment in the An Hoa region.59

In the remainder of I

Corps, large scale enemy attacks against Quang Tri, Quang Nam,
Quang Ngai, and Tam Ky were repulsed by the ARVN.
city

of Hue,

which was

Only in the

seized by the 4th and

6th

PAVN

regiments on the morning of January 31, would heavy fighting
last for more than forty-eight hours.
The fighting in II Corps would follow a similar pattern
as in I Corps:

a limited number of large scale attacks by

PAVN regiments, beginning on January 30.

By the early morning

hours of January 31, the Communists launched attacks against
seven

of

the

twelve

provincial

capitals

and

over

ten

regimental size ground assaults.60 Nonetheless, the fighting
in the Central Highlands was never as desperate as in Hue or
Saigon.

By February 1, the ARVN had weathered the initial

onslaught and had moved to the counter-attack.

Only in the

city of Kontum, which was attacked on the morning of January
30 by a PAVN regiment and two Viet Cong battalions,
substantial American ground units have to be committed.61
58 Simmons, Marines, p.97.
59 Ibid.
60 Shulimson, Tet. p.83.
61 Ibid. p.82.
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By contrast, the Tet Offensive was far more widespread in
the Mekong Delta, the ARVN IV Corps area.

Regiment size

attacks were launched against Ben Tre, Chau Doc, Cai Be, Cai
Lay, Can Tho, My Tho, Soc Trang, True Giang, and Vinh Long.62
National Route 4, the major road in the Mekong Delta, was cut
in sixty-two different places.63

Nonetheless,

despite the

scale of the Viet Cong offensive and the fact that most South
Vietnamese units were caught off-guard, the ARVN in IV Corps
fought extremely well.

The ability of the units of IV Corps

to blunt the Viet Cong offensive and then to go over to
counter-attack without reinforcements from the American II FFV
or the South Vietnamese strategic reserve is clear evidence to
support this argument.
However, the greatest effort was made by the Viet Cong in
the attack upon Saigon.

Clearly, the military commander of

COSVN, Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, considered Saigon the
key to the Tet Offensive.
under

the

command

of

A total of thirty-five battalions,
Lieutenant-General

committed to the assault on Saigon.64

Tran

Do,

were

The capital of South

Vietnam was held by the five battalions of the 5th ARVN Ranger
Group and the 1st and 8th ARVN Airborne battalions.

Only a

single American unit, the 716th Military Police battalion, was
in Saigon on January 31, although an additional twenty-three
62 Ibid. p.87.
63 Ibid. p.85.
64 Ibid. p.82.
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American battalions could reinforce the capital within a
relatively short period of time.65
The Viet Cong attack upon Saigon began at 2:45 AM on
January 31 with a daring commando raid.

A squad from the

elite C-10 Sapper Battalion launched a bold attack on the
bastion of American power in South Vietnam, the United States’
embassy.66

For six and a half hours, the Viet Cong waged a

running battle with American and South Vietnamese forces.

The

fact that such a small force was tasked with such an important
mission, without reinforcements, indicated that the Communists
never actually planned to capture the embassy.

Instead, the

attack was designed to have a symbolic effect for the American
people.
The truly substantive fighting in Saigon took place in
the Chinese quarter of the city, Cholon, and at the large
American bases at Long Binh, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut.67
In

Cholon,

the

equivalent

of

two

Viet

Cong

regiments

established themselves in strong defensive positions.

After

two weeks of extremely heavy fighting, South Vietnamese and
American forces succeeded in clearing Cholon.68 At the large

65 Ibid. p.76.
66 Ibid.
67 General Bruce R. Palmer, Jr., (USA-retired), The__25 Y.ear_
War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam,
(Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press,
1984), p.197.
68 Ibid.
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bases north of Saigon, the commitment of American reserves
from II FFV routed regimental size Viet Cong attacks.
Thus, by February 26, the Tet Offensive had finally been
defeated by South Vietnamese and American ground units.

In

the context of the analytical framework introduced in Chapter
I, the Tet Offensive was to prove the determining factor in
Washington's

decision

to

initiate

peace

talks

with

the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Hanoi's decision to enter
into the talks.

Washington was motivated by the perception of

an impossible military stalemate, while Hanoi had to gain time
to recover from the disastrous losses suffered in the Tet
Offensive.
Clearly, the Tet Offensive was a serious failure for the
PAVN and the Viet Cong, tactically.

Total casualties suffered

during the offensive, according to American estimates, were
40,000 personnel killed in action (KIA).

Most of the KIAs

were Viet Cong cadres, who could not be easily replaced.
Therefore,
devastated.

the

Viet

Cong

urban

infrastructure

was

left

For the remainder of the war, the bulk of the

heavy fighting would be conducted by the PAVN, not the Viet
Cong.
Yet, the Tet Offensive was not a clear cut success for
the South Vietnamese and the Americans.

Although the ARVN

generally fought well, the heavy casualties suffered greatly
reduced its combat effectiveness.

The elite units which

comprised the corps' reserves and the strategic reserve were
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left decimated.

The Ranger battalions were reduced to 40

percent strength, while four of the nine battalions of the
Airborne

Division

were

rated

as

"combat

ineffective.1,69

Perhaps more serious, the pacification programme of the Saigon
government was in a shambles.

Only the cities were firmly in

government control.
The military weakness of the South Vietnamese government
was complicated by incompetent leadership.

During the Tet

Offensive, South Vietnamese corps and division commanders had
not

performed

their

duties

adequately.

After

the

Tet

Offensive, this fact was recognized by President Thieu when he
relieved the commanders of II and IV Corps, Major-Generals
Vinh Loc and Nguyen Van Manh, respectively.70

Nonetheless,

President Thieu1s shake-up of the senior command of the ARVN
failed to address one all important problem: Thieu*s regime
lacked stability.
Thus, the Tet Offensive clearly evinced the fundamental
weakness of American strategy in Vietnam.

As long as the

Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and the supply lines in the
Laotian panhandle were exempt from American ground attack,
Communist forces enjoyed the initiative and even the cities of
South Vietnam were not secure from attack.

By the end of

February, 1968, the White House recognized that a military

69 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War. (New York: Pantheon,
1985), p.310.
70 Shulimson, Tet. p. 144.
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stalemate existed in South Vietnam.

As long as American

ground forces were prohibited from entering Laos and Cambodia,
the conflict could not be brought to an end.
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CH A P T E R

I I I :

W ASHING TO N B E G IN S

D E E S C A L A T IO N

Tet of 1968 was the single most important event of the
Second Vietnam War.

The ability of the North Vietnamese and

Viet Cong to launch a massive, countrywide offensive clearly
demonstrated that the American strategy for conducting the war
in Vietnam had failed.

Therefore, the Johnson Administration

had to deal with an extremely serious political and military
crisis

in

which

major

economic,

political

and

military

constraints greatly limited the decision-making power of the
Administration.

In

other

words,

the

United

States

involved in an Asian land war with no end in sight.
also

had

other

important

consequences:

was

The war

serious

social

problems, an overextended and weak military that could not
protect vital American interests, such as the oil fields of
the

Persian

Gulf,

October, 1929.

and

the

worst

financial

crisis

since

Therefore, President Johnson concluded in late

March of 1968 that the United States had to disengage itself
from the conflict in South-East Asia.
To President Johnson and his new Secretary of Defence,
Clark W. Clifford, the Vietnam War seemed to be hopelessly
stalemated.

The only way for the United States to "end" the

war was by interdicting the North Vietnamese supply lines in
the Laotian Panhandle and destroying the Communist base areas
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in Cambodia with American ground troops.
this approach was valid.

On paper at least,

The Viet Cong forces had been

decimated by the Tet Offensive and in most regions of South
Vietnam, Viet Cong military units would only play secondary,
rather unimportant roles, essentially in the Mekong Delta.
Thus, as noted by Philip Chinnery, Senior Lecturer at the
United States Air Force Academy:
Now was the time to abolish the prohibited zones (for the
air campaign) around Hanoi and Haiphong and along the
border with China.
The major ports and harbors could
have been mined to cut off outside support to the North
[Democratic Republic of Vietnam] and a major air campaign
without restrictions could have destroyed the war-making
capability of North Vietnam.71
Chinnery*s analysis is not without merit.

Clearly, the

PAVN and especially the Viet Cong had suffered a devastating
defeat, tactically.

Even if the Communist casualties were

inflated by American military

intelligence,

as argued by

Gabriel Kolko,72 the main force units of the Viet Cong were
left devastated, with a shattered urban infrastructure and,
perhaps most seriously, a weakened rural infrastructure.

The

only effective Communist ground units left in South Vietnam
were PAVN regiments.

A full scale American offensive against

the base areas In Cambodia and supply lines in the Laotian
Panhandle could have been decisive.
Yet, Chinnery*s analysis is far too simplistic.

Although

71 Philip Chinnery, Air War in Vietnam. (Novato, California:
Presidio Press, 1987), p.171.
72 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.310.
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sound on basic tactical premises, the analysis fails to take
into account the wider strategic situation.

American military

initiatives were greatly restrained by the threat of Soviet or
Chinese intervention in South-East Asia.

Thus, the classical

role of third-parties, as defined by Fred C. Ikle in Every War
Must End, direct military intervention or even the threat of
it, acted as an influence on the Johnson Administration.
In particular, the threat of Chinese intervention deeply
alarmed President Johnson: he often spoke of the possibility
of "another Korea" to his closest advisors.73 There seems to
be no

doubt that

Lyndon Johnson sincerely believed

that

Chinese, and possibly even Soviet, intervention would result
if he allowed his field commanders to escalate the war.
Senior

American

military

men,

particularly

General

Westmoreland, have condemned President Johnson's decision to
limit the war.74
truly wrong?

Yet,

in retrospect,

was Lyndon Johnson

During this time period, 1965 to 1969, China was

undergoing one of its most tumultuous periods of this century,
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Revolution was,

in effect,

The Cultural

a Chinese civil war in which

factions of the communist Party contested with one another for
supremacy.

This period remains very controversial and it is

not clear what individual or individuals were in control at
any particular time.

In his

insightful

account

73 Karnow, Vietnam, p.239.
74 Ibid. p.39.
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People's Republic of China, The New Emperors: China in the Era
of Mao and Deng. Harrison Salisbury presents a compelling
thesis: one of the Cultural Revolution's central objectives
during this time period was to establish Mao's successor.75
Thus, the Gang of Four was attempting to promote Yao Yenyuan
as Mao's successor, while the Minister of Defence, Marshal Lin
Biao, and Mao's chief secretary, Chen Boda, were enhancing
their prospects.
Therefore, any ground incursions by American forces into
Cambodia, Laos, or southern North Vietnam after the tactical
victory of Tet might have resulted in Chinese intervention.
Despite the fact that Mao probably did not want an extension
of the war, there was the possibility that he could have lost
control

of

the

situation.

Thus,

if

the

American

XXIV

Provisional Corps, under Lieutenant-General William B. Rosson,
(USA), entered the Laotian Panhandle to sever the Ho Chi Minh
Trail

in March of 1968,

the Red Guards might have taken

matters into their own hands.

In addition, such a situation

would certainly have been manipulated by the Gang of Four,
Chen Boda,
agendas.

and Marshal

Lin Biao for their own political

Thus, the United States had to be extremely cautious

regarding the role of China in South-East Asia.
The

Soviet

Union

was

much

less

nonetheless it was an important player.

of

a

threat,

but

In the first months

of 1968, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was on large-scale exercises
75 Salisbury, The New Emperors, p.289-335.
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in and north of the Sea of Japan with the Democratic Republic
of Korea.76 Although these naval exercises had probably been
planned for months, judging by the logistical effort required
to sustain them, the movements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet
were a cause of concern to the Pentagon.

If the Soviets had

ever actually decided to strike at Japan or South Korea, there
was no effective riposte the United States could have made
apart from the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The threat of Chinese or Soviet intervention in SouthEast Asia is closely related to another factor: the general
weakness of American military power in the world.

Since the

Congress had passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August of
1964, the United States had been fighting an undeclared war in
South-East Asia.

However, the Johnson Administration had not

taken the obvious action required to sustain the military
build-up in Vietnam as well as maintain troop strength in
other strategic regions of the world, notably Western Europe
and North-East Asia: activation of the reserves.

In order to

bring troop strength up to 582,000 personnel by March of 1968,
the Pentagon was forced "to strip" personnel away from the 7th
Army in West Germany, the 8th Army in South Korea, and the
vital reserves stationed in the United States.
7th and 8th armies existed on paper only.

By 1968, the

In addition, in the

event of a crisis, the United States Army only possessed a

76 Ian Beckett, The March of Communism-1917 to 1984.
(London:Bison, 1984), p.154.
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single

combat-ready

division

that

could

be

deployed

immediately— the 82nd Airborne.77
The fact that the United States military had reached
"imperial overstretch" was demonstrated by events on the
Korean Peninsula in January of 1968.

On January 23, 1968,

North Korean commando units seized the American intelligencegathering ship, USS Pueblo, in international waters.78

This

incident not only humiliated the Johnson Administration, but
it demonstrated that the United States was
decisive military action against North Korea.

incapable

of

To complicate

matters even more, the openly hostile action by North Korea
was

accompanied

by

a

massive

military

Pyongyang and the cease-fire line of 1953.

build-up

between

Throughout late

January, heavy skirmishing took place between the Republic of
Korea's Army and the North Korean People's Army.79

As South

Korean President Park Chung-Hee placed his military forces on
a war footing, American military weakness became painfully
clear by two facts.

The first was the decision by the South

Korean President to consider withdrawing the large South
Korean

contingent

in South

Vietnam

(almost

49,500

men—

77 Shelby L.Stanton, The Rise and Fall of An American Armv.
(Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1987), p.7.
78 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.313.
79 General Richard G. Stillwell, (USA-Retired), "Introduction"
to The Modern US War Machine, edited by Ray Bonds,
(New York:Arco, 1987), p.15
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organized

into

brigade) .80
peninsula,

two

Second,
the

infantry

divisions

and

a

in the event of a war on the Korean

United

States

would

have

been

virtually

powerless to influence the fighting on the ground.
American

divisions

marine

stationed

in

South

Korea,

The two
the

2nd

Mechanized and the 7th Infantry, were barely at 40 percent
strength.81 In addition, there were no available reserves to
commit to South Korea in the event of a conflict.
If the situation in South Korea was alarming to the
Administration and the Pentagon, then the developing crisis
over Berlin was even more so.

For several months, the Four

Power Talks had been deadlocked over such simple issues as
West

German

postal

delivery

to

West

Berlin.

In

early

December, the Soviet Union adopted a much more intransigent
position.
by

The new hard-line negotiating strategy was followed

a build-up

Army.82

of the

forward-deployed

units

of the Red

As elite Soviet units were moved closer to Berlin,

Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko began to make
extremely bellicose statements.83
For the United States, a new Berlin crisis could not have
come at a worse time.

Not since

1948 had the American

00 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.313.
81 Stillwell, "Introduction" to The US War Machine, p.15
82 Beckett, The March of Communism, p.161.
83 Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, and Reform: The
Great Challenge. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), p.295.
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military presence in Western Europe been so weak.

In a top-

secret memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General J.L.
Polk,(USA), commanding officer of the 7th Army, declared that
he did not have a single division fit for combat.84

If the

forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were to move against
West Berlin, the United States European Command could take no
effective

action apart

from the tactical

use

of nuclear

weapons.
Therefore, by the winter of 1968, the American military
was stretched dangerously thin.
consumed virtually
available.

every

The war

American ground

in Vietnam had
unit

which

was

As a result, the United States was left in an

extremely tenuous position, strategically.

Indeed, General

Bruce R. Palmer, Jr.,(USA), who served as Vice Chief of Staff
of the United States Army from 1968 to 1973, has written that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were primarily concerned with this
strategic vulnerability, not the war in Vietnam itself , during
February and March of 1968.85
Thus, in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, President
Johnson and his senior advisors had to face some very harsh
realities.
had won

Although the American and South Vietnamese forces

decisive victories,

any attempt to exploit this

tactical success, by escalating the conflict, risked Chinese
84 Stanton, The Rise and Fall of An American Army, p.7.
85 General Bruce R.Palmer, Jr., (USA-Retired), The 25 Year
War; America^ Military Role in Vietnam. (Lexington,
Kentucky; University of Kentucky Press, 1989), p.187.
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and/or Soviet intervention.

If either of the Communist giants

was to intervene in the conflict, American strategic interests
elsewhere in the world would be in great peril.
The vulnerability of American strategic interests was
recognized

by

the

Pentagon,

however.

General

Earle

G.

Wheeler,(USA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (19641970) , realized that the reserves had to be activated to allow
the United

States

to honour

its other

commitments.

He

prevailed upon General Westmoreland to make a dramatic request
for an additional 206,000 troops.86 Of this number, however,
only a fraction were meant for deployment to Vietnam.

The

purpose of this troop call-up was meant to strengthen American
forces in South Korea and West Germany.

President Johnson

must have been surprised by the dramatic request from General
Westmoreland.

If the reserves were activated, the social

fabric of the country would be further strained, while the
resulting inflationary pressures might lead to the collapse of
the

dollar

rejected,

on world markets.
would

the

American

Yet,

if the

position

elsewhere, become strategically untenable?

in

request

was

Vietnam,

or

To study these

vital questions, President Johnson ordered a full-scale review
of Vietnam policy to be conducted by a special committee,
chaired by incoming Secretary of Defence Clark Clifford.87

86 Karnow, Vietnam, p.529.
87 Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves. (Camden, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988), p.136.
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Clark Clifford was a natural choice to replace McNamara
at the Pentagon and to conduct the fundamental review of the
Administration's policy in Vietnam.

A respected Washington

attorney, Clifford had strong lobbying influence in Congress.
He also had close connections with the captains of industry,
including

the

giant

defence

contractors.

In

addition,

Clifford was a close personal friend of Lyndon Johnson's, and
was one of the President's three closest confidants along with
Abe Fortas and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.88 The President
undoubtedly expected his old friend to be a very vigorous war
manager.

Indeed, Secretary Rusk had described Mr. Clifford as

"one of the biggest hawks in Washington.1,89
The special committee,

that included Clifford,

Rusk,

National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, Assistant Secretary
of State Paul Warnke, General Wheeler, retired Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, Secretary of
the Treasury Henry Fowler, and outgoing Secretary of Defence,
Robert McNamara, began its deliberations in the last week of
February.90

Within a week,

the committee,

especially its

chairman, became deeply pessimistic about the American role in
Vietnam.

In the last week of March, Secretary Clifford would

shock the President by advising him to reject Westmoreland's
troop request and to move towards deescalation.
88 Ibid. p.141.

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. p.136.
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As a whole, the committee's conclusions were shaped by
the strategic situation facing the United States, globally,
and the perilous state of the American economy.

The first

factor has been fully analyzed and its relevance is quite
obvious.

The second factor, however, was equally important to

the members of the committee.

In the literature, it has not

gained the attention it deserves.
By February of 1968, the United States was facing the
"dollar geld crisis."

This financial crisis was a result of

the American dollar being pegged to the gold standard, and all
other major currencies, in turn, being pegged to the American
dollar (the Bretton Woods System of 1944).

Since the summer

of 1965, however, the very stability of the American dollar
had been shaken by what economists have called the "double
whammy"— the war in Vietnam and the social programs of the
Great Society.

The resulting inflationary pressures had been

exacerbated by the refusal of the Administration to raise
taxes.

By 1968, the United States was running dangerously

large current account deficits.
A financial crisis emerged at the end of February when
Senator Jacob Javits of New York called for an end to the gold
pool.

In a panic, almost $118 million was withdrawn from the

pool in only two days.91

By March 4, Treasury Secretary

Henry Fowler warned the President that the gold rush and
flight from the dollar were serious and could worsen quickly,
91 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.314.
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with a gold embargo leading to "exchange rate wars and trading
blocs with harmful political as well as economic effects."92
Amazingly, for the next few weeks, the war in Vietnam was not
the top priority for the President.

Instead, as noted by one

of Johnson's biographers, Doris Kearns: " The specter of 1929
haunted him daily.

He worried that if the economy collapsed,

history would subject Lyndon Johnson to endless abuse."93
The monetary crisis would worsen.

On March 11, banks

rushed the gold pool and once it suspended operations on March
14, almost $1 billion had been withdrawn.

Treasury economists

calculated that once operations were started up again,
another $1 billion in gold would be withdrawn on the first
day.94

Lyndon

Johnson

and

Henry

Fowler

were

only

too

painfully aware of the consequences of such a depletion of the
gold reserves.

President Johnson wrote to British Prime

Minister Harold Wilson that "these financial disorders— if not
promptly
political

and

firmly

overcome— can

profoundly

damage

the

delations between Europe and America and set in

motion forces like those which disintegrated the Western world
between 1529 and 1933."95
Although the fact that the Tet Offensive occurred just a
month before the "dollar-gold crisis" was only a coincidence,
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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it was highly symbolic.

The symbolism of the situation could

not have been lost to the members of the committee studying
Westmoreland's troop request, particularly Robert McNamara, a
former

President

of

the

Ford

Motor

Company

and

future

President of the World Bank, Secretary of the Treasury Fowler,
and above all, the Secretary of Defence.

Mr. Clifford had

very close ties to the world of big business.

He was only too

aware how seriously the captains of industry viewed the strain
on the economy from the war in Vietnam.
The

"dollar-gold crisis" was one of the determining

factors prompting the Johnson Administration to adopt a policy
of deescalation in Vietnam.

Yet, strangely, the financial

crisis that was a leading factor in Washington's decision to
deescalate the war and to seek to enter into peace talks with
Hanoi has been neglected by the literature.

The only work

found from the literature surveyed which analyzed the economic
crisis in any great detail was Gabriel Kolko's Anatomy of a
War. Kolko considers the "dollar-gold crisis" of March, 1968,
to have been the single greatest influence on the President's
dramatic announcement of March 31, 1968.

After his extensive

research, Kolko concluded that :
[I]t was the gold and dollar crisis that created
the most sustained and irresistible pressures on
Washington...The gold and dollar crisis colored all
of Washington's thoughts on responses to the
precarious military situation in South Vietnam.96
However, the exact thoughts and attitudes of the decision
96 Ibid. p.313.
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makers in Washington on the effects of the fiscal and monetary
crisis

to

the

situation

comprehensively researched.

in

Vietnam

have

not

been

This area remains one of further

potential research.
Although the members of Clifford's special committee were
clearly trying to focus primarily on strategic and economic
questions regarding the possibility of escalation in Vietnam,
there is no doubt that they were at least aware of the anti
war sentiment in the country.

Indeed, the National Security

Adviser, Walt Rostow, who was probably the most "hawkish"
individual on the committee,

recognized the importance of

popular opinion, when on February 12, he told the President:
The North Vietnamese audacity "shook U.S. public opinion."97
Thus, it is obvious that the members of the committee did not
make their deliberations in some sort of vacuum, unconscious
of the lack of support for the war.
The powerful chairman of the committee, who would move
the Johnson Administration away from escalation more than any
other individual, was especially concerned about the decline
in

elite

support

Administration,

for

the war.

Clark

Clifford

Ever
had

since

been

joining

the

observing

the

attitudes of corporate leaders towards the war.

What he heard

from his colleagues must have alarmed him.

The monetary

crisis of March of 1968 had badly frightened American bankers
and industrialists.

These individuals were convinced that

97 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p.140.
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further escalation by the Administration could lead to a
massive run on the dollar and the depleted gold reserves of
the

Treasury.

If

such

an

event

were

to

occur,

the

consequences could be fatal for the America.! as well as the
world economy.

For Secretary Clifford, the attitudes of the

business community seem to have played a critical role.

He

recognized that the foreign policy consensus which had existed
since the Truman Administration had been fragmented when he
stated:
What seems not to be understood is that major
elements of the national constituency— the business
community,
the
press,
the
churches,
the
professional groups, college presidents, students,
and most of the intellectual community— have turned
against this war.98
In the wake of the Tet Offensive, anti-war sentiment was
an important influence on the Johnson Administration.

The

single

the

greatest

influence

of

the

Tet

Offensive

political effect it had in the United States.

was

North Vietnam's

ability to launch a coordinated, countrywide offensive in the
South convinced many Americans that the war could not be won.
President Johnson, who had been portraying the ground war in
South Vietnam far too optimistically,
shattered.
approval
percent.99

On
rating

the

eve of the Tet

on his

conduct

had his credibility
Offensive,

of the war

Johnson's

stood

at

40

At the end of February, his approval rating had

98 As cited in Small, p. 130.
" Karnow, Vietnam, p.341.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59.

plummeted

to

26

percent.100

Neither

Lyndon

Johnson's

p.pularity with the American people nor his Presidency would
ever recover from the Tet Offensive.
Two dramatic events would succeed in demonstrating to the
President and his advisors that popular support for the war
effort had collapsed.
1968,

with the

Cronkite.

The first occurred on February 27,

"defection"

of CBS news anchorman Walter

Walter Cronkite was America's most respected and

influential broadcast journalist.

In what was the first

"television war," Cronkite was as important as any opinion
maker in American society.
Cronkite

President Johnson respected Walter

and considered him to be

"fair."101

Cronkite's

ardent support of the Administration's Vietnam policy up to
January 31, 1968, was considered crucial by Lyndon Johnson in
maintaining middle class support.102
However, Walter Cronkite was badly shaken by the Tet
Offensive.

On national television on January 31, Cronkite,

shocked by the images of heavy street fighting in Saigon,
exclaimed:
war!"103

"Jesus Christ!
Cronkite,

I thought we were winning this

like most

every

other

American,

utterly caught off-guard by the Communist Tet Offensive.

was
He

decided to spend two weeks in South Vietnam at the end of
100 Ibid.
101 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, p. 138.
102 Karnow, Vietnam, p.340.
103 Ibid.
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February to survey the progress of the war for himself.
Cronkite returned to national primetime television on the
evening

of February 27,

with a rare editorial

regarding his recent trip to Vietnam.104

This

scheduled
editorial

would be one of the most important media events of 1968, a
fact symbolized by the President's request to his aides that
they tape the newscast for him.
declared

that

the

Administration's

war was

policy

In his editorial, Cronkite

not going

in Vietnam had

well

and

that the

clearly

failed.105

Watching the taped newscast the next day, President Johnson
stated: "I have lost middle America.'*106
There

can

be

little

doubt

that

Walter

Cronkite's

editorial was a significant "turning point" in the popular
attitudes towards the war.

Up to Tet of 1968, Walter Cronkite

had been a very loyal supporter of the President and of the
war against "Communist aggression."

Cronkite was able to

influence tens of millions of Americans in a much more direct
way than the editors of The New York Times or The Washington
Post.

The impact of Cronkite's dramatic editorial has been

best observed by Dr. Melvin Small:
...[I]f Cronkite, a moderate and patriot, was
turning on his policies, then he [Lyndon Johnson]
must be losing millions of like-minded Americans as
well.
Johnson, who had "enormous respect" for
Cronkite, always had considered him "fair."
Now
104 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p. 138.
105 Ibid.
106 Karnow, Vietnam, p.342.
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this fair-minded opinion leader opposed him in what
was a "turning point" of the period.107
Clearly, both the President and his Administration were badly
shaken by Cronkite's dramatic change of views.
The second major event which convincingly evinced the
strong anti-war sentiment in the country was the Democratic
primary in New Hampshire on March 12.
Johnson won the primary,

As expected, Lyndon

but it was a "Pyrrhic" victory.

President Johnson had faced an extremely strong, and utterly
unexpected,

challenge

from

an

obscure

senator,

Gene

McCarthy.108 McCarthy's solid performance in the primary— 42
percent

of

the

registered

delegates— clearly

revealed

substantial discontent within the Democratic Party towards the
Administration and strong anti-war sentiment.

The President

and his advisors were deeply alarmed by McCarthy's strong
showing.
On March 16, a far more dangerous threat emerged against
the President politically: Robert F. Kennedy announced his
decision to seek his Party's nomination for the Presidency.
Robert Kennedy was the only Democrat that President Johnson
feared as a political foe.
incumbent
Kennedy

Democratic
enjoyed

personality

and

an

If any Democrat could unseat an

President,
excellent

great

family

it

was

Robert

reputation,
wealth.

a

He

Kennedy.

charismatic
was

truly

107 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p. 138.
108 Ibid.

;^
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formidable opponent, as recognized by President Johnson:
And then the final straw. The thing I feared from
the first day of my Presidency was actually coming
true.
Robert Kennedy had openly announced his
intention to reclaim the throne.109
Thus, Lyndon Johnson must have felt very beleaguered when
Clifford’s special committee presented its conclusions at the
end of March.

The President must have been rather surprised

that such a hawkish Secretary of Defence would recommend
deescalation.

To resolve any doubts that he may have held

about the committee’s conclusions and recommendations, the
Secretary of Defence advised the President to convene the
State Department’s Senior Advisory Group on Vietnam— the Wise
Men.
The Senior Advisory Group on Vietnam was literally a
collection

of

America's

most

prominent

military, political, and economic.

public

servants,

Under the chairmanship of

former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1949-1953), the group
included George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Cyrus
Vance, Arthur Dean, John McCloy, General of the Array Omar
Bradley,

General Matthew Ridgway,

Robert Murphy,
Goldberg.110

Henry Cabot Lodge,

General Maxwell Taylor,
Abe Fortas,

and Arthur

In their luncheon with the President on March

26, the Wise Men argued that the country could not afford to

109 Kolko, Ariatomv of a War, p.317.
110 Karnow, Vietnam, p.474.
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prosecute the war indefinitely.111

Two themes dominated the

arguments of the Wise Men: divisions in American society and
the general erosion of support for the war.

The conclusions,

presented by Chairman Acheson, supported Secretary Clifford's
recommendation of deescalation.

Yet, for President Johnson

and his more hawkish advisors, the conclusions of the Wise Men
were anticlimactic.

As noted by Melvin Small:

Clifford
portrayed
the
Wise
Men
as
the
representatives and interpreters of the national
"jury"— on Vietnam policy, the media, and the
public. The verdict was in, and this time the Wise
Men could not ignore it. Johnson finally accepted
the verdict at the eleventh hour, a turnabout that
surprised even Clifford.112
The months

of February and March,

1968,

for Lyndon

Johnson, were as arduous as any period in this century.

At

the end of March, the Johnson Administration realized that its
policies in Vietnam no longer had any substantial support.
The course of action adopted by the President was to begin
deescalation of the conflict.

This decision was announced to

the American people during a national television address on
March 31 in which the President also declared that he would
not seek reelection.
This chapter has analyzed Washington's response to the
Communist Tet Offensive and the

factors that led to the

dramatic policy shift of the United States. , Thus,

this

chapter has addressed the first fundamental question raised in
111 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p. 147.
112 Ibid.
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the introduction: What were the factors that led the two
parties to enter into the Paris Peace Talks in 1968, and
subsequently, to conclude them in 1973.

The three catalysts

identified in the introduction- military reversal/stalemate,
the threat of domestic instability,

and the international

balance of power- all acted as influences on the Johnson
Administration, leading to the March 31 announcement to begin
a partial bombing halt over North Vietnam and to seek to enter
into peace talks with Hanoi.

None of the catalysts was truly

dominant in the Johnson Administration's drastic policy shift.
Instead, the catalysts must be understood to be interacting
with one another.
Shortly after President Johnson's offer to initiate peace
talks,

the North Vietnamese foreign ministry,

through its

delegation at the United Nations (UN) in New York, replied
that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was prepared to
enter into such talks.
the

Paris

Peace

On May 13, the prenegotiating stage of

Talks

would

commence

with

the

American

delegation led by Averell W. Harriman and the North Vietnamese
delegation headed by Xuan Thuy.

This stage of the Paris Peace

Talks would be particularly arduous, ending only on November
1.

To understand the motives that led Hanoi to enter into
the Paris Peace Talks, it is first necessary to comprehend the
nature of the Tet Offensive.

The Tet Offensive was designed

not only to win a decisive military victory, but also to end
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a political stalemate in the United States and, to a lesser
extent, South Vietnam.113

The Johnson Administration had to

be forced to confront the limitations of American political,
economic, and military power in Vietnam.

As noted by Gabriel

Kolko:
It would shock the United States out of its
complacency. The Party considered this the key to
the future of the entire conflict, for without an
unlimited American commitment, the Party could
expect victory in the not-too-distant future.114
Thus, entry into negotiations would be a continuation of the
conflict, forcing the United States to make concessions that
would ultimately benefit the Revolution.
Yet, Hanoi was also forced to enter into negotiations for
more immediate reasons.

These reasons correspond to the first

and second catalysts identified in the introduction.

Both

Party and military leaders had been utterly shocked by the
heavy casualties incurred in the South.

Even Gabriel Kolko,

a harsh critic of American policy in Vietnam,

notes that

Communist casualties were considered to have been ’’higher than
many

Senior

Party

leaders

thought

tolerable."115

Particularly alarming to the leaders in Hanoi must have been
the decimation of the ranks of the highly motivated and
trained cadres, especially in the cities.

Therefore, both

Party and military leaders realized that a "breathing space"
113 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.304.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. p.310.
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was needed to recover from the heavy casualties incurred.
Indeed, the seriousness of the Communist military situation in
1968 would later be revealed by two facts:

Viet Cong main

force units would never again play a decisive military role,
and, even in 1975, the Party's presence in the cities of South
Vietnam was at best marginal.
The influence of the second catalyst discussed in the
introduction— domestic instability or the threat of it— was
also a consideration for Hanoi.

By April of 1968, Hanoi had

been at war with the United States for nearly four years.
American

strategic

bombing

campaign,

Operation

The

Rolling

Thunder, had succeeded in destroying the infrastructure of the
DRV. Divisions would emerge within the Politburo over the best
way to conduct the war.
A faction of the Politburo, led by senior Party theorist
Truong Chinh,

argued that the time had come to focus on

"socialist reconstruction"

of the North.116

At the time,

North Vietnam was ranked as one of the poorest countries in
the world by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).117

The

"moderates" within the Politburo, Truong Chinh and Pham Hung,
were

able

to

forge

a

consensus

particularly the "neutral
President

of

the

among

" faction,

Democratic

Republic,

their

colleagues,

which comprised the
Ho

Chi

Minh,

the

Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong, and the
116 Doyle, Lipsman, and Maitland, The North, p. 164.
117 Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA. p.331.
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Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, that entry into the Paris
Peace Talks,

in return for a complete bombing halt, would

benefit the Revolution.118
time

to

replenish

strengthen

its

its

Hanoi would be given valuable

manpower

supply lines

reserves

in eastern

in

the

Cambodia

South,
and the

Laotian Panhandle, and, no less important, divert a fraction
of Chinese and Soviet aid to economic development programs.
At the same time, drawn-out negotiations in Paris would give
the United States the opportunity to begin troop reductions.
Because of the pressures of American public opinion, Hanoi
could reasonably expect Johnson's successor to be essentially
forced to reduce American troop strength.
Thus,

the

analytical

framework

presented

in

the

introduction explains Hanoi1s decision to accept the American
offer to open peace talks.

The heavy losses incurred during

Tet and the weak state of the economy both called for reduced
military activity in the South,

and above all,

an end to

Operation Rolling Thunder. Clearly, the "moderate" faction of
the Politburo succeeded in, at least tempering the hawkish
views of Lao Dong Party First Secretary Le Duan and his
cohorts,

Le Due Tho and Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap.

After Tet,

a consensus had been established in the North

Vietnamese Politburo that entry into peace negotiations, in
return for a complete bombing halt, would be beneficial to
Hanoi's long term objectives. Yet at this stage, the decision
118 Ibid.
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to enter into the Paris Peace Talks rested with the Johnson
Administration.

The rapid reply given by the North Vietnamese

to Johnson's offer to initiate peace negotiations indicates
that the Politburo had decided upon this course several months
prior to April of 1968. Thus, impetus to the pre-negotiating
stage was provided by the Johnson Administration's full-scale
review of its policy in Vietnam.
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PART III: INTERLUDE

CHAPTER IV: STALEMATE BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY
1968-70

The most notable characteristic of the Paris Peace Talks,
which convened on November 1, 1968, was their duration.
almost

fifty-one months,

the delegations

For

from the United

States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV), and the National Liberation Front, engaged in
often futile negotiations, focusing an inordinate amount of
time on pedantic points.

Indeed, it can be argued that the

only substantial progress in the Paris Peace Talks was made
after October 8, 1972.

Nonetheless, during this time, the

catalysts identified in the introduction were influencing the
two principal players in the negotiations, the United States
and the DRV, gradually moving thrm towards a resolution of the
conflict.

The four historical --snapshots" isolated between

1968 and 1973 are especially important as the intransigent
position of Hanoi was gradually altered.

Between two of these

snapshots. President Johnson's dramatic announcement on March
31,

1968,

that the United States was

imposing a partial

bombing halt over the DRV, and the incursions into Cambodia
and Laos, in April-June of 1970 and February-March of 1971,
respectively to sever North Vietnamese supply lines, there was
a long period of perceived stalemate, both politically and
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militarily.
However,

during the time period under consideration,

March 31, 1968, to April 20,

1970, events in Washington,

Saigon, Hanoi, and Paris, were fluid, not static.

Important

changes were influencing the relative balance of forces in
Vietnam, and consequently, the peace process.

Although none

of these events was as dramatic as the "historical snapshots,"
nevertheless, the catalysts were clearly influencing the major
actors in the Paris Peace Talks.
The purpose of this chapter is to act as a "bridge"
between chapters three and five.

By briefly explaining, and

then analyzing, the major events of this period, notably the
Presidential

election

of

1968,

the

policy

of

the

Nixon

Administration towards the war in Vietnam, and, perhaps one of
the

most

controversial

episodes

of

the war,

the

secret

bombings of Cambodia, this chapter will survey the influence
of the catalysts on Washington and Hanoi.

Although there was

no dramatic movement towards a resolution of the conflict,
these

catalysts

were,

nonetheless,

having

an

extremely

important influence on Hanoi and Washington.
Senior American military men, such as Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer,(USN), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(19701974), have charged that Johnson had no clear war aims in
Vietnam.

In the literature, there is a consensus to support

this view: American war aims as formulated by Lyndon Johnson
were rather nebulous.

As noted by David Halberstam, when

General Matthew B. Ridgway asked the Vice-President what
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General Westmoreland's instructions were, concerning war aims,
Vice-President
question.1,119

Humphrey

merely

It is crucial,

stated:

however,

"That's

a

good

to understand that

President Johnson never expected the war to last longer than
1965:
to

Operation Rolling Thunder was intended to bring Hanoi

the

bargaining

guideline

in

table.

Vietnam

was

Lyndon
to

Johnson's

control

only

Communism:

vague

he

was

committed to assisting the South Vietnamese to "win their
contest

against

the

externally

directed

and

supported

communist conspiracy."120
For five months, after March 1968, Washington and Hanoi
had conducted talks to begin peace talks.

Hanoi had refused

to agree to peace talks until a complete bombing halt was
announced, while Washington had maintained that peace talks
had to precede the bombing halt.

The American negotiators,

Averell W. Harriman and Cyrus Vance, had put forward four
critical conditions which would allow a complete bombing halt:
1)
2)
3)
4)

The
commencement
of the peace talks,
including
representatives of South Vietnam, a few days after the
bombing halt;
An end to all North Vietnamese military activity in the
Demilitarized Zone?
An end to large-scale attacks and the firing of rockets
on the cities of South Vietnam, and
Unarmed American reconnaissance flights must be allowed
over North Vietnam.121

Hanoi would utterly refuse to agree to these conditions.

119 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.270.
■
I20

Karnow, Vietnam, p.351

121 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p.92.
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Nonetheless,

on November

1,

1968,

President Johnson

announced a complete bombing halt over North Vietnam and the
start of Paris Peace Talks.

There is substantial reason to

think that Johnson's action was a brazen political move.
announcing

the

start

of the

Paris

Peace

Talks,

By

Johnson

drastically improved the chances of the Democratic candidate,
Hubert Humphrey, of being elected President.

The last minute

concessions of the United States, in allowing the restrictions
to become "informal understandings," could have been made any
time during the preceding months.

The only practical result

of President Johnson's speech of November 1, 1968, was to make
a "cliff-hanger out of the Presidential election," as argued
by Richard Nixon.122
The Paris Peace Talks in Johnson's last months in the
Oval Office, from November, 1968, to January, 1969, failed to
produce a truly substantive negotiating session. The American
and

North

Vietnamese

delegations,

headed

by

Averell

W.

Harriman and Xuan Thuy respectively, reached a bizarre impasse
which would last for ten weeks over the shape of the tables at
the negotiating sessions-123
the

status

of

negotiations.

the

This strange obstacle concerned

National

Liberation

Front

at

the

Hanoi demanded that the representatives from
I
I

the National Liberation Front be granted the status of a
separate

negotiating

delegation.

Washington

and

122 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p.71.
123 Ibid. p.73.
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countered

that

the

National

Liberation

Front

was

not

autonomous from the DRV, so its delegates should be included
with the official negotiating team from Hanoi.
parties

agreed

overcome.
relevant

to

oval

shaped

tables

was

Only when the
the

impasse

The first episode of the Paris Peace Talks is very
to

this

study:

the

North

Vietnamese

tactic

of

delaying the Talks along strange procedural lines was clearly
revealed.
When Richard Nixon was sworn in as the President of the
United States, there were nearly 543,000 American servicemen
in South Vietnam.124

The Paris Peace Talks had not produced

a single substantive negotiating session in nearly three
months.

Such was the magnitude of the foreign policy disaster

Nixon had to deal with from previous Administrations.
correctly noted by Henry Kissinger,
Administration

would

largely

Yet, as

critics of the Nixon

focus

on

the

current

Administration1s policies, while failing to realize that it
was the Johnson Administration which had committed the United
States to a land war in Asia.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had much more tangible
war aims than Lyndon Johnson.
all,

The United States had, above

to extricate itself from the morass in Vietnam.

had sapped American strength and initiative.

Vietnam

Critical issues,

such as Sino-American relations, had been atrophied by the
Vietnam commitment.

The United States had to disengage from

124 Ibid. p.94.
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this quagmire.

Yet, Nixon and Kissinger were committed to the

survival of South Vietnam.

If South Vietnam were betrayed,

the Americans would lose a great deal of credibility and
prestige.

The lives of 40,000 servicemen would have been lost

in vain.
The

Nixon

Administration had

to

establish

negotiating position, literally, from scratch.

a strong

Despite the

fact that it was the Johnson Administration which had first
initiated the Peace Talks, there was no comprehensive American
bargaining position when Nixon took office.

The only extant

bargaining position which existed was the Manila Formula of
October 24, 1966, which stated that :[A]llied forces... shall
be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side
withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration, and
the level of violence thus subsides.
These forces will be
withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months
after the above conditions have been fulfilled.125
In such a complicated negotiating forum as the Paris
Peace Talks, it is not surprising that it took almost a year
for a firm American position to be established.

The basic

American strategy was to force Hanoi to compromise at the
bargaining table by making the continuation of its war effort
prohibitive.
adopt

the

To accomplish this objective, Kissinger would

"two

track"

negotiating

strategy,

which

attempt to separate political issues from military ones.

would
Yet,

Kissinger had to first establish a comprehensive negotiating
position before substantive talks could begin.
The first major American initiative was the President's

125 Ibid. p.91.
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nationally televised address of May 14, 1969.

Nixon proposed

an eight-point program to guide the American delegation in
Paris,

now headed by Henry Cabot Lodge.

This new policy

called for mutual withdrawals from South Vietnam by the United
States

and North Vietnam,

participation by

the

National

Liberation Front in South Vietnam*s political process, free
elections

under

international

supervision,

and

an

internationally supervised cease-fire.126 For the first time
ever, a coherent American negotiating position had been put
forward.

Yet, the North Vietnamese categorically rejected it.

The Administration’s attention soon turned to unilateral
American troop withdrawals.

Nixon had entered office with a

commitment to a "secret plan"

for ending the war.

For

domestic political purposes, Nixon was virtually required to
continue the deescalation of the American war effort and to
announce even token troop withdrawals.

The Administration

hoped (futilely) that these troop withdrawals would increase
public support for the troops that remained.127

In addition,

the ARVN would be expected to carry a greater burden of the
war effort, thus reducing American casualties.
Domestic political pressures would be the genesis of a
new American strategy: Vietnamization.

By providing advanced

training and logistical support, the United States hoped to
establish an ARVN that was largely self-sufficient, such as

126 Samuel Lipsman and Edward Doyle,
Little, Brown, and Company, 1983), p.98.

The north. (Boston:

127 ibid.
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the military of South Korea, or even completely sufficient
with its own resources, such as the Israeli Army.

Strangely,

the strongest advocate of Vietnamization was Secretary of
Defence Melvin R. Laird.
as Mr.

Exactly how such an intelligent man

Laird could become such a strong advocate of this

policy when the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam,
General Creighton W. Abrams,(USA) and the Commander-in-Chief
of

the

United

States

Pacific

Command,

Admiral

John

S.

McCain,(USN), were opposed to it, must remain a mystery.
Laird was backed by Secretary of State William Rogers in
support of Vietnamization while Henry Kissinger reluctantly
agreed.128
As clearly expounded by Henry Kissinger, Vietnamization
was meant to be a "public relations coup."129 Vietnamization
was

foremost a strategy influenced by domestic political

pressures.

Nixon wanted to be the President who would achieve

a "peace with honour."
serious

consequences

Yet, Vietnamization would lead to
in

the

Paris

Peace

Talks

and

domestically.
The policy of Vietnamization would completely undermine
the American position in Paris that there had to be mutual
withdrawal.

At the Midway Conference in June of 1969, Nixon

had unilaterally announced the withdrawal of 25,000 American

128 Kissinger, White House Years, p.240.
129 Ibid.
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servicemen without any similar concession by Hanoi.130 Thus,
there was no incentive for Hanoi to make concessions.
United States was withdrawing from Vietnam.

The

Clearly, North

Vietnamese Defence Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap's argument
that the Americans lacked the willpower for a sustained land
war was being confirmed.131
If the Administration calculated that a minor withdrawal
of

American

troops

would

alleviate

domestic

political

pressure, it was clearly incorrect.

As Kissinger very much

feared,

was merely a

the

peanut."132

first troop withdrawal

"salted

The troop withdrawal announcements would gain

their own momentum.

Once one troop withdrawal was completed,

the domestic pressure for further withdrawals would become
unbearable.

This fact was revealed by Nixon in September,

when the original troop withdrawal of 25,000 men, augmented by
an additional increment of 35,000 men, allowed the draft calls
for that year to be cancelled.133
was

preparing plans

Meanwhile, the Pentagon

for the withdrawal

of an additional

260,000 servicemen.
North Vietnam's War Aims
The ultimate objectives

of the North Vietnamese war

effort during this period have become very clear from events

130 Ibid. p.243.
131 John Morocco, Rain of Fire. {Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1983), p.82.
132 Kissinger, White House Years, p.
133 Kissinger, White House Years, p.247.
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since 1975.

The reunification of Vietnam was obviously the

single most important objective of the Democratic Republic.
However, equally important was the establishment of Vietnamese
hegemony in Indochina.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in

1978 was clear proof of Hanoi's intentions.

Hanoi's ultimate

aim was the consolidation of a regional power bloc to contest
its old nemesis, China.
Ho

Chi

Minh's

entire

Vietnamese nationalism.

life

had

been

dedicated

to

For sixteen years, Hanoi had waged a

vicious war against the American-backed regime in Saigon to
achieve these twin goals. The people of North Vietnam were
forced to make great sacrifices for the reunification of their
country, which by any perspective was a noble goal.

Perhaps

the most salient characteristic of the North Vietnamese war
effort was the level of devastating casualties.

In 1988,

American scholar Stanley Karnow asked Senior General Giap the
total casualties suffered by the Democratic Republic.

Giap

merely shrugged and stated: "We still don't know."134 Later,
an aide to Senior General Giap would estimate total casualties
of at least one million.135
Thus, the war effort had become critical to maintaining
the legitimacy of the Lao Dong Party. If the leaders of the
Democratic Republic were to accept a settlement in Paris, it
was

absolutely

crucial

that the great

sacrifices

of the

134 Michael Lee banning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the
NVA. (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992), p.21.
135 Ibid.
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Vietnamese people not seem to have been in vain.

Therefore,

a "peace with honour" was just as important to the Central
Committee of the Party as it was to the Nixon Administration.
The dilemma facing the North Vietnamese leadership has been
neatly summarized by Mitchell:
The general rule seems to be that the higher the
sacrifices involved, the more people will feel that
some significant gains must be achieved in the
final settlement to make up for all they endured.
The more prolonged the conflict, the more difficult
it becomes for the leaders to accept anything short
of a significant improvement on the pre-conflict
situation as a final settlement.136
Thus,

the

senior

recognized that

leadership

it could

of

the

not be

seen

Central
as

Committee

"betraying the

Revolution" by the rank and file of the Lao Dong Party and,
above all, the People's Army of Vietnam(PAVN). This factor,
perhaps more than any other, largely explains why the Paris
Peace Talks dragged on from November, 1968 to January, 1973.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese negotiating strategy in Paris
had to aim towards these ultimate objectives.
Hanoi's Negotiating Strategy
Hanoi's military and negotiating strategies were thus
working very well.

To Hanoi, the political struggle and the

military struggle were both a part of greater strategy.

The

negotiating strategy adopted by Hanoi was foremost a form of
psychological warfare.
Hanoi had succeeded in committing Washington to ending
the strategic air campaign against North Vietnam, Operation

136 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, p. 180.
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Rolling Thunder, in return for only agreeing to the start of
the Paris Peace Talks.

Washington had gained no concrete

concessions from Hanoi.

The fact that intransigence would

characterize Hanoi's strategy was demonstrated by the impasse
over the shape of the negotiating tables.
For

Hanoi,

propaganda forum.

the

Paris

Peace

Talks

would

provide

a

The North Vietnamese would put forward the

mirage of their dedication to a negotiated settlement.

Yet,

the American media would always blame Richard Nixon for his
iniquity and failure to conclude the Peace Talks, despite the
fact that the United States was announcing troop withdrawals
and offering unilateral concessions, without any reciprocity
from North Vietnam.
The basic position of Hanoi in the Paris Peace Talks was
expounded

by

Xuan

Thuy

in

Kissinger on August 4, 1969.

a

secret

meeting

with

Henry

There could be no separation of

the military and political issues.137

The military solution

required the unconditional withdrawal of American troops.
However,
political

a

military

solution

solution— the

was

removal

of

meaningless
President

without
Nguyen

a

Van

Thieu(1967-1975) and Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky(1967-1971)
and the establishment of a coalition government dominated by
the Communists.138 In other words, the war would not end and
the American prisoners of war would be held captive until the

137 Ibid. p.316.
138 Ibid.
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Thieu government was removed.
In this context,

Kissinger's "two track" negotiating

strategy of separating the political and military issues would
be meaningless if the North Vietnamese refused to compromise.
The United States made major concessions, such as agreeing to
a unilateral withdrawal, concerning a military solution, but
North Vietnam refused to change its position.
strategy

rested

on

the

concept

of

Hanoi's basic

time.135

Anti-war

sentiment would eventually force the United States to make
these concessions.
Vietnam.

The United States was pulling out of South

North Vietnam would only have to bide its time until

there was no longer an American combat presence to support the
ARVN.

In a worst case scenario for the Americans, North

Vietnam could overrun South Vietnam and still hold American
prisoners-of-warI
In retrospect,

North Vietnam's war aims were crystal

clear to any observer.

American war aims were very nebulous

under President Johnson.

Nixon would formulate much clearer

war aims, but his strategy had a fundamental contradiction:
the

need to

domestic

withdraw

political

American
pressure

ground
and

forces

the

because

need

to

of

give

Vietnamization time to work.
The

Nixon

Administration

clearly

faced

a

desperate

I

situation in Vietnam upon its inauguration: the Paris Peace
Talks had failed to provide a single substantive negotiating

139 Lipsman and Doyle, Fighting for Time, p.59.
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session, American casualties were totalling 250 servicemen a
week, and the nation was seriously divided.

Yet, Richard

Nixon was determined to avoid a disgraceful withdrawal from
South Vietnam.

The President was very skeptical about the

utility of the Paris Peace Talks.140

He believed that Hanoi

would only make significant concessions if unbearable military
pressure was brought to bear.

To this end, Nixon in March of

19 69 ordered a major escalation in the strategic air campaign
against Hanoi's lines of communications in eastern Cambodia.
The President's dramatic escalation of the war was a result of
two factors: North Vietnamese intransigence in Paris arid the
fundamental contradiction between Vietnamization and American
domestic priorities.
When Nixon took office, he was determined to rejuvenate
the Paris Peace Talks.

The delaying tactics used by North

Vietnam in Paris were complicated by a new factor: a major
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) buildup was underway in the
Cambodian sanctuaries.141
bold

action

against

The President was convinced that

this

buildup

would

be

an

effective

American initiative: "I think a very definite change of policy
toward Cambodia probably should be one of the first orders of
business when we get in."142

The North Vietnamese Politburo

had to understand that the United States

wanted peace, but

140 Ibid.
141 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 113.
142 Ibid.
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not a peace without honour.
would

accomplish

this

goal

An effective military operation
much

quicker

than

any

other

expedient.
Nixon and Kissinger have been much maligned for the air
strikes in Cambodia, known as Operation Menu.

Yet Operation

Menu was the Nixon Administrations reaction to an escalation
in the war by North Vietnam.

On February 23, 3969, the PAVN

launched a countrywide offensive.

American casualties in the

first week of the offensive totalled 4 53 servicemen; South
Vietnamese

casualties

were nearly

airborne battalion.143

the equivalent of an

President Nixon was infuriated; the

North Vietnamese had refused to bargain in good faith for
nearly five months,

while the United States had deferred

military action against the Cambodian sanctuaries.
The Mini-Tet Offensive of 1969 was clearly planned well
in advance of Nixon's Inauguration: the PAVN needed time to
prepare

such

a multi-divisional

operation.

Two

of

the

"understandings" that had been previously established had been
violated by Hanoi.

This action was certainly designed to test

the new President’s reaction to such a crisis.

Yet Hanoi had

cynically violated the "understandings" without any American
provocation.
response;

Such

an

action

could

a devastating military

only

campaign.

be met

by

one

with Hanoi,

diplomacy always had to be backed by military strength, as
France had learned in 1954.

143 David Fulghum and Terence Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial.
(Boston; Little, Brown, and Company, 1983), p.17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84.

Nixon's decision to retaliate with air strikes in the
Cambodian

sanctuaries

was

concluded

on

February

23.144

However, the pressures of domestic politics and the fact that
I

the President was on an official European state visit delayed
the response by nearly a month.
which would be used most

Nevertheless, the strategy

effectively

in

1972

was being

developed by 1969: defeat North Vietnamese aggression and
I

1

allow military reverses to force concessions.

At this time,

Hanoi had chosen the battlefield over diplomacy.

Battlefield

results, not diplomacy, would determine the Paris Peace Talks.
If Nixon had failed to reply firmly, he would have appeared as
a craven to Hanoi.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle
G.

Wheeler,(USA),

(1964-70),

was

alerted

to

prepare

the

contingency plans regarding Cambodia and General Abrams was
ordered

to

select

targets.

The

planning

for Operation

Breakfast took place at the White House in great secrecy
during a working breakfast meeting that included only the
President, the National Security Advisor, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General John R.
McConnel, (USAF) , the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force
for Operations, Lieutenant General John W. Vogt,(USAF), the
Secretary of Defence, Melvin R. Laird, and the Secretary of
State, William P. Rogers.145

Conspicuous by their absence

144 Kissinger, White House Years, p.475.
145 Ibid.
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from this meeting were Vice-President Spiro Agnew, Air Force
Vice-Chief of Staff, General John D. Ryan,

(USAF), and the

Commanding

General

Nazzoro,

General,
(USAF).

ultimately

Pacific

The

destroyed

Air

secrecy
the

Forces,

which

Nixon

White

Joseph

characterized,
House

was

and

clearly

demonstrated.
The air strike against Base Area 353 (north of the main
positions

of

the

American

1st

Infantry

Division)

was

a

success.

General Abrams was gratified by the results and

requested further air strikes against a range of Base Areas.
Nixon, however, originally intended Operation Breakfast to be
Ma one-time only affair.” He would be provoked into ordering
a series of air strikes, Operation Menu, by a North Korean
action.

On April 14, North Korean MiGs shot down an unarmed

American reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan.1A&
Nixon was irate and possibly ready to allow Task Force 77
of the United States Seventh Fleet to retaliate against North
Korea.

However, the President's advisors talked him out of

this step.

Instead, Nixon ordered a resumption of the secret

bombings of the Cambodian sanctuaries.

This action was not

aimed at Hanoi or Pyongyang, but rather Moscow.

The United

States was determined to show the Communist giant that any
hostile actions by itself or its allies would be met with
American military force.
Operation Menu clearly had an important effect on the
■/

W6 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p.117.
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Paris Peace Talks.

The Nixon Administration had repeatedly

requested secret meetings with the North Vietnamese in Paris
for almost three months.

Hanoi,

however, had steadfastly

opposed this initiative for reasons that are unclear.

Yet,on

March 22, Hanoi would accept Ambassador Lodge's proposal for
a secret meeting, seventy-two hours after it was proposed.147
The rapid acquiescence on March 22 to the American proposal
can perhaps be explained by the North Vietnamese desire to
relieve the pressure on the Cambodian Sanctuaries.
Another important effect of Operation Menu was that it
aided

Vietnamization.

Although

the

success

of

aerial

interdiction in the Vietnam War remains controversial there
can be no doubt that repeated B-52 strikes prevented the PAVN
from massing its forces.

The threat posed by the B-52 strikes

was obviously recognized by the military commander of the
Central Office for South Vietnam(COSVN), Lieutenant-General
Tran Van Tra.

Thus, Operation Menu, would have acted as a

powerful deterrent to any large-scale PAVN/VC attacks in and
around Saigon.
The North Vietnamese Politburo's actions support this
assessment.

In July of 1969, Resolution 14 was issued and it

called for the cadres to break up the main force units and
transform the companies into Sapper units.148

A change in

North Vietnamese tactics was clearly underway as reflected by

147 Lipsman and Doyle, Fighting for Time, p.78.
148 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 119.
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MACV records:

in the second half of 1969,

battalion-size

attacks dropped from 29 to 5 and smaller conventional attacks
dropped from 2,185 to 1,620.

In 1970 and 1971, there were

only 15 PAVN or VC battalion-size attacks.149

The North

Vietnamese had shifted away from the "big unit" war of 1967
and 1968.
For the North Vietnamese, this strategy was logical. The
Americans were withdrawing from Vietnam and it was only a
matter of time before the PAVN faced only the ARVN.

Instead

of massing their forces inside the Cambodian sanctuaries,
where Operation Menu would have decimated them, the North
Vietnamese bided their time by strengthening their units and
improving the lines of communication.
If Operation Menu had failed to prevent the PAVN from
massing

its

endangered.

forces,

Vietnamization

itself

may

have

been

The decline in large unit enemy attacks allowed

the Americans to deescalate while their
engaged in heavy combat.

forces were not

Therefore, American casualties were

kept low and the ARVN was given time to modernize and improve
its force structure.
However, the secret bombings of Cambodia may have been
directed towards another target: China.
aspect,

To understand this

it is first necessary to review the international

balance of power.
gradually altering.

During this time period, the balance

was

The changes in the balance resulted from

149 Ibid.
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three

inter-related

developments:

an

expansionist

Soviet

defence and foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet schism, and the
stabilization of the Chinese domestic situation after April of
1969-

All of these changes in the balance of power shattered

the belief held in Washington since 1949 that a "MoscowBeijing

Axis"

existed,

which

threatened

vital

Western

interests in Asia-

The changes in the international balance

of

lead

power

would

to

one

of

Nixon’s

greatest

accomplishments: the rapprochement with China.
Since 1962, particularly after the downfall of Nikita
Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Onion, in 1964, the Soviet Union had been engaged in a
large scale military build-up.

Sometime in either 1968 or

1969, the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Red Army achieved
nuclear parity with the United States, an objective of the
Soviet General Staff since the late 1940s.150 The leadership
in the Kremlin, along with a new generation of military men,
led by the Defence Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko and the
Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Marshal Matvey Zakharov, now
adopted a much more aggressive foreign policy to complement
the new found nuclear security.
Both the willingness and the ability of the Soviet Union
to

intervene

decisively

in

regions

of

great

strategic

importance were demonstrated on August 21, 1968.

On this

date, the Red Army conducted a multi-divisional invasion of

150 Beckett, The March of Communism, p.76.
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Czechoslovakia to remove tne reform-minded General Secretary
of

the

Czech

Communist

Party,

Alexander

Dub'cek.151

The

Kremlin justified its brutal action, which shocked both the
West and China, by its enunciation of a new security formula,
the Brezhnev Doctrine.
that it had both

By this doctrine, the Kremlin declared

the duty and rightto intervene in the

internal affairs of fellow socialist states where socialism
was threatened.

As stated by Marshal Nie Rongzhen, China's

last surviving Marshal, the senior leadership of both the
Chinese Communist Party(CCP) and the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) interpreted the Brezhnev Doctrine as directed towards
China.152
Clearly, the Brezhnev Doctrine was an important stage in
the

Sino-Soviet schism.

By 1968,

it was obvious to most

scholars and China observers that fundamental ideological and
national interests separated Beijing and Moscow.

If there

ever had been a "Moscow-Beijing Axis," it had been shattered
by

Khrushchev's decisions

to

refuse

to

provide nuclear

technology to the PLA in 1958 and to recall Soviet economic
advisors from China in I960.153

Khrushchev and the senior

ideologues in the CPSU were deeply alarmed by the radicalism
of Mao as clearly demonstrated by The Great Leap Forward.

For

his part, Mao believed that Khrushchev and his colleagues had

151 Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, and Reform, p. 162.
152 Salisbury, The New Emperors, p.273.
153 Ibid.
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betrayed the revolution of Lenin and Stalin.
Sino-Soviet relations would actually worsen after 1964,
when Leonid Brezhnev assumed the position of General Secretary
of the CPSU.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution deeply

alarmed Brezhnev and the Party's senior theorists, Yegor K.
Ligachev

and

Nikolai

Tikhonov.154

However,

Sino-Soviet

relations would not worsen to the point of open warfare until
the winter of 1969.

In the first months of 1969, the PLA

would detonate its first atomic device.

The fact that the

Chinese now had a nuclear capability deeply concerned the
senior leadership of both the CPSU and the Red Army.

A basic

tenet of Soviet defence policy since 1945 had been to prevent
instability on the country's borders.

The tumultuous events

in China were obviously considered a direct threat to Soviet
national security by the Kremlin
In March of 1969,

savage fighting erupted along the

Ussuri and Amur rivers between corps-sized units of the Red
Army

and

quickly

the
to

PLA.155

the

The

perceived

Soviet
Chinese

General

Staff

aggression

reacted

by

heavily

reinforcing its forces in Siberia and the Far East.

By the

end of 1969, the Red Army had forty divisions stationed in the
region.156

The

severity of the

Sino-Soviet

conflict was

revealed in the summer of 1969 when the Kremlin,

154 Beckett, The March of Communism, p. 182.
155 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 176.
156 Ibid.
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diplomatic

back-channels

broached

to

Washington

the

possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike on Chinese
nuclear facilities in the deserts of Xianjiang.157
It was highly symbolic that a month after the first
clashes took place on the Amur and Ussuri rivers, the Ninth
Party Congress was held in Beijing.

The mere fact that the

Congress was even held, in the midst of the turmoil of The
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a major victory for
the Party bureaucrats, most notably Zhou Enlai, and the senior
leadership
declaring

of the

PLA against the

Marshal

Lin

Biao,

radical

Minister

of

Maoists.

Defence,

to

By
be

Chairman Mao's "heir apparent," the Congress evinced to the
world

that

the

worst

excesses

of The

Cultural Revolution were now history.158
the

Congress

also

presented

a

united

Great

Proletarian

No less important,
front,

which

was

especially crucial considering the fact that China and the
Soviet Union were on the brink of war.
By the summer of 1968, Mao had probably recognized the
need to restore stability to China in the wake of The Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 had greatly worried Mao.

He

obviously concluded that China's domestic turmoil had to be
brought to an end to allow the country to deal with the
nuclear

threat

from

Moscow,

both

diplomatically

and

157 Ibid.
158 Alan P.L.Liu, How China Is Governed. (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Kail, 1984), p.50.
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militarily.

This decision by Mao would eventually lead to the

rapprochement with the United States.
The clashes along the Ussuri River marked a watershed in
Sino-American relations since the Korean war.

Mao Zedong at

this time must have realized that China needed the United
States to act as a counterweight to the Soviet menace.
the United States was only of value if it were strong.

Yet,
To

Mao, the air strikes in Cambodia must have represented the
actions of a strong nation willing to use its military power.
Nineteen sixty-nine would mark the beginning of the SinoAmerican detente that would culminate in Nixon's state visit
to Beijing in February of 1972.

The importance of Sino-

American detente must not be underestimated
Nixon's policy in Vietnam.

with respect to

China represented North Vietnam's

great Achilles Heel: logistics.

Although it is true that only

12.5 percent of Hanoi's war material came by the two railways
and eight roads from China, the remaining 87.5 percent came
through a single port. Haiphong.159 Haiphong could easily be
shut down by mining its approaches; in such a situation, Hanoi
would be completely dependent on Beijing's willingness to keep
the land routes open.

If Beijing were to close the land

routes, Hanoi would be left isolated on the battlefield.
United

States

would

now

seek

to

improve

The

Sino-American

relations for this eventuality.
The secret bombings of Cambodia remain one of the most

159 Kissinger, White House Years, p.507.
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controversial episodes of the Nixon Presidency.

Domestic

politics was the determining factor in this secrecy: Nixon was
rather fearful of the anti-war backlash that would result if
it was learned that the United States were attacking targets
in Cambodia.
towards

In fact, Operation Menu would be the first step

Watergate:

in

May

of

1969,

Federal

Bureau

of

Investigation(FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover would make use of
phone taps on government officials to discover who was leaking
critical information to the press.
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a survey
of events that influenced the Paris Peace Accords between two
of the historical snapshots, the decision of President Johnson
to begin deescalation of the war, announced on March 31, 1968,
and the military incursions into Cambodia and Laos between
April,

1970, and February,

1971.

During this period, the

Nixon Administration had made considerable concessions to the
North

Vietnamese,

such

as

implementing

unilateral

troop

withdrawals. However, the Politburo in Hanoi had refused to
grant

a

single

concession

in

return.

Thus,

reasonable offer by the Nixon Administration

despite

a

to end the war,

presented by the President on national television on May 14,
1969,

the

American

Politburo
initiative

in Hanoi
to

categorically

conclude

the

Paris

rejected
Peace

any

Talks.

Therefore, events lend substance to the first hypothesis put
forward in the introduction: the Paris Peace Talks would only
be concluded after a fundamental shift in the position of the
North Vietnamese Politburo.
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This chapter has also related the role of the three
catalysts in influencing the two principal parties in the
Paris Peace Talks.

The Nixon Administration v/as obviously

under great domestic pressure to bring the war to an end.
Strong anti-war sentiment in the country, particularly in the
Congress and in the business community,
Administration

to

continue

the

forced

policy

of

the Nixon
deescalation

initiated by its predecessor. Therefore, in this context, the
troop withdrawals, which were announced by President Nixon in
July of 1969, and the concomitant policy of Vietnamization,
were driven by domestic political considerations, not military
necessity.

Thus, the second hypothesis raised in the first

chapter, that strong anti-war sentiment would force the Nixon
Administration to conclude the Paris Peace Talks, has also
been addressed.
Therefore, Hanoi's hard-line negotiating stance was very
logical.
implement

As long as the Nixon Administration was driven to
troop

withdrawals

because

of

strong

anti-war

sentiment, regardless of actions by North Vietnam, Hanoi had
no incentive to reciprocate American concessions. However, the
logic behind the North Vietnamese negotiating intransigence
was very obvious to Richard Nixon, who probably had a better
understanding of the dynamics of international relations than
any other American president of this century. If North Vietnam
was ever going to negotiate in "good faith,"

which to the

Nixon Administration meant dropping unreasonable demands, such
as the removal of the President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van
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Thieu, Hanoi would have to be coerced into doing so. Despite
the complexities of the American domestic situation, Nixon did
possess two "trump cards" to use against North Vietnam: Great
Power diplomacy and strategic air power.
As briefly analyzed in this chapter, the international
balance of power was in its greatest period of flux since the
end of the Korean War. The Sino-Soviet schism presented the
Nixon Administration with one of the greatest diplomatic
opportunities

since

1953.

President

Nixon

and

National

Security Adviser Kissinger understood this opportunity better
than most other politicians in the United States. However,
attempts

to

achieve

a

diplomatic

breakthrough

of

this

magnitude would by their very nature be long term. In the
short term, Nixon had to try to buy time for Vietnamization,
while

at

the

withdrawals.

same

time

implementing

large

scale

troop

In addition, some sort of leverage had to be

gained against Hanoi to try to force its leaders to modify a
very hard-line negotiating position. Nixon resorted to the use
of

strategic

air

power

against

the

PAVN

base

areas

in

Cambodia. The exact military results of Operation Menu remain
controversial to this day, but the airstrikes clearly were
straining the North Vietnamese supply lines in Cambodia, to
some extent, and preventing COSVN from massing its regiments
for large

scale attacks in the Saigon region.

Thus,

the

airstrikes were of some military value.
Therefore in this chapter, the basic strategy used by the
Nixon Administration to force Hanoi to accept reasonable terms
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in Paris begins to take shape. A combination of military
pressure and Great Power diplomacy would be used to isolate
North Vietnam and force its leaders to modify their hardline
position in the Paris Peace Talks. Thus, there is evidence to
support the two hypotheses being tested in the thesis:

that

a fundamental shift in the negotiating position of Hanoi
allowed the Paris Peace Accords to be concluded and that
strong anti-war pressure in the United States forced the Nixon
Administration to conclude the Paris Peace Accords.
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PART IV: HANOI DETERMINES TO ROLL THE DICE
CHAPTER V: THE NORTH RESPONDS TO AMERICAN ESCALATION OF THE
CONFLICT

Upon the anniversary of Richard Nixon's first year in
office, the Administration could look back on its Vietnam
policy with pride.
been

established

A strong American negotiating position had
at

the

Paris

Peace

Vietnamization was being implemented.
already been
lowered.
President.

conducted

and

Talks,

while

Troop withdrawals had

American

casualties

had

been

Yet, Vietnam was also most frustrating for the
The Paris Peace Talks were hopelessly deadlocked.

Unilateral American concessions had failed to alleviate the
situation.

Only the battlefield situation in Cambodia in 1970

and in Laos in 1971 would apparently alter Hanoi's bargaining
position,
Cambodia

not

diplomacy.

and to

However,

a lesser degree,

the

Laos,

incursions
would

into

also have

critical domestic repercusions for the Nixon Administration.
The

critical

impasse

at

the

Paris

Peace

Talks

was

symbolized by the resignation of the American Ambassador Henry
Cabot

Lodge,

in November,

1969:

replacement until June of 1970.

Nixon would

not

name

a

Yet, a major initiative would
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be announced by Nixon in April of 1970,

that could have

provided the impetus for a settlement if not for the North
Vietnamese
strategy.

refusal

to

adopt

the

"two-track

negotiating"

This initiative would result from American domestic

politics, not as a particular strategy for conducting the
Paris Peace Talks.
On December 15,

1969,

the President had announced a

second troop withdrawal- 50,000 servicemen over a period of
four months.160

The North Vietnamese refused to grant a

single concession in return.
Kissinger,
"Special

In secret meetings with Henry

on March 16 and April 4, the North Vietnamese
Advisor"

Le

Due

Tho

categorically

rejected

an

American offer of mutual withdrawal with all American forces
to be removed over a period of sixteen months after the cease
fire was signed.161

The next troop withdrawal of 150,000

servicemen, announced on April 20, which would be conducted
over a period of twelve months,
domestic political considerations.

was

forced on Nixon by

Hanoi had no reason to

bargain in good faith: the Americans had withdrawn 115,000
servicemen,

and announced the withdrawal of 150,000 more,

without a single North Vietnamese concession!

North Vietnam

was receiving at the negotiating table what it had been unable
to achieve on the battlefield between 1965 and 1968.
Yet,

the

American

position

was

far

from

hopeless.

160 Palmer, The 25 Year War. 102.
161 Karnow, Vietnam, p.672.
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Because

the

April

20

troop

withdrawal

announcement

was

scheduled over a period of twelve months, the Pentagon could
manage the withdrawal so that highly flexible and versatile
units, such as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), would remain in the
country the longest.

Therefore, the United States maintained

the ability to seize the initiative.

Nixon would do exactly

this in Cambodia in 1970.
On March

18,

the ruler of Cambodia,

Sihanouk, was overthrown m

✓

a coup d'etat launched by Lon Nol,

his Prime Minister and Minister of War.162
reasons for Sihanouk's downfall,
Kissinger,

were

his

Prince Norodom

disastrous

The principal

in the opinion of Henry
economic

policy

and

his

inability to evict North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces from
Cambodian soil.163 Although Kissinger's assessment of events
is obviously biased, nonetheless, his arguments are basically
sound.

Lon Nol now adopted a harsh anti-Communist stance: the

port of Sihanoukville was closed to the North Vietnamese and
the North Vietnamese were ordered out of the country.

The

Politburo in Hanoi now reacted savagely to this threat to its
lines of communications in southern South Vietnam: the North
Vietnamese 1st and 7th divisions and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th
divisions attacked westward out of the Cambodian sanctuaries
towards Phnom Penh.

By April 14, the eastern provinces of

162 Kissinger, White House Years, p.976.
163 Ibid.
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Cambodia were firmly under Communist control and a siege of
Phnom

Penh was

only

a matter

of

time.

This

situation

threatened the American position in South Vietnam as noted by
Richard Nixon:

"...we would have been signing a death warrant

but for South Vietnam as well.

A communist dominated Cambodia

would have placed South Vietnam in an untenable military
situation...1,164
The Joint

Chiefs

of

Staff

were

ordered

to

prepare

contingency plans for a massive American-South Vietnamese
attack into the Cambodian sanctuaries to disrupt the enemy
lines-of-communications.
Operation

Toan

Thang

On April 26, the President approved
43/Rockcrusher.165

The

Communist

sanctuaries were concentrated in two areas: the Parrot’s Beak
and the Fishhook, west and northwest of Saigon respectively.
A South Vietnamese task force, under the command of Lieutenant
General Do Cao Tri, commanding general of the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam(ARVN) III corps, would attack into the
Parrot's Beak, while a joint Allied task force, including
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 11th
Armored

Cavalry

Regiment,

under

the

command

of

Brigader

General Robert Shoemaker, would attack the Fishhook.

D-day

was set for April 30.166
On April 30, the President addressed the American people.

164 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 116.
165 Kissinger, White House Years, p.992.
166 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 123.
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Explaining the desperate strategic situation in Cambodia,
Nixon notified the nation of the Cambodian incursion.

To

placate domestic anti-war sentiment, the President declared
that American ground forces would remain in-country for only
sixty days and penetrate no further than twenty-one miles.167
Despite such a show of restraint, anti-war protests soon shook
the nation, particularly after the shooting of four students
at Kent State University on May 4.
Militarily,
American
individual

and

the

Cambodian

South

incursion

Vietnamese

forces

was

a

success.

captured

weapons to equip 74 North Vietnamese

enough
infantry

battalions and enough crew served weapons to equip 25 North
Vietnamese

battalions.

ammunition

was

More

captured-168

than
North

a

year’s

Vietnamese

supply
and

of

Viet

Cong(VC) forces under the command of the Central Office for
South Vietnam(COSVN) would never fully recover from this blow
to their lines of communications.

After 1970, the People's

Army of Vietnam(PAVN) and VC forces would never again mount
large-scale attacks (regimental size or larger) in the critical
southwest approaches to Saigon or the Mekong Delta.

This

basic military fact supports the arguments of President Nixon
and Dr.Kissinger that the Cambodian incursion was a great
military success.

As a direct result, Vietnamization was

given critical time to be implemented.

167 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1018.
168 Ibid. p. 1019.
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However,

the

controversial.

incursion

into

To many Americans,

hastily improvised.

remains

operation

seemed

The military failed to locate and destroy

the much celebrated COSVN.
have beneficial

the

Cambodia

results

Nonetheless, the incursion did

for the United States

and South

Vietnam, despite the fact that there were critical flaws in
its planning,

as pointed out by generals Bruce R. Palmer,

Jr.,and Arthur S. Collins.169
Nixon and Kissinger now believed that the time had come
to appoint a new ambassador to the Paris Peace Talks.

It was

hoped that Hanoi would be willing to negotiate seriously with
the new Ambassador David K. Bruce after the show of American
force.

However,

domestically,

the

Nixon

Administration's

particularly in the Congress,

position

was seriously

weakened by the strong anti-war sentiment that engulfed the
country as a result of the escalation of the conflict.

The

Congress, enraged by the decision to escalate the conflict,
passed the Cooper-Church Amendment in December of 1970, which
prohibited American ground forces from operating outside South
Vietnam.170

The inability of the Nixon Administration to

muster enough votes in Congress to defeat the bill was clear
evidence that support for the President's policy in Vietnam
was at best tenuous. President Nixon made a major unilateral
concession in October by offering a "stand still" cease-fire,

169 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 171.
170 Ibid. p.521.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103.

which would allow North Vietnamese forces to remain in South
Vietnam.171
the

As a direct result of the Cambodian incursion,

American

politically,

negotiating
but the

position

had

North Vietnamese

been

position

weakened
had

been

weakened militarily.
For the next six months, the Paris Peace Talks would
proceed in a fitful manner.

In August, Hanoi would agree to

another round of secret talks.

Because of the need to

alleviate domestic pressure after Cambodia, Kissinger made a
major concession to break the impasse: the American withdrawal
after the war would be complete,
forces

remaining

in

South

with no residual combat

Vietnam.172

In

response,

the

People's Revolutionary Goverment(PRG-a front organization used
by the Lao Dong Party in South Vietnam) issued Madame Binh's
Eight Points in September.

The North Vietnamese proposal was

unacceptable.

required

It

still

unconditional

American

withdrawal and the installation of a provisional coalition
government

in

Saigon.173

The

Paris

Peace

Talks

were

no

closer to resolution in 1970 than 1968.
Even as the Paris Peace Talks were hopelessly stalemated,
a clear sign of North Vietnamese intentions became evident: a
major buildup of PAVN forces in the Laotian Panhandle.

The

North Vietnamese were clearly massing their forces for an

171 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 147.
172 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 122.
173 Ibid.
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offensive in Military Regions 1 and 2 of South Vietnam in
early 1972.

If the North Vietnamese were truly committed to

a settlement, why was there this massive buildup?
seems to suggest that Hanoi had

This fact

rejected the Paris Peace

Talks in favour of a military solution.
Furthermore, it was in Military Regions 1 and 2 (also
called I and II Corps) that the ARVN was weakest.

The South

Vietnamese were stretched to the breaking point, especially in
Military

Region

2.

There

were

simply

not

enough

ARVN

battalions to engage in combat with PAVN forces and to provide
troops

for pacification

deficit."174

duty

- the

so-called

"battalion

Clearly, the strategic and tactical position of

the ARVN would only continue to worsen as the enemy buildup
continued

into

1971.

From

the

strategic

viewpoint

of

Washington and Saigon, the only option was a pre-emptive South
Vietnamese offensive into the Laotian Panhandle in early 1971.
By December of 1970, Nixon, Kissinger, Laird and the new
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer,(USN),(1970-1974) were committed to the concept of a
South Vietnamese pre-emptive strike.
that a successful

offensive

General Abrams believed

could prevent

offensive for the "indefinite future".

a major

enemy

The plan that was

worked out was very daring: the ARVN 1st Division would cross
into Laos on February 8 and proceed half-way to the critical
road junction of Tchepone; a South Vietnamese armoured column

174 Ibid.
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would link up at Tchepone with Airborne troops; the South
Vietnamese would then withdraw southeastward.175

American

troops, which were forbidden to enter Laos by Congress, would
be responsible for support and logistics.

On January 18,

Nixon ordered General Abrams to prepare the operation with a
D-date on February 8.
The

operation,

Lam Son 719,

was a serious

failure.

Several factors would lead to this result: very poor planning,
lack of initiative on the part of the ARVN commanders, and the
absence of American advisors.
Lam Son

719's failure was

Commander,

However, the leading factor in
the South Vietnamese

Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam.

I Corps

Lam was a

powerful political ally of President Thieu and only held his
command for this reason.

Lam’s actions and behaviour during

Lam Son 719 could only be described as incompetent.
reaching Tchepone,

After

Lam would order his forces to retreat

eastward, not southeastward through the PAVN’s base areas.
Lam, in the first week of the operation, stopped giving orders
to his troops for nearly two weeks,

giving the PAVN the

opportunity to regain the initiative.

As a result of Lam’s

stupor, the 3rd Brigade of the Airborne Division was wiped
out, as were two Ranger Battalions, the 21st and 39th.176
However, Lam Son 719 was not the unmitigated disaster as
often portrayed by many scholars, such as Gabriel Kolko and

175 Keith William Nolan, Into Laos: The Story of Dewev Canyon
II, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), p.76.
176 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1282.
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Gareth Porter.

With a few exceptions, the South Vietnamese,

especially the Marines, fought with courage and tenacity.

The

great weakness was the incompetence of the senior officers,
who

retained their commands due to political

President Thieu.

loyalty to

In addition, most South Vietnamese officers

had difficulty calling supporting fire without their American
advisors.

Improved training would alleviate this problem.

Lam Son 719 was thus a partial success: the PAVN would not
launch its Nguyen hue Offensive until March 31, 1972, instead
of early February, which indicated that the North Vietnamese
had difficulty in massing their forces due to the damage
inflicted on the vital lines of communications in Laos and
Cambodia.
The incursion into Laos would lead to renewed activity at
the Paris Peace Talks.

Nixon and Kissinger put forward a

major new proposal: a date would be decided upon for total
American withdrawal; American withdrawal would be unilateral
provided that all additional North Vietnamese infiltration was
halted

(clearly a major U.S. concession); a cease-fire in

place would be established; both sides would agree to honour
the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, and the South Vietnamese
would decide their political future on their own.177

This

proposal would be the one that would be accepted by Hanoi in
October of 1972.

Kissinger put forward the proposal to Xuan

177 Ibid.
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Thuy in a secret meeting on May 11 in Paris.178
significantly,
outright.

did

not

Instead,

reject

the

the

North

Xuar> Thuy,

new military

Vietnamese

proposal

requested

an

additional meeting to be held on June 26 with Special Advisor
Le Due Tho in attendance.
Hanoi

was

possibly

reassessing

its

strategy.

Preparations were well underway for the Nguyen Hue Offensive,
but there may have been divisions within the Politburo Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap was now ill with Parkinson's
Disease and the "hawks" were possibly losing ground, leading
to a review of the new American proposal.

Three meetings were

held with Le Due Tho, on June 26, July 12, and July 26.

The

talks again stalemated over North Vietnamese demands to remove
Thieu.

Serious negotiations would not resume until the Nguyen

Hue Offensive had been defeated in 1972.
The

purpose

of this

chapter has

been to

study

the

military incursions into Cambodia in April of 1970 and Laos in
February of 1971. President Nixon's bold decision to authorize
the incursions,

a clear escalation of the war which was

certain to have negative domestic and international political
repercusions, was prompted by two inter-related facts: the
North Vietnamese continued to be intransigient in Paris and
Vietnamization
success.

required

Nixon hoped,

time

to

ever

have

not without reason,

any

hope

for

that dramatic

escalations of the war would apply pressure on Hanoi to

178

B.A. Johnson, "Giap's Giant Mistake," Vietnam. February,
1992, p.65.
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bargain in "good faith," if only to relieve the military
pressure against the lines of communications.

Also,

the

President could expect that large-scale "spoiling operations,"
against the vital supply lines and base areas of the PAVN
would seriously impede the ability of the North Vietnamese to
launch major offensives against the ARVN , which was still in
an important transition phase.
Therefore, the incursions into Cambodia and Laos were
classical examples of the first catalyst identified in the
introduction-military reversal/defeat.

However, Lam Son 719

in particular had an influence on the Politburo in Hanoi that
the Nixon Administration clearly did not expect.

Lam Son 719

was clearly a serious failure for the ARVN and the American
policy of Vietnamization in general.

Thus, this military

operation reinforced the perception in Hanoi that the ARVN was
merely a puppet army without any intrinsic fighting capability
of its own.

The senior leadership of both the Lao Dong Party

and the PAVN apparently became convinced by the end of March
that

the

American

disastrously.

policy

of

Vietnamization

had

failed

Therefore, the Politburo in Hanoi now decided

to stake all its objectives on a single huge offensive.

The

Paris Peace Talks were now only to be used for propaganda,
primarily.

Instead, the Democratic Republic was seeking a

decisive military solution to the Second Vietnam War in 1972.
Thus, an analysis of the political ramifications of Lam Son
719 in Hanoi also addresses the second question raised in the
introduction- Why did the Paris Peace Talks drag on for so
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long?
The timing of the PAVN'S Nguyen Hue Offensive in 1972 was
not accidental.
would

require

Apart from the fact that the North Vietnamese
almost

a year

to

complete

the

logistical

preparations for an offensive that would ultimately involve
thirteen divisions on three separate fronts,
American Presidential election year.

1972 was an

Obviously, the North

Vietnamese hoped to discredit President Nixon in 1972 in much
the same way they had discredited President Johnson in 1968.
The

North

Vietnamese

considerations to greatly
taken by Nixon.

expected

domestic

political

limit the response that would be

Previous escalations of the war by President

Nixon had resulted in a serious domestic anti-war backlash in
the United States against the Administration's policies in
Indochina, especially on the campuses and in the Congress.
Hanoi could reasonably gamble that Nixon would not reescalate
the war, despite an outright invasion of the South, because of
concern about the anti-war vote in an election year.

Thus,

the two strategic escalations of the Second Vietnam War by the
Nixon Administration up to 1971 clearly had serious domestic
political repercusions for the United States-corresponding to
the second catalyst identified in the introduction.
Thus, this chapter, by reference to two of the three
catalysts,

military

reversal/stalemate

and

the

threat

of

domestic instability, has provided evidence to support the
first hypothesis-that a fundamental shift was required in the
negotiating position of the DRV, and to a lesser extent, the
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second hypothesis that domestic anti-war sentiment would apply
great pressure on the Nixon Administration to conclude the
Paris Peace Talks.

Hanoi, right up to the launching of the

Nguyen Hue Offensive in March of 1972, had calculated that the
war would be settled militarily,

not diplomatically.

The

Politburo had determined in March of 1971 to present the Nixon
Administration with a fait accompli in Vietnam.

There could

be no resolution of the Paris Peace Talks as long as Hanoi
refused to modify its hard-line negotiating position in Paris
and up to September of 1972,

it was unwilling to do this

because it believed that it possessed the military advantage.
Only after the ARVN, with the support of tactical American
airpower, had succeeded in halting the Nguyen Hue Offensive
and the Americans had dramatically re-escalated the war,
without any strong anti-war backlash in the United States nor
any vigourous response from China or the Soviet Union, would
the Politburo authorize Le Due Tho to fundamentally alter the
Party’s negotiating position in Paris.
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PART V: SHOWDOWN BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HANOI

CHAPTER VI: THE NGPYEN HUE OFFENSIVE

In

the

early

morning

hours

of

March

31,

1972,

the

tranquillity and solitude of Easter Sunday were shattered by
a devastating North Vietnamese artillery barrage in northern
Quang Tri province against the fire support bases of the 3rd
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division.

This action

was soon followed by a direct People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)
invasion across the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) involving three
J!

infantry divisions (the 304th, 308th, and 316th) and a brigade
of tanks.

The North Vietnamese had finally launched their

long-awaited Easter Offensive, code-named Nguyen Hue by the
PAVN General Staff.

Hanoi had apparently rejected diplomacy

in favour of a military solution to finally end the Paris
Peace Talks, an assessment supported by events on May 2, when
the

Special

Advisor to the

North Vietnamese

negotiating

delegation, Le Due Tho, categorically rejected a peace offer
put

forward

by

American

National

Kissinger in a secret meeting.

Security Advisor

Henry

Yet, barely five months later,
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Le

Due

Tho

would

put

forward

a

new

North

Vietnamese

negotiating position, the "Nine Points," which was almost
identical to the American offer of May 2.

This chapter will

attempt to rationalize the dramatic North Vietnamese "volte
face" between May 2 and October 8, 1972.
will

be

addressed

by

reference

to

the

This vital issue
three

catalysts

identified in the introduction with special emphasis on the
first one, military reversal reversal/stalemate.
Hue Offensive will be studied

in its entirety,

origins, to its planning, and its outcome.

The Nguyen
from its

By reference to

the Nguyen Hue Offensive, the first hypothesis raised in the
introduction will be addressed: the Paris Peace Talks could
only have been concluded once the Politburo in Hanoi altered
its hard-line negotiating position.

In addition, this chapter

will further address the first three questions raised in the
initial chapter: What were the factors that led the respective
parties to conclude the Paris Peace Accords?; Why did the
Paris Peace Talks drag on for so long?, and finally, why did
Hanoi accept a peace settlement that was not completely in its
interests?
As discussed in a previous chapter, the PAVN had been
massing its forces in the Laotian Panhandle and the Central
Highlands since late in the autumn of 1970.

The North

Vietnamese were clearly preparing for a multi-front offensive
in the wet season of 1972.

This offensive was to be the

culmination of the negotiating and military strategy adopted
by Hanoi. Thus, one explanation of why the Paris Peace Talks
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dragged on for so long is presented by the basic strategy
underlying the Nguyen Hue Offensive: Hanoi had been biding its
time since November of 1968, rebuilding its military after the
heavy casualties sustained in Tet of that year and preparing
for the eventual showdown with the ARVN.
For the Politburo in Hanoi, a peace settlement would
only come through decisive military victory.

Gareth Porter

has observed:
The spring offensive of 1972, like the Tet
Offensive of 1968, was aimed at breaking a
stalemate and moving the conflict to a new stage.
The Lao Dong Party leaders were determined to force
the United States to accept what it had been
resisting for more than three years:
the end of
its client regime's claim to exclusive sovereignty
over South Vietnam.
The reduction of the Saigon
regime to a status equal to that of its opponents
would provide an acceptable basis for ending the
war.
Along with the complete withdrawal of U.S.
military personnel from South Vietnam, it would
shift the balance of forces sharply in favour of
the revolution.179
If Porter's observation is indeed correct, the stalemate that
lasted from November 1968 tc October 1972 was a direct result
of Hanoi's negotiating strategy.

Hanoi was prepared to gamble

everything on a single huge offensive.
Therefore in this context, the Paris Peace Talks were
foremost a form of psychological warfare for Hanoi.180 Since
1969, the Peace Talks had been very fruitful for the hardened
revolutionaries in Hanoi: the United States had unilaterally

179 Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied. (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana State Press, 1975), p.102.
180 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 123.
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halted the bombing of the North, withdrawn nearly 450,000
servicemen (by May of 1972) from South Vietnam, and agreed to
a

cease-fire

in place.

In return,

Hanoi

had

not been

compelled to make a single substantive concession.

Yet, the

anti-war movement in the United States would place the blame
for this deadlock on President Nixon.

The dynamics

of

domestic politics would further reduce the American position
in the Peace Talks.
endangered

by his

Nixon's hopes for reelection would be
inability to

end

the

war.

With

the

Presidential election due in little more than seven months,
Hanoi launched its Nguyen Hue Offensive.

The North Vietnamese

clearly

Nixon

hoped

to

discredit

President

as

they

had

President Johnson in 1968.
Yet, the Politburo's decision was also forced on it by a
sense of urgency.

By late 1971,

Hanoi was feeling very

isolated from the Soviet Union, and especially China because
of the summit announcements of the summer.
year,

Dr.

In July of that

Kissinger's dramatic visit to Beijing had been

announced and both governments agreed to a summit between
President Nixon and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party(CCP) Mao Zedong in February of 1972.

Shortly after the

secret visit to Beijing by Dr. Kissinger had been made public,
the United States and the Soviet Union announced a summit to
be held in May of 1972 between the President and the GeneralSecretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU),
Leonid Brezhnev.

Hanoi now recognized that both of its

Socialist allies placed the greatest national importance on
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improving relations with the United States.

The war

in

Indochina could easily lose the support of the Soviets and
Chinese if these two powers determined that their interests
were being imperiled. As noted by Melvin Small: " The North
Vietnamese,

as

well

as

the

Left

in

the

United

states,

discovered that Nixon's detente and intricate China card
diplomacy were more important to Moscow than its beleagured
socialist ally."181

Thus, North Vietnam had to strike while

its lines of communication remained open to the Soviet Union
and China.
summits

In his memoirs,

vital

to

eventually

Richard Nixon considers the
concluding

the

Paris

Peace

Accords:
Our diplomacy with Moscow and Peking had
turned the tables on Hanoi. It had been
an article of faith within the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations that making a
decisive military move against North
Vietnam risked the intervention of China
and the Soviet Union. That now changed:
Hanoi was fearful that its allies might
use their leverage to intervene on the
side of its enemy.182
Richard Nixon had come into office with a rapprochement
with China one of his major foreign policy goals.
rapprochement

with

geostrategic

reasons

chapter,

China
alone,

was
as

vital

for

discussed

Although a

economic
in

a

and

previous

China was one of the keys to ending the war in

Vietnam because of its logistical importance to the North
Vietnamese war effort.

The dramatic meeting between Mao

181 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p.222.
182 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 123.
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Zedong and Richard Nixon in February of 1972 was a devastating
psychological blow for Hanoi.
The road to Beijing had been a long and arduous one.
Nonetheless, by 1969, Mao clearly understood that his country
needed
because

an

improved

relationship with the United

of the Soviet

threat.

Nixon

and

States

Kissinger had

successfully used a "secret" channel - the office of the
President of Pakistan,

Yahya Khan.

A gradual process of

improving links between the United States and China climaxed
with Kissinger's secret trip to China in July of 1971.

Both

the Americans and Chinese had a common desire to end the war
in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was very close to

concluding a grain deal and a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
with Washington: these concerns were far more important to the
Kremlin than the war in Vietnam.

Hanoi's

dramatically demonstrated in May of 1972:

isolation was

after Haiphong was

mined, neither Moscow nor Beijng offered North Vietnam any
assistance in clearing the mines.
The two men principally involved with the planning of the
Easter Offensive were Le Duan, First Secretary of the North
Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, and Senior General Van Tien Dung,
Chief of Staff of the PAVN.

Apparently, the Politburo was

persuaded by Le Duan to order the Nguyen Hue Offensive of 1972
in March, 1971.183 The Nguyen Hue Offensive was described as

183 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 120.
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a campaign that "might last a year" and "decide the war."184
Yet, in top secret PAVN documents captured by the Americans,
senior officers were warning that "If this attack were not
successful,

it would be ... years before we could launch

another big offensive."185

The Paris Peace Talks would now

be determined by the success or failure of the Nguyen Hue
Offensive formulated by

Senior General Dung.

The North Vietnamese build-up in the fall of 1971 did not
go unnoticed.

As noted by Henry Kissinger, the United States

was fully expecting a major PAVN offensive in the upcoming
Presidential election year.186

By the second half of 1971,

Hanoi’s public statements and military preparations had turned
ominous.

The

White

Agency (CIA), and the

House,

the

Pentagon

had

Central
to

Intelligence

analyze

the

often

conflicting field reports to determine where and when the
North Vietnamese offensive would be launched.
The American response to the North Vietnamese offensive
would be seriously impeded by a crucial disagreement between
the military and the CIA.
Commander-in-Chief

of

General Creighton W.

United

States

Military

Command Vietnam(June 20,1968-June 20,1972),

Abrams,

Assistance

after studying

reconnaissance reports, informed the White House on January 4,
1972 that an offensive was

imminent,

most likely

in the

184 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1108.
185 Ibid. p. 1115.
186 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 152.
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Central Highlands at the

end of February.187

In another

cable on January 20, Abrams declared that the enemy would
attempt "to face us with the most difficult situation of which
he was

capable.1,183

Abrams was

allowed

to

step

up

air

activity in the South, but a resumption of the air war against
North

Vietnam

response

was

prohibited.189

However,

the

to the Nguyen Hue Offensive would be

American
initially

restricted because of fundamentally differing views held by
the Director of the CIA, Richard Helms.
In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasized categorically
that the United States was strengthening its forces in South
Vietnam.

Yet, the American build-up was very slow: on the eve

of the offensive,

there were only three squadrons of F-4

fighter bombers and a single squadron of A-37 attack aircraft
in

South

Vietnam

to

reinforce

the

South

Vietnamese

Air

Force(RVNAF), along with two aircraft carriers, USS Hancock
and USS Midway, in the South China Sea.190 These deployments
reflect serious apprehension over the exact nature of the
upcoming

offensive

within

the

councils

of

the

American

government.
There was no question that a major North Vietnamese
offensive would be launched in the late winter-early spring of

187 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 120.
188 Ibid.
189 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial. 152.
190 Chinnery, Air War in Vietnam, p. 194.
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1972.

But, where would the North Vietnamese strike?

Would

the offensive be launched on multiple fronts and would it
involve corps-sized operations?

Classified CIA reports would

cause serious consternation in Washington and Saigon.
In the winter of 1971-72, CIA headquarters at Langley,
Virginia

had

to

analyze

voluminous

amounts

of

data.

Intelligence had clearly pinpointed the 1st and 7th PAVN
divisions

and

the

5th

and

9th

Viet

Cong (VC)

reassembling in the Cambodian Sanctuaries,

divisions

In addition, troop

movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail were very similar to
those that had preceded the offensives of 1965 and 1968.191
The North Vietnamese were clearly massing their forces, but to
what ultimate strategic design?

The CIA was unable to form a

consensus and it failed to provide any warning of a major
offensive as noted by a leading CIA analyst, George Allen:
We thought there would be another one (in
addition to an attack in the Central
Highlands) of some size in [MRI] - out of
Laos probably... but [the CIA wasn't]
expecting it to involve any significant
quantities
of
heavy
artillery
and
armour.192
Shortly before the invasion, the CIA sent the President a
classified

memorandum

countrywide

offensive

stating
using

that

combined

the
arms

long-awaited
would

not

be

launched in 1972, at least on the scale predicted by American
military intelligence.
•>

191

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1304.

192 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 154.
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The Pentagon's assessment of North Vietnamese intentions
was the direct opposite of that of the CIA.

Both General

Abrams and Admiral John S. McCain, Commander-in-Chief United
States

Pacific

Command,

were

convinced

that

the

North

Vietnamese were preparing for an all out offensive in Military
Regions 1 and 2.

The military's entreaties to Washington did

not go completely unheeded: when the Nguyen Hue Offensive was
launched, the 3rd Strategic Air Division on Guam had been
reinforced and Saigon had moved two Marine brigades from the
strategic reserve to Military Region 1. The limited nature of
American air resources in South East Asia on the eve of the
offensive
military
inference

indicate that the dispute between the
had
made

serious
by

ramifications,

writers

such

as

however.
Gabriel

CIA and
Yet,

the

Kolko193 that

American military intelligence failed to anticipate the Nguyen
Hue Offensive is obviously fallacious.
Therefore,

the North Vietnamese offensive caught the

Americans not completely militarily-prepared to support South
Vietnam in resisting the onslaught.

Senior General Dung's

decision to launch a World War Two type blitzkrieg across the
DMZ took the South Vietnamese Military Region I commander,
Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam,
surprise.

and General Abrams by

The American and South Vietnamese militaries had

expected North Vietnam to respect the DMZ out of fear of
outraging American and world opinion by a blatant violation of

193 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.423.
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international law.194

The weak ARVN 3rd Division, with two

of its regiments, the 56th and 57th, composed entirely of
former deserters and criminals, immediately buckled and lost
all of its firebases north of Quang Tri.

Quang Tri and Hue

appeared certain to fall by early April.
By April 2, the Nixon Administration was fully aware of
the extent of the enemy offensive.195

With disaster facing

the South Vietnamese, Nixon authorized the resumption of air
strikes against targets in North Vietnam -south of the 18th
Parallel - Operation Linebacker I. The offensive could have
hardly come at a worse time for Nixon who was in the midst of
a reelection campaign-

Nixon would risk his political career

to defeat the North Vietnamese offensive.
The White House was also engaged on the diplomatic front
with Hanoi.

A secret meeting was scheduled for May 2 between

Kissinger and Le Due Tho.196

Nixon hoped that his forceful

military response and active diplomacy with Beijing and Moscow
would

convince

Hanoi

that there had

to be

a negotiated

settlement to end the war. Kissinger made the final American
peace proposal of the war: a cease-fire in place, unilateral
withdrawal

of American ground units,

and the release

of

Prisoners-of-War(POWs). However, Washington refused to budge
on a central issue: President Thieu would not be forced from

194 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1313.
195

Ibid.

196 Ibid. p. 1308.
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office

and

replaced

government.

by

a

communist

dominated

coalition

At the secret meeting, Le Due Tho acted in a

very dogmatic manner as if the war was already won.
American proposal was rejected outright.

The

North Vietnam's

refusal to bargain was a direct result of military success on

April 5, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive in

Military Region 3, near An Loc threatening Saigon, while on
April 12, a third offensive threatened Kontum in the Central
Highlands.197

Nixon had to counter this North Vietnamese

aggression.
After the failure of the secret meeting between Kissinger
and Le Due Tho, Nixon had to resort to some dramatic military
action.

The action favoured by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was

the mining of Haiphong.

This step would succeed in severing

Hanoi's lines of communication and isolating it.
Nixon

took

this

drastic

step,

Moscow

cancelling the planned summit for May.

might

Yet,

if

respond

by

Nixon's political

career was now at stake. On May 6, President Nixon authorized
the Pentagon to execute the mining of Haiphong Harbour on May
8. Nixon had clearly decided upon a strategic escalation to
come to the aid of beleagured South Vietnam. If the GeneralSecretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, had cancelled the May
summit, Nixon's bid for reelection in November would have been
imperiled,

giving impetus to the anti-war movement in the

United States.

On May 8,

President Nixon addressed the

197 Ibid.
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American people in a live television broadcast.

He explained

why he had decided upon such a dramatic escalation of the war.
The secret meeting between Kissinger and Le Due Tho on May 2
was revealed and Nixon declared that the peace proposal that
had been put forward remained on the table.

Nonetheless, the

future of the Paris Peace Talks would now be determined by
battlefield results: Hanoi had embarked on a huge military
gamble to try to obtain what it could not at the negotiating
table.
Le Due Tho had rejected the American proposal of May 2,
1972

at

a

time

when

North

Vietnamese

battlefield had reached their zenith.

fortunes

on

the

Quang Tri City had

fallen on April 29 and the ARVN's defensive line along the My
Chanh River was

at best

tenuous.198 The

ancient

imperial

capital of Hue appeared doomed and the new PAVN's offensives
in Military Regions 2 and 3 were initially very successful.
Hanoi now consolidated its forces for the final onslaught.
the

middle of June,

however,

American

By

intelligence was

pointing to a new development: the PAVN offensive had stalled.
North Vietnam's great gamble had failed and 13 under-strength,
war-weary divisions were now tied down in the South.
In retrospect, the Nguyen Hue Offensive had one critical
flaw that undermined its potential for success:
separate offensives were not coordinated.

the three

Therefore, Military

Assistance Command Vietnam(MACV-under the command of General

198 Dale Andrade, " Quang Tri Disaster," Vietnam, edited by
Colonel H.G.Summers, (USA-Retired), April, 1994, p.35.
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Frederick C.Weyand, (USA) , after June 20) could concentrate its
air assets and the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff its
reserves

(composed of only two brigades of the Airborne

Division and a single Marine brigade) against individual
offensives that were isolated on the battlefield.
If the PAVN

been been able to coordinate the different

offensives, the ARVN would have been hard pressed to reinforce
three fronts simultaneously.

In addition, American air power

was seriously understrength in the first few weeks of the
Nguyen Hue Offensive and was quite possibly inadequate to halt
the offensive alone in the absence of strong ARVN reserves.
The prior incursions into Cambodia and Laos by the South
Vietnamese and the Americans were now resulting in strategic
gains: the PAVN found it difficult to mass its forces and
almost

impossible

to

coordinate

the

separate

because of the damaged lines of communication.

offensives

The offensive

in Military Region 2, which threatened to cut South Vietnam in
half at the end of April, had been effectively neutralized by
the end of the next month. After two regiments of the 22nd
ARVN Division had collapsed north of Kontum, President Thieu
acted decisively.

The inept commander of Military Region

Region 2, Major-General Ngo Dzu, was relieved of his command
and replaced with a "fighting general," Lieutenant-General
Nguyen Van Toan.199 Toan, with critical reinforcements from
the Joint General Staff's Strategic Reserve in the form of the

199 Maitland and Weiss, South Vietnam on Trial. p. 123
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3rd Airborne Brigade and the 369th Marine Brigade, was able to
blunt

the

PAVN

offensive

in

the

Central

Highlands.200

Meanwhile, in Military Region 3, the North Vietnamese were only
able to concentrate two divisions, the 5th and 9th VC for the
crucial attack on An Loc.201

In addition, because of the

lack of enemy activity in the Mekong Delta, the entire 21st
ARVN Division was moved outside An Loc to break the siege.
North Vietnam's
critical.

supply

situation

had

by

now

become

The mining of Haiphong was accelerated by the

dilapidated condition of the Chinese railways.202

At the

summit in Beijing, the war in Indochina had been an important
topic, and one of the reasons for Nixon's desire for improved
relations with the Asian giant.

Regardless of ideological

commitments, the leaders of China, especially the Chairman of
the State Council, Zhou Enlai, and the senior officers of the
People's

Liberation

Xianqian,
Vietnamese

Army(PLA), Marshals

and Nie Rongzhen,
expansionism

Ye

Jianying,

Xu

realized that a major war of

was

not

in

their

country's

interest.203 The Vietnamese and Chinese have been historical
enemies for more than two millennia.

A strong, united Vietnam

dominating Laos and Cambodia, possibly allied to the Soviet
Union, was a threat to China.

In addition, if China wanted

200 Ibid.
201

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1312.

202

Ibid. p.1316.

203 Alan P.L.Liu, How China Is Ruled , p.202
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the United States to act as an effective counterweight to the
Soviet Union, the United States had to extricate itself from
Vietnam.

China's attitude towards the war in Vietnam was

expressed by Zhou Enlai to Henry Kissinger while Kissinger was
in Beijing from June 19 until June 23, 1972:
Chou asked pointed
questions about
Nixon's May 8 proposal (which was in
effect a cease fire offer), repeated the
standard line of China's historical debt
to Hanoi, avoided any implication of any
Chinese national interest in the war, and
implied that most of China's supplies to
Vietnam were foodstuffs.204
The realists of the Chinese Politburo had concluded that
improved relations with the United States had to take priority
over Hanoi's concerns.
By mid-June of 1972, the South Vietnamese were prepared
to launch a general counter-offensive, concentrated in Quang
Tri Province.

The PAVN offensives against An Loc and Kontum

had been effectively countered by American air power and the
steadfast resistance of the ARVN.205

President Thieu would

now shuffle his forces in preparation for the offensive to
retake Quang Tri: Lieutenant General Ngo Quong Truong replaced
the inept Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam and the whole of
the strategic reserve was transferred to his command.206
September 9,

South Vietnamese Marines had recaptured the

204 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1343.
205

By

Ibid.

206 Ibid.
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historic Citadel in Quang Tri.

Quang Tri had been the first

provincial capital to fall to the Communists during the Second
Vietnam War

and the

North Vietnamese

leadership

clearly

considered its retention vital for symbolic purposes. The
ability of South Vietnamese Marines and airborne troops to
recapture Quang Tri despite the fact the PAVN had committed
seven of its best divisions to secure it clearly demonstrated
that the Nguyen Hue Offensive was spent.

This fact could not

have been lost to the leadership in Hanoi.
Against this background of military reversal for Hanoi,
the Paris Peace Talks would once again commence in an attempt
to end the war.

This scenario was exactly the one Henry

Kissinger had anticipated:
I had reckoned all along that Hanoi's
offensive would culminate in a serious
negotiation, whatever happened. If Hanoi
were to prevail on the battlefield, Nixon
would be forced to settle on Hanoi's
terms; if the offensive...were blunted
and Nixon looked like the probable winner
[in the November,
1972 Presidential
election], Hanoi would make a major
effort to settle with us.207
Y

On June 29, Nixon announced that the plenaries would restart
on July 16.

A secret meeting was arranged between Le Due Tho

and Kissinger at 11 rue Dartle, Paris, July 19.
Kissinger entered the meeting of July 19 very confident.
The North Vietnamese were suffering very serious reverses in
South Vietnam and, quite possibly, they were deeply concerned

207 Ibid. p. 1336.
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that Nixon would prove to be more hawkish if they could not
settle with him before the Presidential election.

An American

policy of making no new concessions until Hanoi's intentions
were clear was adopted.

The National Security Advisor hoped

to embrace the "dual track" negotiating strategy: "...settling
the

military

political

issues

essentially to future negotiations among the parties.

Such a

settlement

issues,

would

and

preserve

leaving

our

the

allies

and

give

them

an

opportunity to determine their future."208
The secret meeting of 19 July failed to provide any
breakthrough, but Kissinger noticed a new attitude on the part
of the North Vietnamese.

They were "benign and friendly

now"209 as compared to their arrogance in May.

In addition,

Le Due Tho, not Xuan Thuy, did most of the speaking for the
North

Vietnamese

delegation,

indicating

that

Vietnamese attached a new importance to the talks.

the

North

Both sides

agreed to hold another meeting on August 1.
At

this

meeting,

Hanoi's delegation

began

to

offer

substantial concessions, the first time in the history of the
Paris

Peace Talks

that

it did

so.

The most

important

concession made by Le Due Tho concerned the deadline for the
withdrawal of American forces: it was no longer unconditional,
but linked to a cease-fire.210

208

Important concessions were

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1369.

209 Ibid. p. 1371.
210 Ibid.
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also made concerning the provisional coalition government.
For the first time in nearly four years, the Par is. Peace Talks
were making progress.

Further minor progress would be made at

the secret meetings of August 14, September 15, and September
27, but Hanoi would not fundamentally change its position
until October 8.
As the meeting of October 8 opened, Kissinger noticed two
large green folders in front of Le Due Tho.
Security
dramatic.

Advisor

sensed

that

they

The National

contained

something

At 4:00 P.M., Kissinger’s instinct proved correct.

Le Due Tho declared:
I think we cannot negotiate in the way we are doing
now...In order to show our good will and to ensure
a rapid end to the war, rapid restoration of peace
in Vietnam, as all of us wish for, today we put
forward a new proposal...211
The Paris Peace Talks had just entered a decisive stage.
Le Due Tho proposed that the United States and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) sign an agreement settling
the military questions between them - withdrawal, prisoners,
and a cease-fire.212 Relating to the political settlement,
"we shall only agree on the main principles.

After the

signing of this agreement a cease fire will immediately take
place."213

The entire concept of a coalition government was

dropped; instead an "Administration for National Concord" was

211 Ibid. p. 1395.
212 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 150.
213 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1385.

1
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to be established,

being responsible for implementing the

signed agreements, achieving national concord and "organizing"
unspecified

general

and

local

elections.214

Hanoi

also

agreed to permit American military aid for South Vietnam to
continue and to stop all infiltration into the South.

If the

United States could enforce the last provision of the accord,
South Vietnam’s chances of survival would greatly increase.
The United States now had the opportunity to establish a
"protective umbrella" over South Vietnam with which Saigon
would have the opportunity to address the fundamental social
and political problems of the regime.

This new proposal

offered an excellent opportunity for ending the war, and to a
much

lesser extent,

preserving the

independence of South

Vietnam.
Kissinger accepted this new North Vietnamese proposal in
principle.

There were still some serious gaps, such as the

failure to provide cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia,
further

negotiation

contention.

could

whittle

away

these

points

but
of

The war in Vietnam was not yet ended, but this

substantial North Vietnamese proposal was the long-awaited
"light at the end of the tunnel."
This

chapter

has

studied

the

impact

of

the

North

Vietnamese Nguyen Hue Offensive on the Paris Peace Talks.

The

fact that the Paris Peace Talks had been stalemated for almost
forty-one months when the Nguyen Hue Offensive was launched,

214 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 154.
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along with the PAVN build-up in the Laotian Panhandle and
eastern Cambodia since the late fall of 1970 would seem to
suggest

that Hanoi

diplomatic means.

never

intended

to

settle

the war

by

Instead, a strong case can be put forward

that the senior leadership of the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN
had always planned to end the war by a military solution.
Thus, this chapter has addressed three of the four questions
raised in the introduction: What were the factors that led the
respective parties to conclude the Paris Peace Accords in
1973?;
Why

Why did the Paris Peace Talks drag on for so long?;

did

Hanoi

accept

a

peace

settlement

that

was

not

completely in its interests?
The first and third catalysts that were identified in the
introduction were also clearly influencing the belligerents
during this time period.

If a belief that final military

victory was possible acted as the primary determinant in
Hanoi's hard-line negotiating position, it was only logical
that military reversal/stalemate could fundamentally alter it.
The impact of the failure of the Nguyen Hue Offensive on
the North Vietnamese negotiating position in Paris was clearly
critical.

In

his

work,

The

Structure

of

International

Conflict. Mitchell argues that a number of conditions must be
met before conflict termination can begin:
1) The leaders of the party confronting failure
must be agreed that they have, in fact, failed.
2) The loser's leaders must take a decision to make the
best of some compromise settlement rather than
"fighting on," in the hope that some near-miracle will
save them.
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3) The definition of the current situation of success
and failure held by both parties' leaders must be
similar, in that one side has recognized the symbols
of defeat (the loss of a capital, the defeat of the
army in the field, the defection of a key ally), while
the other recognizes that these are, in fact, symbols
of defeat for its adversary.215
A strong argument can be made that by October of 1972, all of
the above conditions had been essentially met for the first
time in the situation facing the Politburo.
The magnitude of North Vietnam's military reversal was
complicated by the international balance of power.
been seen, Nixon's brilliant "triangular" diplomacy

As has
was a

driving force behind the decision of the North Vietnamese
Politburo to authorize the Nguyen Hue Offensive.

However, if

the offensive, which was the largest and most complicated ever
attempted by the PAVN, was defeated or at least brought to a
standstill by the ARVN, then the influence of this third
catalyst would be greatly exacerbated on Hanoi. By the spring
of 1972, the North Vietnamese were feeling seriously isolated
from both

China

and

the Soviet Union.

The psychological

effects of pictures of President Nixon warmly shaking hands
with the Chairman of the State Council of the CCP, Zhou Enlai,
in Beijing in February and three months later, toasting the
General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, should not be
underestimated. In addition, both the Chinese and the Soviets
had already taken one concrete measure which threatened to
influence the balance of forces in South Vietnam: the decision

215 Ibid. p.181.
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not to send minesweepers to clear the approaches to Haiphong
Harbour

after

it had been mined

on May

8.

The

senior

leadership of both the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN had good
reason to fear future actions of China and the Soviet Union.
The North Vietnamese Politburo realized only too clearly that
the

foreign policies of both China and the Soviet Union

contained a fundamental contradiction: ideological commitments
were

often not

compatible

with

national

interests.

This

dilemma was further complicated for the North Vietnamese by
the

fact

that

President

Nixon

unlike

his

predecessor,

President Johnson recognized the fundamental dichotomy that
existed in the foreign policies of China and the Soviet Union
and was determined to utilize it to help bring the war in
Vietnam to an end.
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CHAPTER VII: DO THEY KNOW THAT IT'S CHRISTMAS TIME?

After the momentous secret meeting between American
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the nSpecial
Advisor" to the North Vietnamese negotiating delegation, Le
Due Tho, on October 8, 1972, both Washington and Hanoi had
good reason to believe that the Paris Peace Accords were about
to be concluded.
President

Indeed, there is substantial evidence that

Richard

Nixon

sincerely

believed

that

a peace

settlement would be reached before the election in November.
The optimism of the Nixon Administration was clearly revealed
in a press conference given by the National Security Advisor
on October 26, 1972.

The hopes of a war-weary nation were

greatly buoyed by Dr. Kissinger's famous announcement that
"peace is at hand."

Indeed, the secret meeting of October 8

had brought forward the dramatic change in Hanoi's bargaining
position that would allow the Paris Peace Accords to be signed
on January 27, 1973.

Yet, the path to peace would be a most

arduous one: on December 18, Nixon would order the execution
of

Operation

Bombings."

Linebacker

II.

the

so

called

"Christmas

To this day, the "breakdown" of the Paris Peace

Talks in early December of 1972 and the subsequent "Christmas
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Bombings" remain one of the most controversial episodes of the
Second Vietnam War, and indeed, the entire Nixon Presidency.
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the

two

hypotheses raised in the introduction: that only a fundamental
shift in the negotiating strategy of Hanoi allowed the Paris
Peace Talks to be successfully concluded, and that the Nixon
Administration was compelled to settle the Peace Talks because
of strong anti-war sentiment in the United States, especially
in the Congress.

The first three questions raised in chapter

one will be further analyzed, as will the fourth one: Why did
the United States accept a peace settlement that was not
completely in Saigon1s interests?
To understand the factors behind the "breakdown," one
must first understand the importance of the schedule agreed
upon by the two sides

in October.

The North Vietnamese

obviously wanted the Paris Peace Accords concluded before the
Presidential election on November 7, 1972.
were

quite

possibly

concerned

about

the

Hanoi's leaders
opinion

polls

regarding the upcoming American Presidential election.

Nixon

was going to be reelected in a huge landslide and it was only
natural to expect manor Republican gains in Congress as well.
Hanoi was probably concerned that the President might step up
the military pressure after the Presidential election if the
Paris Peace Accords were not concluded.

Yet, Hanoi's strategy

was based on a critical assumption: that hawkish Republicans
would make major gains in the Congressional elections.
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Kissinger

agreed

to

follow

the

schedule

because

he

believed that the remaining areas of contention in the Paris
Peace Talks, such as the status of the 10,000 Viet Cong being
held

in South Vietnamese prisons,

American

Prisoners-of-

War(POWs) and Missings-in-Action( MIAs), and cease-fires in
Laos and Cambodia, could be successfully resolved before the
end of October and that the approval of South Vietnamese
President Nguyen Van Thieu would be forthcoming.

Indeed, all

of the areas of contention in the Paris Peace Talks would be
successfully concluded, with the ominous exception of a cease
fire

in

Cambodia.

Nonetheless,

Kissinger

believed

that

President Thieu's approval of the October 8 proposal would be
readily forthcoming.

Thus, in retrospect, Kissinger had every

reason to be optimistic as he left Paris for Washington on
October 12.
Yet,

Kissinger's optimism was based on one critical

assumption:
proposal.

that

Thieu

would

be

willing

to

accept

the

Thieu had been informed of every major American

initiative to end the war since Richard Nixon had entered the
Oval Office.
Nixon's

Thieu had claimed to have

Vietnamization

policy

and

the

fully supported

concomitant

withdrawals at the Midway Conference in 1969.

troop

When the United

States had dropped its demand for mutual withdrawal of forces
in

October

concession.

of

1971,

Thieu

Thieu

had

been

agreed

with

this

momentous

fully

aware

and

apparently

supportive of the American position going into the critical
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meeting of October 8.

Thus, it was not illogical to expect

Thieu1s acceptance of the new North Vietnamese proposal.
Yet, a fundamental and vital change had now taken place:
the war was about to end and the remaining American forces
were about to withdraw.

Thieu had probably agreed to all the

other American proposals because he expected Hanoi to reject
them.

If the Paris Peace Accords were concluded, Thieu would

stand alone against the threat from North Vietnam.
President Thieu was a patriot and ultimately his actions
were dictated by this fact.

He had led his country through

seven tumultuous years of bitter warfare.

Now it must have

appeared to Saigon that the United States expected South
Vietnam to stand alone against the DRV.

The Politburo in

Hanoi could not be expected to abandon its quest to
reunify Vietnam, and ultimately, to establish its hegemony
over all of Indochina.

The South Vietnamese were apparently

left to their own fate, despite the fact that President Nixon
had promised to enforce the Accords, a commitment that was
plausible when the President's actions after March 31 are
taken into consideration.
betrayed:

in

maintained

the

similar

Nonetheless, Thieu must have felt

circumstances,

8th Army

in

the

the Republic

United
of

Korea

States
as

a

deterrent against renewed North Korean-Chinese aggression.216
Psychologically, South Vietnam did not feel prepared to stand
alone against North Vietnam.

For eight years the United

216 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1417.
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States had been responsible for most of the heavy fighting and
now South Vietnam was expected to carry the burden.
Against this psychological background, Thieu met with
Kissinger

and

Major

General

Al

Haig,

Special

Military

Assistant to the National Security Advisor, on October 19.217
At this first meeting, Thieu adopted the tactic of stalling a series of intelligent questions was asked, but none relevant
to the Accords.
The

Americans

Both parties agreed to meet the next day.
now

received

some

good

news:

the

North

Vietnamese wanted to keep the original schedule and offered
two major concessions, involving Viet Cong prisoners in South
Vietnamese jails and military hardware replacement.218 The
North Vietnamese had agreed to settle the fate of the Viet
Cong prisoners through one of the mechanisms established to
enforce the Accords, the Joint Military Commission(JMC), while
strict limitations would be placed on the replacement of
military hardware.
The meeting of October 20 was melodramatic and both sides
proposed to meet on October 22,
decisive as October 8.

a day that would be as

At the previous meeting, Thieu had

recommended 23 changes to the original text.219
some of the changes were significant,

Although

Kissinger remained

217 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 150.
218 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p.37.
219 Karnow, Vietnam, p.652.
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confident as he prepared to meet with Thieu and the South
Vietnamese National Security Council that afternoon.

The

American National Security Advisor received a very rude shock:
Thieu rejected the proposal and stipulated that he would never
put his signature on such a document.220

Kissinger now faced

the prospects of four years of diplomacy and thousands of
American lives being expended in vain.
Yet,

from

a

South

Vietnamese

objections were well-founded.

perspective,

Thieu's

The Accords would allow North

Vietnam to maintain a force of 13 divisions and 26 independent
regiments

on

South

Vietnamese

territory

American ground forces departed.221

after

the

last

In addition, Thieu was

expected to resign a month before new Presidential elections
in the South, a proposal that he had accepted nearly a year
earlier.222

The

South

Vietnamese

President,

in

all

likelihood, had only agreed to this proposal because he never
expected the Accords to be concluded.

The only guarantee that

he was specifically given concerning South Vietnamese national
security against renewed encroachments by the DRV was a verbal
commitment by President Nixon.

The South Vietnamese President

way very well have concluded that the war-weariness in the
United States, particularly in the Congress, would prevent any
forceful response from Nixon in the event of North Vietnamese

220 Ibid.
221 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1465.
222 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p.42.
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aggression. Clearly, Thieu had every reason to be less than
pleased with the draft agreement.

Yet the manner in which he

feigned support for every American proposal since 1969 and, at
the

last

second,

treacherous.

revealed

his

real

opinions,

was

truly

Richard Nixon, who had risked his political

career over the war in Vietnam, deserved much better from an
ally.
The

United

States

had

forced Hanoi

to

end

its

intransigence in Paris by decisively routing the Nguyen Hue
Offensive but now faced the prospect of the Paris Peace Talks
collapsing because of a diplomatic conflict with its ally in
Saigon.

On October 26, Hanoi, after being informed that the

United states could not honour the previously agreed upon
schedule,

publicly

released the

draft

peace

agreement.223

The President authorized Kissinger to go ahead with a press
briefing in which the National Security Advisor stated:
We believe that peace is at hand.
We
believe
that an agreement is within
sight, based on the May 8 proposals of
the President and some adaptations of our
January 25 proposals, which is just to
all parties. 24
Kissinger's statement "peace is at hand" would haunt him for
the rest of his life.

His critics would contend that this

action was a blatant electoral ploy.

Yet, a case can be made

that although the upcoming Presidential election influenced

223

Ibid. p.38.

224

Ibid.
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Kissinger's positive assessment, it did not do so decisively:
polls were clearly predicting a landslide for Nixon even if a
peace agresment were not signed.

Nixon deserves credit for

not allowing the upcoming Presidential election to seriously
alter his stance towards Saigon.
November 7, 1972, surely must have been the zenith of
Nixon's political career.

The President received 61.3 percent

of the popular vote and he swept every state in the Union
except

Massachusetts.225

Traditional

strongholds

of

Democratic support, such as the Jewish vote, were undermined
by

Nixon.

Yet,

this

victory

was

not

complete.

The

Republicans actually lost two seats in the Senate, leaving the
Democrats with 57 seats, while only seven seats were gained in
the House, short of a majority by eight.226
The shrewd Politburo members in Hanoi must now have seen
an excellent opportunity to promote North Vietnam's interests.
The elections in early November had resulted in a strongly
anti-war Congress.

Nixon now faced the prospect of Congress

terminating all military support to South Vietnam.

Thus, the

Administration considered it vital to conclude the Accords
before January 30,

1973.

Hanoi believed

it was

in its

interests to procrastinate.

225 Max Frankell, " Nixon Elected in Landslide:Margin About
60%," The New York Times. Volume 122, No.41,927, November 8, 1972,
p.Al.
226 R.W. Apple, Jr. " Democrats Retain Congress: Many Votes
Split," The New York Times. Volume 122, No.41,927, November 8,
1972, p.Al
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Against this background, Kissinger once again met with Le
Due Tho on November 20 .227

The South Vietnamese proposed

changes were put forward and the next day Hanoi categorically
rejected them.

By now, the United States realized that any

settlement

would

require

Vietnamese

proposals.

the

On

abandonment

November

25,

of
the

the

South

Talks

were

recessed.
When the Talks were reconvened on December 4, the North
Vietnamese

had

changed

their

position.

Some

positions

previously agreed upon by Hanoi were withdrawn and new,
unacceptable

demands

were

put

forward,

such

Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) not being a legal boundary.

as

the

To state

that the Talks had "broken down" would be incorrect.

Both

sides still accepted the basic proposal of October 8, but
Hanoi was now demanding a few fundamental changes to the text.
With Hanoi refusing to modify a few of its key new demands,
Nixon ordered the Talks recessed on December 13.

The much

celebrated "breakdown" had occurred and prospects for the
future were bleak.
The motives behind Hanoi1s actions have been greatly
debated.

Yet,

in all probability,

North Vietnam was not

attempting to scuttle the Accords, but rather trying to force
Nixon to make at least one major concession, regarding the
DMZ,

before the Congress

reconvened on January

3,

1973.

Militarily, Hanoi's position had not improved since October,

227 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p.31
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1972: there was no longer a strategic reserve in North Vietnam
and

all

the

units

understrength.228

in

South

In addition,

Vietnam

were

seriously

the Soviet Union and China

were applying heavy diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to
conclude the Accords.

North Vietnamese intransigence was thus

fulfilling two major goals: pressuring Nixon to make a few
major concessions and allowing various ancillary units, such
as anti-aircraft battalions and construction regiments, to be
rushed to the battlefield in South Vietnam before the cease
fire was achieved.229
Nixon, however, was not prepared to make any further
concessions.
existed.

The Accords had to be signed as they currently

If any further concessions were made, conservatives

could charge the President with betraying South Vietnam.

Four

years earlier, Nixon had promised the American people that he
would obtain a "peace with honour" and that promise would be
fulfilled before his second term began.

In retrospect, it can

perhaps be argued that this matter was quite possibly some
sort of obsession for President Nixon.
On December 14, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,

Admiral

Thomas

H.

Moorer,(USN),

(1970-1974),

was

ordered to prepare contingency plans for massive air attacks
to be carried out by the Strategic Air Command in and around

228 Ibid. p.42.
229 Tom Carhart, Battlefront Vietnam. (New York:
1984), p.137.

Warner,
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Hanoi and Haiphong.230
military were lifted.

This time, the restrictions on the
Moorer was told by the President:

"I

don't want any more of this crap about the fact that we
couldn't hit this target or that one.

This is your chance to

use military power to win this war, and if you don't, I'll
hold you responsible!1,231 Hanoi would be forced to return to
the

negotiating table

partially

due

to the

and

to

sign the Accords

devastating

strategic

at

air

least

campaign

conducted by the United States.
Beginning on December 18, B-52s from the 3rd Strategic
Air Division on Guam and other aircraft from the Air Force and
Navy, would fly nearly three thousand sorties for the next
eleven days, except December 25.

Some 40,000 tons of bombs

would be dropped on the most populated areas in North Vietnam
with total North Vietnamese civilian casualties amounting to
between

1300

sources.232
genocidal.

and

1600.

according

to

North

Vietnamese

These controversial bombings have been called
Such a claim is false.

If the United States had

wanted to cause wanton civilian deaths, why were the dikes on
the Red River not targeted?

Even if the North Vietnamese had

intentionally lowered their estimation of the casualties, why
were total casualties only a tinv fraction of those in Dresden
or Tokyo in 1945?

230 Ibid. P. 151.
231 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 125.
t

232 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p. 107.
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Nonetheless, despite the fact that civilian casualties in
Hanoi-Haiphong were probably kept

as

low as possible,

a

devastating anti-war backlash resulted both domestically and
internationally against the Nixon Administration's dramatic
escalation of the war-

Massive anti-war demonstrations took

place not only throughout the United States, but also abroad.
Perhaps most

alarming

for Nixon,

there was

Congress over the "Christmas Bombings."
approached,

revulsion

in

As the New Year

such powerful senators as Mike Mansfield,

the

Majority leader in the Senate, William Fulbright, Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and John C. Stennis,
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called for
strong action by the Congress to limit the President's scope
of action as Commander-in-Chief.233

As made clear from his

memoirs, President Nixon took the threats from Congress very
seriously.

Both the President and ranking members of the

Administration believed that the Paris Peace Accords had to
settled by the end of January, 1973, before the Congress could
act.

In retrospect, as argued by Gareth Porter, Richard Nixon

had clearly miscalculated the degree of anti-war sentiment
that would be generated by the "Christmas Bombings."234
However,

the

"Christmas Bombings"

effect at least to some point:

had their desired

when Kissinger once again met

233 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p.223.
234 Porter, A Peace Denied, p.275.
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with Le Due Tho on January 8, the North Vietnamese were no
longer intransigent.

All proposed changes to the Accords

previously made by Hanoi had been deleted.235 Although it is
true

that

Kissinger

was

unable

to

obtain

any

further

concessions, Le Due Tho made one verbal commitment promising
token troop withdrawals.

Significantly, shortly after the

Accords were

PAVN

signed,

the

308th and

312th divisions

withdrew across the DMZ.236 Quite possibly, Hanoi would have
honoured the Accords, agreed upon by Kissinger and Le Due Tho,
on January 13, 1973, if Washington could have enforced them.

After January 13, 1973, the only serious obstacle left
was Thieu's unwillingness to sign the Accords.

Nixon now

threatened to sign the Accords with or without South Vietnam.
Thieu, realizing that South Vietnam would be in a difficult
position, agreed to sign.
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze the
impact of the three catalysts on the two principal actors in
the Paris Peace Talks, the United States and the DRV.

By

analyzing the importance of the three catalysts for the two
principal

belligerents,

introduction,

that

the two hypotheses raised

only

a

fundamental

change

in the
in

the

negotiating strategy of Hanoi allowed the Paris Peace Talks to
be concluded and that strong anti-war sentiment in the United

235

Ibid. p. 112.

236

Ibid. p. 106.
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States compelled the Nixon Administration to accept the Paris
Peace Accords,

have been

addressed.

The

fact that Hanoi

rejected the American proposals of May 2,

1972,

but then

accepted the same ones on October 8, 1972, clearly indicates
a fundamental shift in the position of the Politburo.
rationalize

the

dramatic

policy

change

by

the

To

senior

leadership in Hanoi, it is necessary to study the changing
circumstances of the war in South-East Asia, both militarily
and politically.

By the end of September,

even the most

ardent supporters of a military solution in the Politburo of
the Lao Dong Party, First Secretary of the Party Le Duan,
Chairman of the Party’s Organization Department Le Due Tho,
and the Minister of Defence Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap had
to recognize that the Nguyen Hue Offensive had failed.

The

’’doves" within the Politburo, senior Party theorist Truong
Chinh

and the

Vietnam(COSVN)

Chairman

of

the

Central

Office

for South

Pham Hung, were able, judging by the extant

evidence available, to prevail upon their "neutral" cohorts,
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong and the
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, to support a negotiated
settlement to the conflict.237

Support for a conclusion of

the Paris Peace Talks was based on a recognition of military

237 This speculation on the internal dynamics of the North
Vietnamese Politburo is largely based on an article by William
E.Colby, "Operation Phoenix" in Vietnam magazine in January of
1994. Mr. Colby was the CIA Station Director in Saigon from 1967
to 1969. From 1973 to 1976, Colby was the Deputy Director of the
CIA under Stansfield Turner.
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reversal, as well as deep concern over domestic problems in
the DRV.
According to the World Bank, in 1966 North Vietnam was
one

of

the

twenty-five

poorest

countries

in

the

Third

World.238 Along with the re-unification of Vietnam, economic
development was one of the two most important objectives of
the regime.
construction"

Between 1954 and 1963, the policy of "socialist
would

produce

some

beneficial

results.

Illiteracy was largely wiped out and basic health care had
been extended to most sectors of the population.

Yet, serious

problems remained to be overcome.
By the early 1960s,
crisis.

agriculture was

in a very deep

The forced collectivization of farmland, after 1955,

had led to serious disturbances in the countryside.

Sources

as diverse as Richard Nixon and Dr. Douglas Pike estimate that
at least fifty thousand landlords and wealthy peasants were
put to death during this period.

Once the collectivisation of

agriculture had taken place, the giant state farms were found
to be extremely inefficient and cumbersome.

As a direct

result, agricultural production declined considerably.
The implementation of a Soviet-style command economy led
to serious problems in the industrial sector as well.

Between

1954 and 1965, the DRV received massive amounts of foreign
assistance.

China contributed approximately $670 million

238 Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the
NVA , p.261.
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during this period, while the Soviet Union contributed roughly
twice this amount.239

Most of this foreign assistance went

towards developing a nascent industrial sector.

With some

exceptions, such as the Thai Nguyen Steel and Rail Works, the
industrial sector was very inefficient and characterized by
bureaucratic

corruption.

As

an

industrial

power.

North

Vietnam ranked behind states such as Uruguay and Lebanon.
If North Vietnam's economy was in a severe crisis in
1965, it was on the verge of collapse in 1972, however.

With

the complete bombing halt announced by President Johnson in
October of 1968, the North Vietnamese had made great progress
in rebuilding

the

devastated

economy

of the

DRV.

Such

accomplishments were all the more impressive because of the
devastating effects of Operation Rolling Thunder between 1965
and 1968.

However, the country's infrastructure had been

utterly shattered by the resumption of the American bombing
campaign— Operation

Linebacker

I— in

April

of

1972.

Continuation of the war could very well lead to an outright
collapse of the economy of North Vietnam.
No

less

relevant,

the

United

States

had

reacted

forcefully in response to North Vietnamese aggression.

The

resumption of the bombing campaign in April had devastated
the transportation and communications infrastructure in North
Vietnam.

Perhaps most ominously,

in December of the same

year, the United States had executed a brilliant strategic air

239 Ibid.
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campaign against Hanoi and Haiphong.

By the end of December,

the intricate anti-aircraft network in the Red River Delta had
been neutralized by the Americans (notwithstanding different
claims

from

objective

writers

analysis,

such

as

Gabriel

Hanoi's military

Kolko240) .

By

any

objectives had been

thwarted by January of 1973.
The "moderates" in the Politburo now began to mobilize
their colleagues to support the conclusion of the Paris Peace
Talks.

Powerful

members

of the

Politburo,

such

as the

Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong, and even
junior

Politburo

members,

such

as

Nguyen

Van

Linh,

now

realized that acceptance of the terms offered by Washington
was

in

Hanoi’s

interests.

There

would

be

no

military

advantage in refusing to conclude the Paris Peace Talks and
the Democratic Republic desperately needed to rebuild its
shattered infrastructure.

Instead, by focusing on "socialist

construction" of the economy, the Democratic Republic would be
in an enhanced position for the

final showdown with the

Republic of Vietnam.
Yet,

the" moderates"

within the Politburo may have

failed to build the needed consensus if it had not been for
support from senior officers of the PAVN.

Clearly, serious

organizational, command and control and logistical problems
had plagued the North Vietnamese offensive in the South.
Further time was needed for the PAVN to tranform itself into

240 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.426.
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a mechanized juggernaut on the model of the armies of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Senior General Giap was revered

by junior officers as a revolutionary hero and the victor of
Dien Bien Phu, but by 1972, he was perhaps considered an
anachronism.

The dramatic decline in Giap's influence in both

the military and Party after the summer of 1972, along with
his poor health, probably isolated the remaining "hawks" in
the Politburo.
A new generation of military men now emerged after the
disastrous outcome of the Nguyen Hue Offensive.

Giap was

eclipsed in the Politburo by another military man, Senior
General Van Tien Dung, PAVN Chief of Staff.241

Although Dung

himself was an "old revolutionary"— he had commanded the 340th
Viet

Minh

Division

at

Dien

Bien

Phu,

he

shared

the

professional aspirations of younger men, such as Lieutenant
Generals Huang Cam , Le Due Anh, and Dong Sy Nguyen.

For

these generals, the re-unification of Vietnam would not be
achieved by a reliance on Maoist guerrilla
doctrine,

but rather,

the principles of Soviet mechanized

warfare.242 Thus, for the senior leadership of the PAVN, the
influence

of the Chinese

"Yanan School"

of revolutionary

warfare would be eclipsed by the Soviet "Frunze School" of
mechanized warfare, as demonstrated by the brilliantly planned

241 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace ,p.42
242 Ian Beckett, The March of Communism-1917 to 1984. p. 134.
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and executed offensives of

1975 and

Vietnam and Kampuchea, respectively.

1978,

against South

The most important thing

required by the PAVN at this period was time.

Only with time

could the military recover from its losses in 1972 and prepare
the Soviet-style mechanized force that would reunify the
nation.
By January of 1973, a consensus had been forged within
both the powerful Politburo and the senior leadership of the
PAVN.

North Vietnam had suffered a very serious military

setback, a fact that could not be ignored.

The country now

had to focus on rebuilding the economy and re-organizing the
army for the imminent confrontation with South Vietnam.

The

remaining •'hawks," notably First Secretary Le Duan, could no
longer resist the will of their colleagues in the Politburo.
Domestic concerns were clearly a consideration in Hanoi's
decision to accept the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973.
Yet, the influence of the second catalyst identified in the
introduction also affected the decision-making in the Nixon
Administration.

In the memoirs of all of the senior officials

of the Nixon Presidency, notably the President himself and his
National Security Advisor, the importance of concluding the
Paris Peace Talks in the first term of the Administration was
recognized.

Dr. Melvin Small has concluded that ultimately

President Nixon was able to neutralize the influence of the
anti-war movement by his "Silent Majority" strategy, which
involved a direct appeal by the President to the American
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people over the heads of academics and journalists, along with
his successful diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union.

In

addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), headed by
its

controversial

Director,

J.Edgar

Hoover(1924-1972),

conducted a vigorous campaign against the principal anti-war
organizations, along with prominent anti-war activists who
ranged from Stokely Carmichael to John Lennon. Yet, twenty-two
years after Mr. Hoover's death, the effectiveness of the FBI's
campaign

to

neutralize

the

anti— war

movement

nebulous.

However, Nixon was only too well aware that support

for his policies in Indochina was at best tenuous.

remains

Small has

noted:
The Silent Majority speech and the offensives
against the movement on several fronts did not
give him a free hand, although they did buy him "a
lot of time and a lot of room." The population had
rallied around his perceived moderate policies. Most
Americans, even congressional and media leaders,
accepted Vietnamization, the continuation of peace
talks, and especially the staged withdrawals of
American troops...Nonetheless, both he and the North
Vietnamese knew that the moderate policy supported by
most citizens would lead ultimately to a total
American withdrawal...243
Thus, President Nixon did not have a free hand to escalate the
war as he saw fit as demonstrated by the massive protests that
erupted in response to the

"Christmas Bombings"

of 1972.

Nixon had clearly miscalculated his support in the country
when he ordered the controversial bombings to be executed.
The anti-war protests that resulted from Operation Linebacker

243 Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves ,p.l91
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II weakened Nixon's political support, particularly in the
Congress,

and intensified the Administration's need for a

settlement.
The

role

of

intervention/the

the

final

international

catalyst,
balance

third

of

previously addressed in the preceding chapter.

party

power,

was

A determining

factor in the Politburo's decision to fundamentally alter its
negotiating

position

in

October

of

1972

was

Nixon's

"triangular diplomacy." Hanoi had become isolated from its two
principal allies.

Continued Chinese and Soviet support for

the war in Vietnam could no longer be assured.

This fact was

obvious from the dramatic summits that President Nixon held
with

Mao

and

Brezhnev

in

February

and

May

of

1972,

respectively, and the failure of either China or the Soviet
Union to offer to clear Haiphong after May 8, 1972.

The

senior leadership of both the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN
certainly concluded that it was in the DRV's interests to
conclude the Paris Peace Talks because of the Chinese and
Soviet desire to see the war in South-East Asia come to an
end.
Along with addressing the two hypotheses raised in the
introduction, this chapter has examined the four inter-related
questions also posed in the introduction.

By reference to the

three

are

catalysts,

addressed.

An

the

four

in-depth

questions

anaysis

of

the

substantially
hypotheses

and

questions raised in the first chapter will be presented in the
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conclusion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156.

PART V: NOW THE BATTLE IS OVER
CHAPTER VIII:

CONCLUSIONS

The analytical framework introduced in the first chapter
provides a basic analytical tool with which to examine the
dynamics of the Paris Peace Talks, and to a lesser extent, the
Second

Vietnam War

itself.

By

reference

to

the

three

catalysts, the first hypothesis raised in the introduction,
that only a substantial shift in the negotiating position of
the Politburo in Hanoi allowed the Paris Peace Talks to be
concluded, is effectively addressed.

All the evidence clearly

indicates that this hypothesis is valid.

On May 2, 1972, the

"Special Advisor" to the North Vietnamese Paris Peace Talks
delegation, Le Due Tho, rejected the peace propsal put forward
by the American National Security Advisor.
months

later,

Le

Due Tho

accepted the

Yet, barely five
same

offer.

To

understand the factors that led the North Vietnamese Politburo
to radically alter its negotiating strategy in October of
1972, by accepting an American peace proposal, which it can be
argued

it

could

have

obtained

in

1969

with

vigourous

diplomacy, it is necessary to refer to the catalysts.
The single greatest change that had occurred by October
of 1972 was that the DRV had suffered a serious military
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reversal.

Ever since the beginning of the Paris Peace Talks

in November of 1968, neither the senior leadership of the Lao
Dong Party nor the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) doubted
that eventually North Vietnam would defeat South Vietnam.

The

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was considered a "puppet
army"

not

only

commentators.

by

Hanoi,

but

also

by

many

Western

After November of 1968, North Vietnam was

biding its time.

The strong anti-war sentiment in the United

States guaranteed that the winner of the 1968 Presidential
election would be forced to continue President Johnson's
policy of deescalation.

Thus, as American troop withdrawals

picked up momentum, Hanoi recognized that it would only be a
matter of time before the ARVN faced the PAVN without American
ground troops in Vietnam.

In addition, as Hanoi waited for

American troop withdrawals to pick up pace, it was also given
valuable time in which to replenish the ranks of the PAVN that
had been diminished through the heavy casualties sustained
during Tet-1968.
Therefore, the first two "historical snapshots" which
were isolated - the Tet Offensive of 1968 and the decision of
the Johnson Administration to begin deescalation of the war in
March of 1968, are critical to understanding the dynamics of
the Paris Peace Talks which followed.

The ability of the

North Vietnamese to launch a country-wide offensive clearly
indicated to the American people that the conflict in Vietnam
could continue indefinitely. Public support for the war, which
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was in decline prior to Tet of 1968, now collapsed.

The

dramatic announcement made by President Johnson on March 31,
1968 was a direct result of the Tet Offensive.

In turn, the

President's national television address was the genesis of the
Paris Peace Talks.

However, the results of the Tet Offensive

also influenced the North Vietnamese Politburo’s decision to
enter into the Paris Peace Talks.

Both the PAVN and the VC

had suffered crippling casualties and time was desperately
needed to make good these losses.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese decision to enter into
the Paris Peace Talks was motivated by the tactical military
reversal

suffered during Tet and the need

Rolling Thunder to be brought to an end.

for Operation

Yet, by entering

into the Paris Peace Talks, the Politburo in Hanoi never gave
up its

ultimate goals-the reunification of Vietnam and the

establishment

of

Vietnamese

hegemony

over

Indochina.

Ultimately, the ARVN would have to face the PAVN alone.

The

shaky performance of the ARVN during Lam Son 719 in FebruaryMarch of 1971 only strengthened the impression in Hanoi that
the South Vietnamese military was "a puppet."
The second catalyst identified in the introduction, the
threat of domestic instability, was also a factor for both
Washington and Hanoi in the eventual conclusion of the Paris
Peace Accords in 1973.

Most of the literature focuses on the

role of the anti-war movement in the United States.

Although

the strong anti-war sentiment was a leading factor in the
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decision of President Johnson to begin deescalation of the
conflict in March of 1968 and President Nixon's determination
to extricate the United States from the conflict in South-East
Asia, its importance must not be overestimated.

As noted by

Small, the anti-war movement lost momentum and influence after
the spring of 1970.244

Thus, President Nixon’s three-tiered

policy for dealing with the anti-war movement- the "Silent
Majority"

Strategy,

Great

Power diplomacy,

and

increased

activity by the FBI against prominent anti-war leaders- was
ultimately effective in giving the Administration both the
time and the manoeuver room needed to execute its policy in
Indochina.
Yet, in no sense did Nixon's "neutralization" of the
anti-war

movement

after

June

of

1970

mean

Administation had "carte blanche" in its policy.

that

the

The strong

anti-war sentiment and general war-weariness in the United
States acted as a powerful restriction on the Administration's
Indochina policy, particularly the ability to escalate the
conflict by the use of American ground troops after the
Cambodian operation.

Although President Nixon may have felt

utter contempt towards the anti-war movement, he could not
ignore

its influence

in the media and the Congress.

A

consummate politician, Richard Nixon realized that his support
in the country was dependent upon deescalation as symbolized
by the troop withdrawals and Vietnamization.

The war had to

244 Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon.and the Doves, p. 193.
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be brought to an end and, ultimately, it may be argued, this
consideration became paramount for the Nixon Administation.
Thus, there is also substantial evidence to support the second
hypothesis raised in the introduction.
Most of the literature on the Second Vietnam War fails to
address the importance of the second catalyst for Hanoi,
however.

Although the importance of the second catalyst would

obviously be greater on Washington than Hanoi, the Democratic
Republic was not immune from domestic concerns.

Even in the

left-of-centre accounts which tend to be more sympathetic to
Hanoi and which might be expected co be more informed about
its domestic situation, such as Gabriel Kolko's Anatomy of a
War and Gareth Porter's A Peace Denied, there was found to be
a common recurring
monolith.

fallacy:

the

DRV was

portrayed

as

a

Even in Gabriel Kolko's very well researched work,

terms such as the "party11 and the "revolution" are found
throughout the

text.

Thus,

the Politburo

in Hanoi

was

inferred to be a united monolithic decision -making body with
a single over-riding objective :the reunification of Vietnam.
Yet, this analysis is far too simplistic. In order to
address the first, second and fourth questions raised in the
introduction- What were the factors that led the respective
parties to enter into the Paris Peace Talks in 1968, and
subsequently, to conclude the Paris Peace Accords in 1973?,
Why did the Paris Peace Talks drag on for so long ?, and, Why
did Hanoi accept a peace settlement that was not entirely in
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its interests?, it is necessary to understand the nature of
the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party.

In almost all of the

literature on Communist states, there was a consensus that the
ruling parties were seriously divided over priorities.

The

same was true for the Lao Dong Party during the Second Vietnam
War.

The North Vietnamese Communist Party had two critical

goals that were vital to maintaining its legitimacy, both
domestically and internationally: "socialist construction" of
the

DRV,

Although

and

of

these

complimentary

to

course,

two
one

the

reunification

priorities
another,

were

in

critical

of

Vietnam.

many

respects

divisions

emerged

within the North Vietnamese Central Committee over which one
should

take

objective.

priority

and

the

best

As a direct result,

way

to

achieve

at least three

each

factions

emerged within the Politburo.
The first faction, referred to as the "hawks" by the
Central

Intelligence

Agency (CIA)245,

was

most

closely

identified with the First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, Le
Duan.

This faction also included the Chairman of the Party's

Organization Department,

Le Due Tho,

the Chairman of the

Central Office for South Vietnam(COSVN) , Senior General Nguyen
Chi Thanh up to his mysterious death in July of 1967, and his
successor, Pham Hung.

The second faction identified by the

CIA was most closely associated with the senior theorist of
the Lao Dong Party, Truong Chinh.

This faction-the "doves

245 Lipsman and Doyle, The North. p.3o.
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argued that South Vietnam could not possibly be liberated
until the DRV had built up a strong economy.
extant

evidence

available,

the

balance

Yet, from the

in

the

Committee was determined by a third faction-the

Central

"neutrals."

This faction was most closely identified with the Chairman of
the Democratic Republic, Ho Chi Minh.
September

3,

1969,

this

After Ho's death on

faction became dominated by the

Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong.

The

"neutrals," which also included the Foreign Minister of the
DRV, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and possibly the Chief of Staff of the
PAVN, Senior General Van Tien Dung, tended to be far more
pragmatic than the two other more dogmatic factions.

For

these powerful members of the Politburo, the priorities of the
DRV had to be dictated by circumstances, not iron-clad dogma.
The

single

greatest

determinant

for

the

"neutrals"

regarding the ultimate objective of reunification was the
situation on the battlefield.

As long as victory still

appeared possible in the immediate future, men such as Pham
Van Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh accepted the aggressive policy
of the "hawks."

Yet, when the battlefield situation turned

against the DRV, the "neutrals" supported the more moderate
policy of the "doves." In both March of 1968 and September of
1972, the "neutrals" recognized that the DRV had suffered a
critical military reversal and were willing to support the
beginning of the Paris Peace Talks and the conclusion of the
Paris Peace Accords, respectively.
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The third catalyst introduced in the first chapter, the
role of third parties/the international balance of power, is
also crucial in understanding the dynamics of the Paris Peace
Talks.

As was discussed in the third chapter, the threat of

either Chinese or Soviet military intervention was a decisive
influence on the Johnson Administration's decision to begin
deescalation of the war in March of 1968.
parties

would

also

play

a

critical

The role of third

role

in

the

North

Vietnamese Politburo's decision to accept the Paris Peace
Accords.
By 1972, the dramatic transition in the international
balance of power, which had been underway since at least 1959,
was obvious to the general public.

The two dramatic summits

held by President Nixon with Mao and Brezhnev in February and
May of 1972 respectively clearly evinced the shift in the
international balance of power.

Super power detente and Sino-

American rapprochement would act as a powerful impetus for the
Politburo in Hanoi to risk the great military gamble of the
Nguyen Hue Offensive and once it failed, to conclude the Paris
Peace Accords.
The members of the North Vietnamese Politburo recognized
that there were fundamental differences between Moscow and
Beijing.
willingness

China's
to

and

the

Soviet

Union's

assist

the

Vietnamese

ability

Revolution

and
were

ultimately determined by the relative balance of ideological
commitments and national interests.

Senior leaders of both
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the

Lao

Dong

Party

and

the

PAVN

realized

that

improved

relations with the United States was a priority for both
Moscow and Beijing.

Ultimately, the benefits that both Moscow

and Beijing could hope to gain from a new relationship with
the United States

would greatly outweigh the advantages that

could be gained by supporting the DRV in South-East Asia.

The

senior leaders of the DRV were only too well aware that China
and the Soviet Union would not risk the new relationship with
Washington in favour of the Vietnamese Revolution.
Yet, in the best accounts of the "triangular diplomacy,"
the memoirs of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, there is an
inference that Moscow and Beijing "abandoned " the DRV in
1972.

Although both of the Communist giants wanted the

conflict in South-East Asia brought to an end regardless of
the views of Hanoi, the senior leaders of the Lao Dong Party
were able to successfully manipulate the fundamental dichotomy
in Communist foreign policy to their advantage.

National

interests dictated that China and the Soviet Union wanted to
improve relations with the United States and to facilitate an
end

to

the

conflict

in

Vietnam.

However,

ideological

commitments dictated that China and the Soviet Union had to
support the Vietnamese Revolution.
Both China and the Soviet Union claimed to be the true
leader of international socialism.

Thus, both countries were

required to support "wars of national liberation" against
imperialism.

Under the astute leadership of senior theorist
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Truong Chinh, the Lao Dong Party had argued that it was the "
world revolution’s front line.”246 As noted by Gabriel Kolko,
Vietnam had become the symbol of the world socialist movement
by 1972, having defeated first French imperialism in 1954 and
then having fought American imperialism to a stand-still.247
Thus, the DRV could claim special legitimacy in the world
socialist movement.

This was a political fact that could not

be ignored by the senior leadership in either Moscow or
Beijing.

Because of the ideological premises of both the

revolutions of 1917 and 1949, neither of the Communist giants
could be seen to be ’’abandoning" the DRV.

The leadership of

the Lao Dong Party recognized this reality and thus, even as
Moscow and Beijing applied diplomatic pressure on Hanoi to
settle the Paris Peace Talks,

the DRV was able to obtain

commitments of massive amounts of Soviet and Chinese military
and economic aid.

After reading the memoirs of President

Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, especially their analyses of why the
Paris Peace Accords failed, one it is left with the impression
that

neither

brilliant

statesman

fully

understood

the

relevance of Chinese and Soviet ideological commitments to the
DRV.
The analytical framework introduced in the first chapter
provides a basic reference to understand the dynamics of the
Paris Peace Talks.

For almost fifty-one months, the delegates

246 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.407.
247 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from the United States,
National

Liberation

negotiations.

South Vietnam,

Front,

engaged

the DRV,
in

and the

often

futile

The primary obstacle to a resolution of the

Paris Peace Talks was the intransigient negotiating strategy
of Hanoi.
the

As long as the leadership in Hanoi believed that

conflict

could

be

settled

militarily,

it

unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement.
position was logical.

would
Yet,

be

this

As long as the Nixon Administration

continued to gradually withdraw troops, Hanoi realized that it
was only a matter of time until the PAVN faced the ARVN alone.
Hanoi's assessment was further buttressed by doubts about the
effectiveness of Vietnamization and the ability of President
Nixon

to

drastically

reescalate

the

conflict

because

of

domestic anti-war sentiment.

Only when Hanoi's Nguyen Hus

Offensive had been decisively

defeated by American airpower

and steadfast resistance from the ARVN would the Politburo of
the Lao Dong Party decide upon a fundamental shift in the
negotiating position of the DRV.
The Paris Peace Accords were concluded more than twentyone years ago.
Peace

Talks

Yet, the successful resolution of the Paris
remains

one

of

the

greatest

diplomatic

achievements for any American president since the end of the
Korean War.

When Richard Nixon entered the White House in

January of 1969, his administration faced the most complicated
foreign policy disaster for the United States in this century.
The

ability

of

the

Nixon Administration to

successfully
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conclude a "peace with honour," which not only extricated the
United States from Vietnam but also provided South Vietnam
with at least a chance for survival,
greatest

foreign

presidency.

policy

ranks as one of the

achievements

of

Mr.

Nixon's

The fact that the Paris Peace Accords collapsed

and South Vietnam eventually fell to the Communists in no way
discredits the diplomatic success of the Nixon Administration.
The Paris Peace Accords failed because of two interconnected
developments that few could have foreseen in January of 1973:
Watergate and a violently anti-war Congress.

The question of

whether South Vietnam could have survived if it had not been
for the above two developments will never be known.
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PART VX: EPILOGUE
CHAPTER IX: FAILURE OF THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

On April 30, 1975, Saigon fell to the People's Army of
Vietnam's(PAVN) Ho Chi Minh Offensive; the next day, the last
President of the Republic of Vietnam, Duong Van Minh, ordered
the armed forces of the republic to cease all resistance.

The

fall of Saigon was symbolic in many respects of the brief
history of the Paris Peace Accords.

There was great optimism

when the Accords were signed on January 27, 1973.

However,

both the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese refused to
abide

by

the

Accords

from

the

start.

South

Vietnam's

strategic position would gradually deteriorate after January
of

1973.

reference

The purposes
to

the

introduction to
the

collapse

of

three

of this

chapter are,

catalysts

first,

identified

in

by
the

briefly analyze the underlying reasons for
South

Vietnam,

and

conclusions on the Paris Peace Talks

second,

to

provide

in relation to the

analytical framework presented in chapter one.

A Brief Analysis of the Failure of the Paris Peace Accords
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To understand why the Paris Peace Accords failed, it is
first necessary to provide an outline of the Accords and the
vital mechanisms established to enforce them.

The Paris Peace

Accords, or Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Vietnam248, were composed of twenty-three articles, divided
into nine chapters, as follows:
Article 1
It recognized the "independence, sovereignty, unity, and
territorial integrity" of Vietnam as defined by the Geneva
Accords.249
Articles 2 to 7
They involved the cease-fire and American withdrawal.
Importantly, North Vietnamese infiltration was supposed to
come to a halt.
Article 8
It involved the return of all American Prisoners of
War(POWs).
Articles 9 to 14
The political settlement yet to be reached by Hanoi and
Saigon.
Article 15
Respect for the Demilitarized Zone(DM2).
Articles 16 to 19
In many respects the most important part of the Accords,

248 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p. 106.
249

Ibid. p. 112.
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it established mechanisms to enforce the agreement.

The

International Commission for Control and Supervision(ICCS),
consisting of delegates from Poland, Hungary,

Canada,

and

Indonesia, along with the Joint Military Commission, composed
of delegates from the ARVN, the PAVN, and the Viet Cong, was
designed to enforce the Accords when the parties involved had
disputes.250
Article 20
Reiterated the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords with respect
to Laos and Cambodia.
Articles 21 and 22
The former called on the United States to provide aid in
"healing the wounds of war" by contributing to "post-war
construction of North Vietnam and throughout Indochina." With
this aid serving as a foundation, Article 22 urged the United
States and DRV to establish "a new,

equal,

and mutually

beneficial relationship."251
Therefore, the Paris Peace Accords were far from perfect.

i:

The PAVN remained on the sovereign territory of South Vietnam
and there were still r.io cease-fires in Cambodia and Laos.
V

Yet, the prospects for South Vietnam were far from bleak in
January of 1973.

In a recently declassified memo sent to

President Nixon in 1973, the last American Ambassador to

250 Edward Doyle, Fall of the South. (Boston:
and Co., 1985), p.47.
251

Little, Brown

Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 165.
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Saigon, Graham Martin, declared:

"...we have every right to

confidently expect that the GVN can hold without the necessity
of U.S. armed intervention.1,252
Graham Martin's optimism was well founded.

In January of

1973, the military balance favoured South Vietnam, at least on
paper.

The

ARVN

had

a

field

strength

organized into thirteen divisions.

of

450,000 men,

The Enhance and Enhance

Plus programmes had re-armed South Vietnam: 550 M-48 medium
tanks and M-41 light tanks, 1,200 M-113

armoured personnel

carriers and 1,330 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers.

In addition,

Regional Forces and Popular Forces had a total strength of
525,000 men.

The PAVN's combat strength in South Vietnam had

been reduced to about 148,000 troops organized into thirteen
understrength divisions and 26 independent regiments.

Perhaps

most importantly, the South Vietnamese, on paper, enjoyed air
superiorityAmbassador Martin’s positive assessment was buttressed by
the performance of the ARVN during the PAVN *s Nguyen Hue
Offensive.

The ARVN had stood up to the strongest PAVN

offensive to date in an excellent manner.

Morale in the army

was very high,253 and the senior generals of the ARVN had
proven their competence in combat.

In addition, President

Nixon had given his word that if Hanoi violated the Accords,

252 Ibid. p. 193.
253

Ibid. p. 187.
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the United States would react.254 Nixon had kept his word in
July of 1973 when the North Vietnamese attacked Hon Ngu (in
the Mekong Delta) by authorizing repeated B-52 strikes.
Throughout
promising.

1973,

South

Vietnam's

position

looked

The ARVN was on the offensive and the PAVN was in

a difficult position.

The number of combat personnel in the

PAVN

percent

had

fallen

25

by

the

summer

of

1973.255

Attempts to rebuild the Viet Cong infrastructure were very
unsuccessful.256 Senior General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff
of the PAVN,

would declare in October of 1973 that North

Vietnam faced a "critical situation. 1,257

Military reverses

in the South, such as the destruction of the 1st PAVN Division
in the Battle of the Seven Mountains, were exacerbated by a
very weak economy and critical divisions in the Politburo.
the summer

In

of 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were holding,

however imperfectly,

and the

chances

for South Vietnam's

survival appeared to be good.
However, within 16 months, South Vietnam would no longer
exist as a sovereign state.

The PAVN's Ho Chi Minh Offensive

would conquer South Vietnam in a mere two months in the spring
of 1975.

Military Regions 1 and 2 would fall almost without

a fight!

In many respects, the fall of South Vietnam in 1975

254 Palmer,

The 25 Year War, p. 202.

255 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p. 109.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
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was similar to the fall of France in 1940.
How could the Paris Peace Accords and thus South Vietnam,
have collapsed completely within such a short period of time,
especially when things were looking so promising in 1973?
There are several

factors:

American domestic politics,

a

massive PAVN build-up, and disastrous strategic and tactical
blunders by the South Vietnamese High Command.

The remainder

of this section will explore the roles of military blunders by
the

South

Vietnamese

and

American

domestic

politics

in

contributing to the final collapse of South Vietnam in 1975.
Thus, the final collapse of South Vietnam will be analyzed by
reference

to

the

three

catalysts

introduced

in

the

introduction.
(a)

The Balance of Forces in South Vietnam- 1973 to 1975
An objective military analysis clearly indicates that

primary factors in South Vietnam’s collapse were a massive
PAVN build-up in late 1973-1974 and a series of disastrous
strategic and tactical errors by South Vietnamese generals.
Thus, an argument can be put forward that the fall of South
Vietnam was not a foregone conclusion even after the reduction
of American aid.

Instead, a strategy of duplicity on the part

of President Thieu and his senior generals would destroy South
Vietnam in 1975.
Immediately after the Accords were signed on January 27,
1973, the North Vietnamese engaged in a huge build-up that
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would climax in the spring of 1974.258

By January of 1974,

between 75,000 and 80,000 troops had been infiltrated into
South Vietnam.259

Yet, this development was not critical:

the infiltrations only brought PAVN strength up to its 1972
level. More ominous were the dramatic improvements in North
Vietnamese logistics and anti-aircraft defenses in occupied
South Vietnam.

Equally important, Senior General Dung had re

established a general strategic reserve in the North of seven
divisions.260

By early 1974, Dung had finished re-equipping

and refurbishing his forces in the South.

However, as noted

earlier, he remained pessimistic.
General

Dung's pessimism would be alleviated by the

stupidity of the South Vietnamese High Command.

Thieu faced

two serious strategic problems: the complete absence of a
strategic

reserve

communication.

and

overextended

lines-of-

The North Vietnamese enjoyed the strategic

initiative as a result.
isolated

seriously

locations

and

The PAVN
enjoy

massive

especially in the Central Highlands.
one option: truncation.

forces

could mass

local

at

superiority,

Thieu really had only

South Vietnamese forces should have

been withdrawn from Quang Tri province and the interior of the
Central Highlands so that a strategic reserve could have been
re-established.

258

Such a move, advocated by high-ranking South

Ibid. p. 117.

259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
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Vietnamese generals,261 would have caused political problems
but there was no option.

Thus, the first catalyst introduced

in chapter one was clearly in favour of Hanoi by December of
197*.
(b)

Collapse of American Support
Critics of the South Vietnamese regime alleged that its

collapse in 1975 was proof that it was completely dependent on
American support to survive.
American
collapse.

aid

was

a

critical

Obviously, the reduction of
factor

in

South

Vietnam's

However, the reduction of American aid compounded

South Vietnam's strategic problems that were exacerbated by a
series of disastrous blunders in 1975.

No one factor can be

studied in isolation from the others.
Richard Nixon clearly blames Congress for South Vietnam's
fall:
When the Paris Peace Accords were signed
in January 1973, a balance of power
existed in Indochina. South Vietnam was
secured within the cease-fire lines...But
United States power was the linchpin
holding
the
peace
agreement
together...and without adequate American
military and economic assistance, South
Vietnam would lack the power to turn back
yet another such invasion.
Congress
proceeded to snatch defeat from the jaws
of victory.262
Nixon's assessment is essentially correct, but he should not
underestimate the devastating effect of Watergate.

261

Ibid.

262 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 167.
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At the

most critical hour, the American Presidency was emasculated!
In August of 1973, Congress cut-off all funds for military
operations in Indochina.

Nixon's control over the military

was reduced by the War Powers Act of October, 1973.

Thus, the

United States was "shooting itself in the foot" at the same
time that Senior General General Dung was apprehensive about
the future.
The

most

damaging

blow

inflicted

by

Congress

reduction of economic assistance to South Vietnam.

was

For Fiscal

Year 1975, Congress only authorized a budget ceiling of $700
million when the Administration was seeking no less than
$1,126 billion.263 These serious budget restrictions would
force President Thieu to drastically reduce supplies for the
military.

Stocks of ammunition totalling 177,000 tons in

January of 1973 had fallen to 121,000 tons in May of 1974.

By

April of 1975, South Vietnam only had adequate ammunition for
the M-102 howitzer for fifty-two days of light fighting.264
Over half of the air force was grounded due to a lack of fuel
and spare parts; only 55 percent of all motor vehicles were
still on the road by April of 1975.

The ARVN had lost its

firepower and mobility.
At the same time that South Vietnam was being starved of
aid, North Vietnam was the recipient of Chinese and Soviet
largesse.

In 1973, Hanoi imported 2.8 million metric tons,

263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
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while

in

1974

Interestingly,

it
the

imported

3.5

million

Communist

giants

metric

lost

any

tons.265

desire

to

restrain North Vietnam, as in 1972, only after the United
States lost the will to do so.

A devastating psychological

blow fell on Saigon on August 8, 1974: Richard Nixon resigned
from the Oval Office under threat of impeachment.
was now ready to enter the final act.

The tragedy

Thus, the role of

domestic politics in the United States and of third parties
would play a critical part in South Vietnam's fall.
South Vietnam was in a serious position by early 1975.
Yet, its final collapse was in no way assured.
critical blunders would lead to final defeat.

A series of
The beginning

of the end for South Vietnam began in December of 1974 when
the Ninth Plenary of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong
Party convened in Hanoi.

The Chairman of the Central Office

for South Vietnam, Pham Hung, had been convinced by his senior
military

commander,

propose to the

Lieutenant-General

Politburo

the execution

Tran

Van

Tra,

to

of a large-scale

offensive against ARVN positions in the province of Phuoc
Long.266
In retrospect, it is now clear that Pham Hung was risking
his considerable prestige in backing Lieutenant-General Tra's
bold plan.

From the extant evidence available , Tra appears

to have been considered a maverick by the senior leadership of

265

Ibid.

266 Lipsman and Doyle, The Fall of the South, p.31
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the PAVN, and to a lesser extent, the Lao Dong Party.
been the

He had

ranking officer in COSVN since the death of Senior

General Nguyen Chi Thanh in July of 1967.

In this role, he

had been responsible for the massive assaults on Saigon in
1968 and 1972, which had failed disastrously with very heavy
casualties.

The fact that Tra was not in favour with the

senior leadership in Hanoi seems to be

indicated by his

failure to be elevated to the powerful Politburo.

Thus, when

Pham Hung championed a plan put forward by Tra, his colleagues
in the Politburo were undoubtedly sceptical.
Yet, the offensive devised by Tra was very bold and its
potential ramifications went far beyond Phuoc Long province.
As already discussed, the ARVN was stretched to the breaking
point by late 1974-early 1975.

Tra considered a large-scale

offensive in Phuoc Long province to be a critical test of two
factors:

the ability of the ARVN Joint General

Staff to

reinforce isolated regions of South Vietnam, and second, the
reaction of the United States to clear cut North Vietnamese
aggression.
In the first week of January, 1975, Pham Hung finally won
approval for the offensive in Phuoc Long province.

However,

the offensive was only to be executed with available forces
from the COSVN reserve.

Also, the Politburo issued a dire

warning that the attack ’'had to succeed at all costs.”267
This

ominous,

rather bizarre

declaration

infers

critical

267 Ibid.
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divisions within

the Politburo.

Quite possibly,

if the

offensive was a failure, the Politburo would have demoted Pham
Hung and Tran Van Tra.

Nonetheless, Lieutenant-General Tra

realized that a"do-or-dien situation was now at hand.

His

deputy, Lieutenant-General Tran Do, would be responsible for
executing the attack with three divisions, the 5th and 9th VC
and the 7th PAVN.
On January 6, the capital of Phuoc Long province, Phuoc
Binh,

garrisoned

battalions,

was

by

only

struck by

Communist assault.

a

handful

of

Regional

Force

a devastating multi-divisional

If the capital was to be recaptured,

substantial reinforcements would have to be committed by the
Joint General Staff in Saigon.

The decision on whether or not

to reinforce Phuoc Long province was the responsibility of the
ARVN Military Region 3 commander,
Nguyen Khang.268

Lieutenant-General

Le

After studying his situation maps and the

ARVN's order-of-forces in Military Region 3, Khang realized
that the situation was hopeless.

Lieutenant-General Khang1s

primary responsibility was the defence of Saigon.
forces were to be committed to the battle
province,
perimeter.

If valuable

in Phuoc Long

they would have to come from Saigon^ defensive
The depleting of the forces defending Saigon was

a decision that neither Khang nor his superiors was willing to
take.
The fall of Phuoc Long and its capital, Phuoc Binh, had

268 Ibid.
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ramifications that were out of all proportion to the tactical
victory itself.

Since January, 1973, President Thieu of South

Vietnam had declared that he would
territory to the Communists.

never cede

sovereign

The fall of Phuoc Long, the

first province of South Vietnam to ever be captured by the
Communists, clearly revealed that Thieu's policy was bankrupt.
The South Vietnamese military was stretched as taut as a
violin wire.

Both the Politburo and the senior leadership of

the PAVN now became convinced that one decisive blow would
lead to the collapse of the Saigon regime.

This strategic

analysis was buttressed by the reaction of the United States
to the PAVN offensive in Phuoc Long province.
the

Ford

Administration(1974-1977)

to

Vietnamese aggression was timid at best.

The reaction of

clear

cut

North

In stark contrast to

the decisiviness of the Nixon Administration, the only action
taken

by

President

Gerald

Ford was

to

lodge

diplomatic

protests with the ICCS, along with Moscow and Beijing.

The

weak nature of the American response could not have been lost
on Hanoi.
divert

Perhaps most surprising, Washington did not even

a

carrier

battle

group,

centred

around

the

USS

Enterprise(CVN-65), which had recently left Subic Bay Naval
Base in the Philippines, to the region.

Obviously, the senior

leadership in Hanoi must have concluded that a " window of
opportunity" now presented itself.

In mid-January, Senior

General Dung was given authorization by the Politburo to
)

execute

a corps-sized

offensive against

South Vietnamese
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Military Region 2.

The events that followed in March and

April would utterly surprise even the most optimistic members
of

the

Politburo

in

Hanoi,

not

to

mention

the

Ford

Administration in Washington.
In March of 1975, the ARVN Military Region II commander,
Major-General Pham Van Phu would make a series of errors,
resulting in a decisive tactical defeat at Ban Me Thuot in the
Central Highlands.269

The North Vietnamese were now in an

excellent position to cut South Vietnam in half.

A strategic

crisis soon became a full scale disaster when Thieu decided to
abandon Military Regions 1 and 2.
had turned into a complete rout.

By late March, the retreat
By the middle of April, the

PAVN had massed its forces for the final offensive against
Saigon itself.

On May 1, South Vietnam surrendered.

What is the importance of the Paris Peace Accords?

There

is no longer an independent South Vietnam? American foreign
policy clearly failed in Itidochina.

Yet, these judgments fail

to understand the depth of the Paris Peace Accords.
The Paris Peace Accords were, as discussed, flawed.

Yet

if the United States had been able to enforce the provisions
of the agreement and if the South Vietnamese had not made a
series of critical blunders, there is a chance that South
Vietnam could have survived.

Nixon and Kissinger deserve the

utmost credit for successfully concluding the Accords.

In

1969, the war in Vietnam was raging out of control because of

269 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 179.
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the errors of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Nixon's ability

to "end" the war in an honourable manner and give South
Vietnam at least a chance of survival was the most that could
have been hoped for by any observer.

\.v
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